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1Capital Moves
Interview with Brian Massumi 
by Krystian Woznicki 
Krystian Woznicki: Somehow our world works best when 
everything (people, data, goods, money, etc.) remains in motion. 
What is this contemporary co-motion all about? In which 
particular sense is the social, economic and political framework 
for such a world conditioned by the global expansion of 
neoliberal capitalism?
Brian Massumi: The world has always been in movement. The 
study of human prehistory is currently being rewritten in light 
of new realizations about the rapidity of the movements that 
brought our ancestors out of Africa and across Europe and 
Asia, and about the complexity of the migrations, which, it is 
now realized, included movements of return among all three 
continents. There is movement everywhere, from as far back 
as we can see, and nowhere is it linear. There is a restlessness 
in human history that constantly tangles the lines, so much 
so as to call into the question the integrity of the species. 
Interbreeding between modern humans and other human 
species, Neanderthals, Denisovans, and at least one other whose 
existence is at only hinted at, has contributed to our genome, 
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and that contribution is now being tied to specific physiological 
and phenotypic characteristics of human populations.
This may seem a bit off-topic, but it brings up some crucial 
points. The first is that there is a principle of unrest that 
traverses human history. It does so in so entangling a way that 
it calls into question notions of species integrity, let alone racial 
purity, and fundamentally challenges the concept of identity 
as something stable that precedes movement and mixing. It 
challenges us to rethink movement, in order to think differently 
about those issues, among many others.
We normally think of movement as simple displacement: 
a change in location. What is in movement is thought of as 
remaining fundamentally what it was, retaining its identity across 
the displacement. But as the human entered into entanglements 
as it moved through history, it underwent changes in its very 
nature. It underwent qualitative change. Displacement is just the 
visible trail of qualitative changes in nature. Displacement is not 
just a shift of place. It’s the index of a becoming: movement not 
just from one spatial location to another, but from one nature-
changing entanglement to another. It’s always a question of 
transformation – transformation in relation.
In the movement of relational transformation, the very definition 
of what moves changes. Identity is ceaselessly overcome in 
variation. Should we say, then, that the human has always been 
on the move throughout its history? Or is it more accurate to 
say that a movement of relational transformation has moved 
through the human? If so, when did that movement of relational 
transformation begin? It is clear that the “principle of unrest” 
predates the human – or rather this continuing process of 
hominization – and runs the full length of evolution, from the 
beginnings of life. From this perspective, the human is a carrier 
of a movement of relational transformation, one that swept it up, 
and sweeps through it.
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KW: Talking about human history and human life in that way 
feels intuitively right to me. Facing the environment or looking 
at one’s body one somehow knows that everything is in flux – 
without always being able to actually grasp this. That is also why 
I personally enjoy reading deconstruction or your philosophical 
writing: You experience the sense of the world as process. But to 
come back to my initial question: How does movement play out 
in capitalism?
BM: Capitalism may well be the figure in which the movement I 
was just describing actually exceeds the human. The neoliberal 
moment might be thought of as a vector of becoming coming 
out the far side of our humanity. It is the moment when market 
mechanisms declared their autonomy, and the economy became 
a regime of power in its own right. Governments, let alone 
individual actors, feel they have no choice but to conform to 
the operating conditions it sets for them. The cutting edge of 
capitalism is in the financial markets, which have evolved forms 
of abstract capital so abstruse, contingent, and objectively 
undecidable that it is impossible to get an effective grip on them. 
They run according to their own process, and sometimes run 
away with themselves, periodically crashing and burning. The 
financialized economy is beyond the human pale: beyond full 
human comprehension and beyond effective human control. It 
is a self-driving machine, operating more and more abstractly, 
with no one in particular at the steering wheel. It was created 
by the human, but not in its own image, emerging rather as a 
monstrous offspring that turns back to engulf its maker and 
drive away with it.
This is what Deleuze and Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus 
describes in terms of “machinic enslavement,” presciently 
describing the neoliberal moment before the fact (1987: 466-
473). They speak of the role of the nation-state changing. The 
state, they say, now functions as a “model of realization” for 
global capital, or what Guattari liked to call “worldwide integrated 
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capitalism.” What they mean is that nation-states can modulate 
the way the capitalist process falls on their territory, using their 
borders as a kind of refractive lens, but they cannot be the 
master of it. At best, they can create zones of relative stability, 
precariously sheltering their national territory from the worst 
effects of the “creative destruction” of capital’s transformational 
movements, and redistributing those effects elsewhere. The 
situation in Greece vis-à-vis Germany and the other more stable 
economies at the core of the European Union is a case in point. 
The Greek state is rendered powerless and forced to accept 
conditions deeply unacceptable to its population in the name of 
the core stability of the integrated European market.
But this relation is just an internalization within Europe of the 
imbalance of capitalist power that has defined the dehumanizing 
relation between the “developed world” and the “developing 
world” for a long time. The state’s humanistic aspirations (social 
welfare, universal rights, and respect of the person) have become 
subordinate to the economic “realities.” Philosophy declared the 
humanism supposedly embodied in the modern state dead many 
decades ago. But it jumped the gun. It is the neoliberal-capitalist 
realism that pulled the trigger. Bill Clinton’s 1992 presidential 
campaign slogan said it pithily: “it’s the economy, stupid.” 
Twenty-five years on, it still is. It has gotten to the point that it 
seems that many people have concluded that the only possible 
way around it is actually to install stupidity at the head of the 
state (candidate Donald Trump’s belief that as president he could 
man-handle the economy with not-so-invisible little hands had 
pundits’ heads swimming).
KW: There is a lot of talk about how the continuous acceleration 
of the movement of people, data, goods and money seems 
to further enlarge the crisis of liberal democracy. A variety of 
observers have pointed out that democractic apparatuses are 
not up to dealing with the speed of contemporary movements. 
What is your take on this? 
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BM: The speed of contemporary movements is indeed a factor, 
but speed is not adequate as a diagnostic tool. It is inadequate in 
light of what I was just saying about displacement being the index 
of a movement of qualitative change. Speed and acceleration are 
basically displacement concepts. They are quantitative notions 
referring to the rate of displacement. How many things and 
different kinds of things are catapulted into circulation by capital, 
and how fast they turn over, is the tip of the iceberg. The bulk 
of the issue is that there has been a qualitative change in how 
capitalism’s movements move.
KW: What is this qualitative change about?
BM: Capitalism no longer just assembles its products from 
raw materials and fabricated components, and then launches 
them into circulation. That scenario assumes a predesigned 
product, and a meaningful separation between the realm of 
production and the realm of circulation. Today, those realms 
have largely collapsed into each other. Contemporary capitalism 
is increasingly concerned with setting in place the conditions 
for its products to emerge. They are not only made to emerge, 
but this happens as a by-product of circulation itself. There 
are many ways this happens. Examples are the feedback loops 
that have formed between crowdsourcing and the data-mining 
of internet, cell phone traffic, and credit-card use on the one 
hand, and product-development and marketing on the other. 
The network becomes a matrix of emergence for products 
that do not preexist, but take shape in and through networked 
circulation. In the ebb and flow, marketing potentials appear 
like waves cresting on a sea of movements. These are skimmed 
off, “mined,” then concretized as new products to be sold for 
profit. You could look at the profit generated as embodying a 
“surplus-value of flow”: a yield of added value emerging from 
the complexity of movements under way, directly as a function 
of them. Philosophically speaking, capitalism has learned to 
motorize itself immanently to its own movements.
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The epitome of surplus-value of flow is the way the financial 
markets operate. At that level, surplus-value is produced by 
leveraging movements of capital, by gaming turnover, by 
playing the timing of transactions, by second-guessing the 
trends, without even the need for a concretized product to 
emerge, but rather purely through abstract, second-order 
products like derivatives and credit default swaps. It is toward 
this short-circuiting of production that the center of gravity 
of the economy has moved, as if in search of a soul: the spirit 
of capitalism endeavoring to free itself from the body of 
production. Capital, self-abstracting. The value of the financial 
sector in the developed economies is now many times greater 
than the manufacturing sector. Even if the self-abstracting can 
never be complete, and the articulation of the financial markets 
to the so-called “real” economy cannot be eliminated, it is highly 
significant that the balance has shifted and that the effort of 
capital to levitate itself from the sphere of concrete production 
has taken on the piloting role.
Another prominent, very different, way in which capitalism 
has learned to valorize matrices of emergence is through 
biotechnology. Biotechnology, for its part, doesn’t abstract 
the body away. It abstracts it into existence. It descends to the 
emergent material level of life, the gene, in order to manipulate 
the potentials of life’s rearising. It operates on an infra-corporeal 
level. Capital, taking body emergently. The infra-corporeal level 
is a level that is “immanent” to existence: the well-spring from 
which it emerges like an artesian well feeding the many streams 
of life. It is the level of potential.
KW: What do you mean by infra?
BM: “Infra-” is a prefix I like to use to refer to the immanent 
level at which potentials of emergence are found. As my two 
examples indicate, the immanence of the infra-, and the manner 
in which it is accessed and to what effect, is highly variable. 
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An extraction of surplus-value from an infra-level is not a 
manufacture. Financial surplus-value comes from capital’s 
becoming self-abstracting as a function of its own flow, hoisting 
itself on its own soulful petards into another realm of its being. 
Biotechnological reembodiments, for their part, are more grown 
than manufactured – they are less made than made to take form, 
by manipulating how potentials come to express themselves. On 
the infra-level what is at issue is a veritable becoming, a bringing 
into determinate existence of something prefigured only on the 
run, in the upswell of as-yet unformed potential. Modulating or 
manipulating what comes of this level constitutes an extreme 
form of power: the power to bring to be; the power to make 
become; the power to harness qualitative transformation. I 
call it ontopower (“onto” from “ontogenesis,” or the process of 
being’s becoming).
KW: You recently published two books which develop the 
concept: Ontopower (2015) and The Power at the End of the 
Economy (2014a). I wonder how this concept of power plays out in 
our discussion about movement. 
BM: I said earlier that the economy has become a regime of 
power in its own right. What I meant is that the capitalist process 
has made itself an ontopower. This has far-reaching implications 
for liberal democracy when you consider that according to 
theorists of neoliberalism, its most astute proponents as well 
as its critics, neoliberalism does not just produce objects, but 
also its own subjects. Foucault called the neoliberal subject the 
“subject of interest,” emphasizing that its form is homologous to 
that of the enterprise. The founding theorists of neoliberalism 
called this enterprise-subject “human capital.” In The Power at 
the End of the Economy and Ontopower, I try to look at some of 
the consequences of the way in which capitalism’s ontopower 
extends to the production of the very capitalized individuals, the 
capital life-forms, that populate its field. The fact that capitalism 
has found ways to productively access matrices of emergence 
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means that it now increasingly functions at the infra-individual 
level wherever capital flows – which is everywhere. Capital seeps 
down to the affective level of felt potential, before life potentials 
have concretized in a determinate form of life, where life is 
as-yet emergent.
This level is stirring with micromovements. I call these formative, 
but not yet fully formed movements “bare activity.” With 
respect to the infra-human, these are ebbs and flows of desire, 
tendency, fear, hope, self-interest, sympathy, tensings for action 
and easings into relation. It is as easy as click-bait to modulate 
that ebb and flow in order to orient its taking-determinate-
form. Facebook demonstrated this with its infamous informal 
experiment in modulating people’s moods and online behavior 
by modulating the affective tenor of their Facebook feeds. 
Capitalism has learned to descend to the infra-level where the 
individual is emergently divided among potential inflections of its 
own self-formative movements. Deleuze coined a word for the 
neoliberal subject, taking this self-dividing, this “schizzing,” into 
account: the “dividual” (Deleuze 1995).
My hypothesis is that neoliberal capitalism directly couples 
this infra-individual level with the transindividual level. It 
energizes itself with feedback effects between the infra- 
and transindividual levels in a way that largely bypasses the 
intermediate level of the supposedly self-contained individual. 
This intermediate level is that of the social or moral person: 
the figure of the citizen, as subject of right, and the subject of 
rational interest. This level of the person, at which we like to think 
we function, is reduced to a hinge mechanism through which 
the infra- and the trans- communicate: a miniaturized “model of 
realization” of global capital, zoomed down to fit the contours 
of the human body (or rather, the pattern of whole-body 
movements indexing the flow of a quantum of human-capital 
becoming). The transindividual level is, at its widest horizon, the 
integrated worldwide network of qualitatively transformational 
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movements whose complexity and contingency escapes not 
only individual human control, but mastery by any individual 
nation-state.
KW: If the figure of the citizen is somehow suspended in 
capitalism, what does that imply for models of democracy?
BM: There is a fundamental misfit between the multi-scale 
regime of ontopower I just described and liberal democracy. 
Liberal democracy is ostensibly predicated on the personal 
sanctity of the individual subject of right, the citizen safely 
enwrapped within the sovereign sanctity of the individual state. 
Liberal democracy only knows how to work across those two 
scales of individuality, the fully formed citizen and the sovereign 
state (neither of which is what it purports to be any longer). Its 
bridging strategy is the mechanism of representation. It is this 
mechanism that has broken down.
Representation is dead – if it was ever really alive. Who today 
feels truly represented by their elected government? Witness 
the exodus from the established parties throughout the world, 
most vividly illustrated by the rise of the populist “independent” 
voter in the United States and elsewhere who disavows any 
party allegiance that would inscribe them in the institutionalized, 
normative functionings of their supposedly representative 
governmental system. The result is a simultaneous leakage from 
the left and the right, producing an increasing polarization. The 
mechanism of representation is obsolete. It assumes a stable 
identity on both scales: a government that mirrors who its 
citizens are, and citizens who embody the identity of the state, 
in a mutually structuring embrace. The prevailing conditions, 
however, are of continual qualitative change, ceaseless 
transformational relational movements – as far from a stable 
structure as you can get. The structural embrace has been swept 
through by becoming, transversed by flows that are increasingly 
uncontrolled by anyone or any one institution in particular.
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As a result, the purportedly rational intercourse liberal 
democracy assumes as the necessary condition for its structure 
of representation has been swamped by affect stirred up 
by the structurally disavowed instability. Affective tides ebb 
and flow. In their upswell they prefigure emergent, far-from-
equilibrium follow-on movements whose direction is increasingly 
unpredictable. Representation lies among the flotsam and 
jetsam like a weather-beaten plastic bottle.
KW: Could you give an example?
BM: Look at the Brexit vote. UK voters voted to “take back their 
country” from the supra-national EU, but the complexity of the 
situation actually means that what they may get is their country’s 
breaking apart, with Scotland now reconsidering its own recent 
vote to stay in the union. They voted to represent their perceived 
personal and national interests, only to be taken aback by the 
result, leading to a widespread expression of hand-wringing 
contrition the very next day, out of sudden doubt that their 
representation of their interests represented their interests. A 
resounding decision of indecision.
The whole thing was an exercise in the avoidance of the political 
crux of the matter: that non-representative forms of democracy 
need to be invented, at the interpersonal, national, and supra-
national levels – or better, transversal to them all, in a new 
kind of infra-trans feedback system yet to be invented. Playing 
the identity card and the associated discourse of particularist 
interest, on whatever level, leads nowhere. The plastic bottle of 
representation, half-full of polluted water, is running on empty. 
The dividual rules – one way or another. The dividual is the 
individual divided among itself. This considerably complicates 
the calculus of interests, which become undecidable within 
the structure of representation. Perhaps, if new practices are 
invented for it, rather than in denial of it as is presently the case, 
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the dividual can become the seat of ontopowers counter to 
capital: counter-ontopowers.
KW: Where to start?
BM: It is important, in thinking about what democracy could 
become, to try to theorize this becoming integrally-affective of 
politics and the role of the dividual. This has to be done without 
giving credence to the idea that rationality and affectivity are 
opposites (rather, deconstructing that opposition). It is critical to 
be able to think about and experiment with the ways in which 
affectively-based politics can give rise to radically inclusive forms 
of direct democracy.
KW: The term direct democracy is often used to refer 
to referenda.
BM: Yes, but as Brexit has shown once again, in the networked, 
affectively energized political environment, the referendum is 
but a caricature of it. Prefigurative glimpses of what it could be 
have been seen in the spontaneously self-organizing movements 
of the 2010s, from Occupy and the indignados forward through 
events like 2016’s Nuit Debout, and their power of contagion 
across identity lines. Nothing like a definitive model has 
emerged. But something has been stirring. The politics-to-come 
will likely have no definitive model, by dint of transformative 
movement. No one model, but many relational matrices, in 
resonance and interference. That prospect is uncertain, even 
unsettling, but the alternative is downright frightening: a return 
of a kind of affective politics more akin to the one whose ravages 
we know only all too well from the history of the twentieth 
century – the radically exclusive anti-democratic movements of 
fascism. These also are stirring, in the same cauldron of bare 
activity, immanent to the same field of complexity.
KW: How could we reimagine and rebuild democracies by 
understanding movement better?  
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BM: As a preliminary to that question, it is important to think 
very hard about the historical conjuncture we have arrived at. If a 
vector of becoming has swept through and come out the far side 
of the human adventure in the form of the neoliberal-capitalist 
machinery of ontopower, then the label of the Anthropocene to 
designate the age we are entering is off the mark. I find Jason 
W. Moore’s term the “Capitalocene” (Moore 2015) a much better 
starting point, because this is the age in which the movement 
of the capitalist process through the human outstrips “man,” 
precisely by making the effects of “his” activity ubiquitous, in 
ever more complicated feedback effects between levels that 
escape his control, to the ultimate detriment of his own life 
environment and, potentially, his very survival.
To a certain extent, this dovetails with the discourse of what 
has come to be known as accelerationism. But we have to be 
careful. It is necessary to work through the issues guided by an 
understanding of movement as qualitative transformation. The 
premise of accelerationism is that capitalism’s natural tendency 
is to speed things up. Since the mobilization of capital is now 
ubiquitous, the only way out is to encourage it to speed up 
its own speeding up ever more. In catastrophist versions, the 
acceleration will reach a point where the capitalist economy can 
no longer catch its own tail in surplus-value of flow, and it falls in 
a heap – the crisis to end all capitalist crises. All of this is couched 
in quantitative terms of speed.
KW: Yes, we touched upon this issue already.
BM: It’s crucial to return to that point here, in order to account 
for the possibility – I would call it a certainty – that in the field 
of emergence plied by the movements of capitalism there 
are emergent potentials for qualitatively different modes of 
existence that are stultified because –if they were allowed to 
take fully formed expression, if the budding tendencies they 
prefigure were to deploy and express themselves to their fullest 
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power – they would move in directions beyond capitalism’s orbit. 
In other words, on the infra-level of potential there are germinal 
stirrings of counter-powers of emergence. These are ontopowers 
immanent to capitalism’s processual field, but as-yet uncaptured 
by its logic. When movements suddenly and inexplicably erupt, 
as happened in 2010-2011 and sporadically since, in one country 
after another, it is these potentials germinating and coming to 
a paroxysmal expression that suddenly calls everything into 
question, at times extending to capitalism itself, only to fizzle just 
as quickly they came. If we honed ways of understanding these 
countertendencies, perceiving them in germ, curating the traces 
of their passing in a way that makes them reactivatable, then 
perhaps we could coax them into taking more enduring form 
– or at least iterating more often, with more transformational 
relational overlaps, and as a result greater potential for 
contagion. Perhaps it is possible to extract counter-capitalist 
surplus-values of movement.
If this is possible, it is only by acting directly in the register of 
affect. No amount of ideological analysis or persuasion will 
do the trick, because programmatic politics is as implicated in 
structures of representation and identity as liberal democracy 
is, although from a different angle (for example, in the guise of 
the “will of the people” as spear-headed by a vanguard, explicitly 
or in the implicit form of a technocratic elite). The counter-
tendencies I’m talking about are just as moving, just as emergent 
and, ultimately, just as self-driving as the machine of capitalism 
itself – only with a different, non-monetary, directly qualitative 
sense of value. That is a sense of the value of movements, 
events, relations, in and for themselves, a sense of aliveness, the 
sense of intensity that comes with the experience of potential. 
These unmonetizable surplus-values of movement feedback 
into themselves, in their own currency of experienced potential, 
sketching alter-economies of transformational relation. They are 
tendentially anti-capitalist counter-ontopowers immanent to the 
capitalist field.
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KW: I am not sure I can follow your interest in value.
BM: The call to focus on the question of the qualitative in 
movement is a proposal to return to the question of value, 
radically rethought outside programmatic politics or normative 
ethics. To concede the question of value to capitalism, moralism, 
or conformism is to lose the battle before it begins. Any 
democracy-to-come will arrive as a collective embodiment of 
emergent intensities of experience whose living-out is its own 
value, immanent to that live event, before they are encasted in 
any institutional armature, and with the tendency to push across 
and overspill any regularizing or regulatory incorporation, in a 
perpetual cycle of stabilizing capture and revivifying escape.
This is value not unlike the way in painting we speak of the value 
of a color. This is where I want to take my work next: toward 
a rethinking of politics based on a chromatic theory of value 
(Massumi 2017). The basis for a chromatic politics can be found 
in the work of Whitehead and Ruyer, and in a unique formulation 
in the work of Fred Moten (although Moten would have serious 
reservations about rehabilitating the term value).
KW: Activism and emancipatory politics in general are often 
searching for the outside to capitalism. The way you linked 
capitalism and movement, the question arises: Is there an 
outside to movement? In a world that is centered around 
movement, is even non-movement a type of movement?
BM: No, there is no outside to movement. As Erin Manning points 
out in her book Relationscapes (2009), even stillness is composed 
of movements. Standing still is a dynamic balance achieved 
through liminally perceptible micromovements of muscles and 
attention. In physics, the vacuum is abuzz with dark energy and 
teams with cosmic rays. As Bergson maintained, there is no 
such thing as immobility. There are only regimes of movement 
of qualitatively different kinds whose manners of combining 
and disjoining compose motional-relational fields. Objects are 
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coagulations of these fields: motional-relational knots that come 
to stand out as saliencies against the background activity from 
which they arise and which continues to sustain them for as long 
as they endure: objects are movement field-effects. The same 
could be said of situations and events, and even logics (which 
always arise from and express themselves through patterns 
of movement).
Given everything I’ve been saying about movement and 
capitalism, the way in which the question regarding the outside 
to capitalism is answered determines a great deal about what 
kind of anti-capitalist politics makes sense – or if any anti-
capitalist politics of the activist variety makes sense. This 
question is emphatically raised by the recent debates around 
accelerationism.
An attitude that sometimes comes with perspectives related to 
accelerationism is that since capitalism is all about mobilization, 
any move we make is just feeding its logic. A related position 
sometimes arises from a reading of Giorgio Agamben’s thesis 
that the greatest power is the power not-to, since to-do is to 
collapse the wave packet of potential into a limited expression 
of it. This can lead to the conclusion that the most powerful 
action is non-action. This has led in some quarters to a critique 
of activism that dovetails with certain attitudes that could be 
reinforced by accelerationism. For if capitalism is all about 
mobilization, then to make a move is just to feed its logic further, 
so why even try to make counter-moves? We are all in capitalism’s 
movement, which is now gone global and become universal.
KW: There is no outside of capitalism, it is said.
BM: The only option, then, is to let, or encourage, the movements 
of capitalism push themselves to the point of no return. This 
is an interesting position, but it ignores the qualitative points 
I started out with: not only are there qualitatively different 
kinds of movement, but movement as displacement is but 
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the visible index of qualitative variation. It also presupposes 
certain ideas about the nature of capitalism. To say that there 
is no outside of capitalism so that everything we do is “inside” 
it, is implicitly to construe it as a structure: a set of interacting 
elements whose functioning delineates a bounded space of 
operation. The accelerationist will counter that the point is just 
the opposite: capitalism operates in the unbounded space of its 
own universality, and that is precisely why everything we do is in 
it. But this riposte is based on a logical flaw.
KW: Could you elaborate on that?
BM: Well, I agree that capitalism is unbounded and there is no 
getting outside of it, and that it is universal in that sense, but 
when I say that I mean it very differently, in a way that doesn’t 
entail the conclusion that everything we do is “in” it. The logical 
question is: How can you say that a space without boundaries is 
an interiority? Is not a space without boundaries rather a field of 
exteriority? A great outside: an expanded field. If the capitalism’s 
field of operation is a field of exteriority, then we have to invert 
the question. Given that everything is afoot in a great outside, 
under what circumstances can we say that anything is inside? 
Deleuze and Guattari answer: when mechanisms deploy 
themselves to contain it. When it is captured by a system or 
structure and folded into it, incorporated into it. The capitalist 
field is full of what Deleuze and Guattari call “apparatuses 
of capture” (1987: 424-473). There are prisons, schools, 
legal systems, bureaucracies, political parties, corporations, 
nongovernmental organizations, all manner of institutions and 
quasi-institutions. Each sets its own operative boundaries in 
order to set itself apart. The setting-apart allows for an internal 
logic proper to that domain to hold sway inside the boundaries of 
that territory.
To say that these formations are “capitalist” is not untrue, but 
it is not sufficient, since each also has its own operating logic. 
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They must of course bend to the logic of capital. They are fed 
by capital and under neoliberalism are allowed to prosper 
only if they in turn feed the capitalist economy, providing 
something that can be considered an “added value” for it. 
Under neoliberalism, the raison d’être of everything is justified 
in economic terms. Even so, these formations are not simply 
“capitalist.” A for-profit prison in the United States is capitalist – 
but it is still also carceral. It participates in two logics, capitalism 
and carcerality. Overall, it answers to a fuzzy logic: one that 
allows for partial belonging in more than one set.
Being “in” capitalism is a question of degrees of inclusion in its 
field. “Degrees” might still imply a quantitative distinction, 
but what I’m getting at is a qualitative difference: different, 
interacting logics corresponding to qualitatively different modes 
of relation. A for-profit prison feeds off of flows of capital. But 
it also feeds off of flows of criminality. The flows of criminality 
answer to a logic of infraction implying modes of relation that 
are not outside capitalism, but are not reducible to the capitalist 
relation. Each such logic constitutes its own mode of relation 
corresponding to a qualitatively different degree of inclusion in 
the neoliberal fold. The model is of symbiosis: formations that 
are incorporated in a larger assemblage and serve its global logic, 
but at the same time retain a certain heterogeneity.
KW: Can you say more about the way in which carcerality and 
criminality are not reducible to the capitalist relation?
BM: Marx defines capitalist relation as a conjunction between a 
flow of labor-power and a flow of money as salary, cross-cut by a 
flow of commodities and a flow of money as means of payment. 
Each conjunction presents itself as an equal exchange, value for 
value, as measured by money in yet another guise, as general 
equivalent. In reality, the exchange is unequal. The capitalist 
relation is actually predicated on an asymmetry: profit. An excess 
is skimmed off, and channeled into yet another form of money: 
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investment money. Technically, capital is not the quantity of 
profit, but rather the ability of investment money to produce an 
increased quantity of money in the future. That increase-over 
any present quantity of money, already present in investment 
potential, is capitalist surplus-value.
It is interesting to note here that the capitalist relation is 
essentially a time-form, and that as a time-form its native 
tense is the future. Now, a for-profit prison bathes in the 
capitalist relation. It participates in it on all sides, including 
on the inside. It lives for the capital flows it captures and 
channels into surplus-value production. But it also captures 
flows of criminality and channels them into a different form 
of surplus-value production: a surplus-value of social order, of 
normalization. Or at least, it produces as a surplus-value the 
affects associated with these, even if the ends of social order 
and normalization are not actually met. Which they aren’t. At 
any rate, the disciplinary logic of normalization is not specifically 
capitalist. It is found in many kinds of society. I would go so far 
as to argue that it doesn’t correspond to the actual direction 
in which the logic of neoliberalism preferentially moves. The 
watchword of neoliberalism is not “conform,” but rather “excel”: 
exceed the norm. Its call is to “innovate”: reinvent the norm. 
The direction of movement is toward the supernormal. The very 
idea that there is a normal situation has gone out the window. 
The situation is understood to be complex, if not chaotic, and 
the job of the business executive or entrepreneur is to learn 
how to creatively depart from normal operating procedures in 
order to make a peerless leap that seizes upon the singularity 
of the situation – rather than confirming and conforming to a 
notion of its regularity. I do not agree with critiques of present-
day capitalism that lament its homogenizing effects. Its logic 
embraces heterogeneity, and fosters it, on the condition that the 
resulting variation remain within the orbit the capitalist relation. 
From this point of view, the ostensibly normalizing function of 
the prison might be seen as a compensatory mechanism for the 
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supernormal disruptiveness of capitalism’s logic: a calmative 
balm for the harried voter. This might be a useful defense 
mechanism for capitalist business as usual, but that does not 
change the fact that the its logic is different from the logic that of 
the capitalist relation as such.
As Foucault made abundantly clear in Discipline and Punish (1977), 
the carceral system actually produces more of the criminality 
that it is its stated objective to stamp out, rather than effectively 
normalizing the population as it ostensibly purports to do. In 
my work on preemption, I assert that this positive production 
of what is supposed to be negated is a characteristic of all 
preemptive mechanisms of power. This aspect of the disciplinary 
institution prefigures ontopower, whose power to bring to be, I 
argue, revolves around preemption. But the main point for the 
moment is that the for-profit prison, as disciplinary institution, 
has its own logic, which is not reducible to the capitalist relation 
without remainder, and that it also feeds off modes of relation 
that are likewise irreducible to the capitalist without remainder. 
In this case, what is fed upon is criminality, of which the prison’s 
dedicated institutional logic of carcerality is a function. Of course, 
much criminal activity is conducted for profit, and criminal 
organizations have a kind of entrepreneurial spirit. But not 
all crimes are for profit. The spectrum of criminality extends 
into other territories (in particular, territories of passion). The 
equation between criminality, carcerality, and capitalism is far 
from perfect. There is co-functioning, but there are also areas of 
disjunction and relative autonomy. The more useful model, again, 
is symbiosis, rather than hegemony, if hegemony is understood 
to imply a single dominant structure sucking everything in 
without remainder and making everything homogeneous (or at 
least homologous). Symbiosis, but also parasitism. 
Repeat this analysis, based on degrees of inclusion and relative 
autonomy, for every institution or quasi-institution cohabiting 
the contemporary field of capitalist life. You then get the image 
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of a field that is bathed through and through with the capitalist 
relation, but also rife with other modes of relation that are 
capturable by different apparatuses, and channeled by each 
toward a dedicated form of surplus-value whose production 
fuels the apparatus in question, driving it forward into its 
own future operations. This self-driving of each apparatus 
describes a tendency: a way of orienting to the future. Now 
consider that institutions and quasi-institutions are historically 
emergent, and that capitalist society is highly conducive to their 
emergence, multiplication, and differentiation – what is referred 
to as its “pluralism” and, rightly or wrongly, identified with the 
representative form of government originating with the nation-
states of the capitalist center.
KW: What is your conclusion?
BM: The idea is that the capitalist field is rife with tendencies 
embodying relations that cannot be reduced to the 
capitalist relation itself. It is not only rife with them, they are 
constantly self-multiplying and differentiating – leading to 
the corresponding multiplication and differentiation of the 
apparatuses dedicated to their capture and their channeling 
into institutional and quasi-institutional self-drivings. Each 
mechanism of capture piggy-backs on an emergent tendency. 
Some of the emergent tendencies are symbiotic only as a ruse, 
or as a first camouflaged move toward a fuller expression. 
If that expression were to be taken to its logical conclusion, 
the resulting movement would fully realize other values than 
capitalist value, and would inevitably become antagonistic 
to capitalism itself. These tendencies are parasites in the 
pores of the body of capitalist society. They originate as 
adventitious growths. 
You could even say that every tendency arising in the capitalist 
field is adventitious to the extent that it affirms itself: to the 
extent that experiences its own coming to pass as a value in 
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itself, independently of the monetary value that it may attributed 
to it. Such tendencies are passional: that is the best word for 
a movement that affirms its own occurring. Love is a good 
example, as long as the analogy is not taken too far, since the 
kinds of tendencies I’m talking about come in many an affective 
form – we’re back at the affective level I talked about earlier. 
Love is tied up with all manner of economic pressures and 
opportunities, but we still seek and sustain it for its own sake. 
We value it for its own quality, for the heightening of experience 
it brings: for the qualitative surplus-value it offers. For neoliberal 
economists, this kind of noncapitalist surplus-value is a problem. 
Its affirmation may well lead a person, in the name of “quality 
of life,” to resist the role of “human capital” that neoliberalism 
assigns to them. Human capital is the idea, foundational to 
neoliberalism, that human life not only serves the capitalist 
relation, but that it is a form of capital: that everyone’s basic 
“job,” which we are hired into simply by virtue of being born, 
is to be an “entrepreneur of oneself”: to make every decision, 
including how one spends one leisure time, including what kind 
of affective alliances to enter into, based on how it will optimize 
one’s competitiveness, increase one’s market value, in order to 
yield the maximum monetizable return in the future.
The capitalist field is swarming with non-capitalist tendencies. 
These are to some extent aided and abetted by neoliberal 
capitalism’s own supernormal tendency, which opens the 
pores wider than normal, creating elbow room for adventitious 
tendencies following a different logic. Everything possible is done 
to bring these tendencies into the fold. They are articulated with 
the capitalist relation by the apparatuses of capture that feed off 
them. But there is always a remainder, a left-over of bare activity 
passionally agitating the capitalist field. You could even say that 
the fundamental antagonism of capitalism under neoliberalism, 
at least as fundamental as class, is the antagonism between 
monetized, capitalist surplus-value and noncapitalist, purely 
qualitative surplus-value – what I call surplus-value of life.
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You can think of the capturing institutions and quasi-institutions 
in the way I was talking about objects in relation to movement 
earlier: motional-relational knots that come to stand out as 
saliencies against the background activity from which they arise, 
and which continues to sustain them for as long as they endure; 
as movement field-effects which come to stratify the field of life.
That is: life’s field of exteriority. The emergent tendencies are 
brought into the fold, and take on a contributing function. In 
themselves – that is to say, in their own adventitious emergence 
– they are uncontained. They are emergently outside. Their 
agitation forms a great outside of emergence, understood not in 
a spatial sense, but in the processual sense of bare, background 
activity, arising, in-coming, passionally, out of immanence. The 
formations they feed into demarcate the inside of capitalism, 
understood as a complex array of interacting structures and 
systems, each of which is a relative outside to the others, and all 
of which together, in their interactions and reciprocal standing 
apart, distinguish themselves from the great outside of bare, 
tendential activity.
KW: Speaking of capitalism as an array of systems somehow 
suggests a degree of stability and order that one hardly can call a 
reality when facing today’s neoliberal mess of uncertainties.
BM: That’s right. We need more than a concept of system. 
When we say the “capitalist system” what we are designating is 
this tangle of insides reciprocally limiting each other with their 
respective external boundaries and regimes of passage across 
their thresholds. But capitalism is more than that. More than a 
system, or even a system of systems or structure of structures, 
it is a process. A system is defined by its operational closure. A 
structure is defined by its functional parameters. A process is in 
touch with a great outside. It is defined by its openness to that 
great outside: by how it dips into and captures the tendential 
potentials stirring there. These potentials are unlimited – they are 
Capital Moves 29
always astir, ready to offer more of themselves. Rather than any 
in-itself of things, we’re talking about the of-itself of the world, the 
giving-of-itself of the world’s potential, the partitive, parturitional 
movement of formative activity, not yet fully channeled into 
taking determinate form.
A process is unbounded – but limited. It is limited by its ability 
to dip into the unlimited of the great outside. This reserve 
of bare activity that it verges on is its immanent limit. This 
is a way of saying that the capitalist process, as apparatus 
of capture of monetary surplus-value in symbiosis with any 
number of institutions and quasi-institutions sharing its field, 
is paradoxically limited by potential. Capitalism is continually 
pushing its immanent limit further by finding more and 
more ways to redescend to the emergent level of the world’s 
movements. Earlier I mentioned some of the ways this happens: 
biotechnology, affect, and what I called surplus-value of flow, the 
extraction of surplus-value purely as a movement-effect. The 
extraction of surplus-value of flow is always resonant with affect, 
whether on Facebook or in the financial markets, which are like 
mood rings of fear and anticipation. Still, even in the face of these 
ontopowers, the continual giving-of-itself of potential outstrips 
the capacity of capitalism, and its fellow-traveling institutions, 
to capture it and channel it to their own ends. There is always a 
remainder: an excess of potential over capture, of bare activity 
over useful function, of just-arising over normalized operation. 
If you define action in terms of functionality or operativity, then 
there is always an excess of activity over action. In Deleuze and 
Guattari’s vocabulary, there are always “lines of flight” suggesting 
themselves: tendential movements which, if extended to 
follow their own arc, uncaptured, would move in very different 
directions than the established channels: these are the counter-
ontopowers I mentioned earlier.
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KW: What does this mean with respect to the question of 
whether there is an outside to capitalism and, if not, whether our 
every move is “in” it?
BM: It means that there is a surfeit of potentials that are 
immanent to capitalism’s field but not inside its system. There is 
always an excess of activity afoot that has not been mobilized 
into action. There is always an excess of potentials (puissances) 
suggesting themselves but are not yet channeled into the 
exercise of powers (pouvoirs). There is no outside of capitalism 
in the sense that, in its tireless displacement of its immanent 
limit, there is nowhere it cannot go potentially. It is virtually 
everywhere. The attractor of the capitalist relation is tendentially 
space-filling. It is by nature imperialistic. It is universal by 
vocation. Processually speaking, however, it is awaft in a great 
outside of bare activity. It is hard to describe the “exteriority” 
of this field of germinal life, because we have no words for a 
nonspatial domain. As it is used here, the word “outside” is 
directly processual and lacks a spatial connotation, so in a sense 
it is arbitrary to call it that. We’re talking about what Blanchot 
and Deleuze called an absolute outside, more radically open than 
any mere exterior defined as such relative to the enclosure of an 
interior. An immanent outside: the in-which of all that stirs forth.
The distinction between activity and action makes it possible, 
in fact absolutely necessary, to affirm an activism against 
capitalism, and suggests that this can be done without 
automatically falling “into” its fold. This is not to say that is 
possible for any activity to remain outside it. In the great 
outside, there are no steady footholds. The absolute outside is 
a reserve of potential, not a place of refuge to hunker down in. 
The moment a line of flight begins to draw itself out, it begins 
to enter the institutional/quasi-institutional landscape. Even if it 
succeeds in avoiding being captured by a particular formation, 
it is necessarily navigating the relative outside of the cracks 
between institutions, and that necessity inflects its course. It 
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may also find itself in head-to-head confrontation, in which case 
it is immediately identified in the terms that particular formation 
uses to designate its unassimilable outside: enemy, criminal, 
deviant, refugee, free-loader. This nomination is in itself a partial 
assimilation, because it influences the arc of the movement 
of resistance. There is an ineluctable tendency for a counter-
ontopowerful movement to fall into some form of complicity.
KW: The question would be whether there is something like 
emancipatory complicity as opposed to one that is merely 
catering to dominant ontopowers.
BM: The idea is that complicity is of the nature of things. The 
idea that everything is included in the capitalist field to a certain 
degree and that there are degrees of inclusion rather than a 
simple inside and outside, makes it possible, and necessary, to 
work with this complicity rather than simply moralizing about 
it. Work with it – or better, play it. Play with it. Play on it. Game 
it. Processual duplicity is an ontopowerful tool. It is not the same 
as dishonesty: it is the fuzzy-set capacity of the dividual to truly 
belong to two sets at the same time, but not in like manner, 
rather with simultaneous divergent tendencies in co-operation. 
The practice of processual duplicity is a way, limited by necessity 
it is true, of prolonging the “schizzing” of bare activity into the 
institutional landscape – a way of keeping a hold on potential, of 
continuing to be on the move with a quantum of becoming.
Processual duplicity requires a rethinking of the limits of 
capitalism. Earlier, I set out some traditional Marxist terms. 
My definition of the capitalist relation was the basic, text-
book Marxist definition. But the concepts started to stray 
from traditional Marxist vocabulary. For example, traditionally 
Marxists would say that the limit of capitalism is property. In 
the schema I have just presented, property is not the absolute 
processual limit of capitalism, which is rather capitalism’s trucking 
with its own immanent outside. Private property is the absolute 
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systemic limit of capitalism. What marks a movement’s entry 
into the capitalist system is its gaining the possibility of being 
designated as property, or of feeding in some way or another 
the accumulation of property. Property is one of the requisite 
conditions for the capitalist system, the enterprise-form being 
another, and quantifiability (the standardization of measure 
and accounting) yet another (this is not an exhaustive list). The 
capitalist system is a way of building upon these conditions 
in combination, in intrication. No one of them in isolation is 
adequate to its definition as a system. But property is the linch-
pin. Were the property form to crumble, the capitalist system 
would surely crumble with it. It might also crumble should one 
of its co-conditions be withdrawn, in such a way that its removal 
rebounded upon the property form. Capitalism would have hit 
its limit as a system. An absolute systemic limit of this kind can 
be called an ulterior limit: a threshold across which the capitalist 
system falls out of itself. This could conceivably occur from 
capitalism pushing certain of its own movements too far, so 
that it falls out its own far side – at which point it is swallowed 
back into its everywhere immanent limit (which, in a topological 
processual torsion, folds around, the great outside coinciding 
with the beyond of the far side).
The kinds of institutional and quasi-institutional boundaries 
populating the field of capitalism that I discussed around the 
example of the prison are relative limits, in contradistincton to the 
absolute limits, both immanent and ulterior. An anti-capitalist 
counter-ontopower is one that connects to and prolongs 
emergent tendencies which, if they were to follow their arc to 
its logical conclusion, would ultimately lead to the abolition of 
property as we know it. 
It is important to note that anti-capitalist counter-ontopowers 
have to be defined in relation to both absolute limits at the 
same time: as a partaking in the potential of bare activity at 
the immanent limit, and concurrently as a tendency moving 
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through the institutional landscape toward an ulterior limit. 
You could envision the two types of absolute limit as operating 
along different coordinate dimensions, one horizontal, at the 
far end of the line through the history of capitalism vectors (the 
ulterior limit), and the other vertical, having to do with the field 
of ontogenetic emergence that infra-infests that history with 
bare activity at every point along the way, feeding its onward 
trajectory with potentials that may be capturable but never 
without remainder, so that they are always also potential lines of 
escape (the immanent limit).
KW: Financial capital seems to be the prime contemporary 
example of the very movement of capital threatening to fall out 
its far side.
BM: Yes. In the form of derivatives called collateralized debt 
obligations, debts like home mortgages are bundled together 
and sold as an investment package mixing high- and low-risk 
debts. This “tranching” is meant to “securitize” the overall 
product. If the debts composing any particular tranche defaults, 
the effect of that breakdown is watered down and the overall 
value is safeguarded. The underlying “assets” (i.e., debts) can be 
packaged into more than one product: the debt packages can 
be sold on to other investors, wholly or in part. This multiplies 
and divides the assets at the same time: it fractalizes them. The 
complexity can get to the point where who owns what can be 
impossible to ascertain. The debt then becomes uncollectable. 
This was one of the contributing factors behind the 2008 
financial crisis in the US. In some cases, ownership became 
indeterminate by dint of an excess of it. Property was threatened 
by over-ownership. Capitalism’s in-built tendency toward excess 
can be its own worst enemy, leading it to the point where it 
calls its own systemic requisites into question, in this case 
property itself.
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This is where accelerationist notions might be helpful. It is 
perhaps possible to identify tendencies toward excess in the 
way capitalism itself is working, and help push them over the 
edge of one of its ulterior limits. It is along these lines that 
accelerationists Alex Williams and Nick Srnicek are thinking, but 
within a very different theoretical framework (their call for a 
“Promethean politics of maximal self-mastery over society and 
the environment” is obviously going in very different directions 
from the ones I am suggesting; Williams and Srnicek 2014: 360).
From my perspective, the move to accelerate only becomes 
compelling in light of the kinds of qualitative considerations 
I have been arguing for, connecting them to the idea of bare 
activity as the immanent limit of capitalism. The only reason 
to push capitalism beyond its pale is to allow non-capitalist 
forms of surplus-value to affirm themselves in the expression 
of potentials for qualitatively different movements and modes 
of relation whose value is their own occurrence, whose only 
justification is their lived quality: what I called a minute ago 
surplus-values of life. Anywhere a non-monetized surplus-value of 
life is generated there has occurred what I term, again following 
Deleuze and Guattari, an escape to the immanent limit. Escapes 
can be deviations, perversions, hijacking, hackings. They come in 
many varieties.
KW: Could you give an example for such escapes developing out 
of the logic of capitalism?
One example is the open source movement, which hijacks 
the digitality driving the networking of capitalism toward the 
production of surplus-values of non-proprietary cooperation: 
surplus-values of the flow of cooperation. What I am pointing 
to here relates to property, but perhaps even more directly to 
another of the ulterior limits of capitalism that I mentioned: 
quantification; a notion of value that is fundamentally 
quantitative. Cooperation is immeasurable. It is experienced, 
Capital Moves 35
qualitatively, as a value in itself. Cooperation is something that 
is encouraged by neoliberalism in its own service: one of its 
catchwords is “team work,” which has spawned a whole industry 
of management consulting. But in the case of the open source 
movement, cooperation is the object of a passional affirmation 
that can find itself in acute antagonism with property rights.
Another example are the potentials of the blockchain form 
behind Bitcoin. Bitcoin, and its offspring Ethereum, are runaway 
speculative forms of capital whose escape was only apparent. 
They were designed to be convertible into fiat money, and they 
reproduced many of the same functions underpinning traditional 
finance: a transactional model in which exchange was the basic 
social relation; a quantified system of value, enabling exchange 
to be construed as equal (value for value); a definition of the 
financial actor as share-holder, preserving private ownership; 
and all of this within an economy of scarcity (there is a limit 
to the number of Bitcoin that can be mined). What Bitcoin did 
was to demonstrate that speculative finance could operate 
independently of the banks, corporate and sovereign, that are 
currently at the heart of the financial system, and outside the 
existing political hierarchies. It gave birth to the “distributed 
autonomous organization,” or DAO. As the blockchain has 
evolved, the simple transaction model of exchange is being 
replaced the idea of “smart contracts” that could take any 
number of forms. Some people are intrigued by the idea that 
the smart contract could be stretched beyond the traditional 
economic model, to become the basis for what are essentially 
social pacts operating according to another logic. This would 
enable a DAO to prefigure a different economy in miniature.
The research-creation laboratory I work with, the SenseLab, 
is collaborating with a cooperative called the Economic Space 
Agency (ECSA) to explore this possibility. ECSA's project is to 
create an ecology of self-governing DAO-based "economic 
spaces," each of which would design their own internal 
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cooperative economy to support collective projects. SenseLab's 
project is to invent affectively charged online modes of 
operation that foster collective action offline, in a way that is 
experienced as the creation of a surplus-value of life. There 
would be a dedicated currency pegged to the qualitative 
surplus-value of life generated through the back-and-forth 
between online collaboration and offline events. This special 
currency – the working name for which is Occurrency –  would 
be convertible to a general ECSA currency, and through it to the 
other special currencies of the surrounding economic spaces in 
the shared ecology and even, if desired, to Bitcoin and national 
currencies. We're working very hard on models for this. Much 
experimentation is still to be done, and there is no guarantee 
of success. 
One thing that has become clear is that the project will only 
work if, in our particular collective space of operation, the model 
of currency is dethroned from its position of centrality. With 
currency comes the logic of the market, and with that comes an 
activation of long-ingrained habits and orientations, creating 
inexorable pressure back towards a primacy of the quantitative 
and the kinds of individualizing, self-interest-based calculations 
I just criticized in the case of Bitcoin, no matter how collectivist 
the intention. It is in fact the logic of the financial markets that 
offers the most potential for radical reappropriation: the logic of 
derivatives (Bryan and Rafferty 2006; Lee and Martin 2016). 
I talked a bit earlier about the way in which derivatives begin to 
liquefy the very concept of property. Another aspect of that is 
that there is no necessity to actually own the underlying asset 
involved in order to enter into a derivative contract. Neither is 
there a necessity to actually take ownership at the conclusion 
of the contract: that is the whole point of options. Whereas a 
currency pivots on the present instant of exchange, derivatives 
pivot on futures and allied forms. The future, rather than 
quantitative equivalence, is their medium. They are speculative 
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by nature, forever deferring. Which means: forever feeding 
their own movement forward. The absence of a grounding in 
the solid foundation of an underlying asset of known value, 
combined with the openness and uncertainty of the perpetual 
future tense, places affective dynamics all the more intensely 
at the center, as the motor of the process. If you put all of this 
together, you can start to imagine a non-ownership-based, self-
motoring speculative process "backed" by collectively produced, 
creatively induced affective intensity: a creative process engine 
run on the collective generation of surplus-value of life. This is 
the direction we are trying to go in. Building on a title from one of 
Guattari's last books (2014), our creative economy will be called 
the Three Ecologies Process Seed Bank (we had originally named 
it Adventure Capital, but in the end decided that the neoliberal 
connotations of that moniker were too strong). The offline events 
would compose an alternative collective learning environment, 
a kind of alter-university called the Three Ecologies Institute that 
the SenseLab would transition into. The point of the economy 
would be to sustain that project. All of the value generated would 
be cycled back into it. 
Although there would be a currency involved, its operations 
would be kept peripheral. The intensities coursing through the 
project would be lived for their own value. Intensity is a double-
edged sword: in itself, it marks a purely qualitative difference. 
At the same time, its fluctuations can be construed as changes 
in intensive magnitude. This enables it to be translated into 
quantitative terms: transduced from the realm of quality to the 
realm of quantity by the application of suitable mechanisms 
of measure. The transduction renders it comparable, inducts 
it into a system of equivalence. You just have to think of the 
irreducible, n-dimensioned singularity of the weather at any 
given moment, and the inimitable qualitative feel it carries, and 
then the way that is quantified as a degree of temperature on 
the thermometer, with its linear scale of units of measure, and 
by that operation rendered comparable. Our idea is to exploit 
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this transducibility of intensity. The fluctuations of collaborative 
affective energies running through the project would be 
treated as a creative climate. At the periphery of the space, 
mechanisms of measure would be applied which would "take 
the temperature" of the flow of intensities: unitize it and render 
it comparable, and therefore convertible. In a word, monetize 
it. From the point of view of this quantitative translation, the 
n-dimensioned intensities of the collaborative climate would be 
flattened into something like a proto-monetary mass. Internally, 
the qualitative economy would continue to operate on its own 
terms, directly in the "currency" of affective engagement and 
intensities of creative collaboration, or what Whitehead calls 
"appetite" and identifies as the motor of "creative advance." 
Internally there would be no division into units, no individual 
shares, and no contractual transactions in any traditional sense.
All of this is in continuity with the SenseLab project, which since 
2003 has been dedicated to the invention of techniques for 
fostering new, emergent modes of relation at the intersection 
of art, philosophy, and activism. Its founder Erin Manning and 
I described its ethos and some of its techniques in our book 
Thought in the Act (2014). The SenseLab's way of working seeks to 
avoid reproducing not only hierarchy, but any self-perpetuating 
governing structure. This entails refusing any formal decision-
making procedures, whether vote-based or consensus-based. 
The idea is activate tendencies agitating at the infra-individual 
level, in order to bring them to expression in such a way that they 
play out transindividually, in collective experimentations whose 
improvisational character prevents what takes place from being 
attributable to individuals. This generates a kind of surplus-
value of life that is irreducibly collective, and entirely event-
based: an embodied speculation in emergent modes of relation. 
From this point of view, the value generated by the proposed 
Three Ecologies economy would be a kind of event-derivative. 
Like derivatives, it would run on affectively fueled speculative 
energies, in a kind of metabolism of the future. Unlike existing 
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derivatives, it would function according to what is basically a 
gift economy, an economy of abundance, without debt or credit. 
The "decisions" made along the way will be self-deciding: they 
come from the way in which the tendencies in play in the event 
play out among themselves, weighted only by the affective force 
they effectively mobilize, as directly "measured" by what creative 
propositions take hold with a collective momentum that carries 
them to realization.
There isn't the time here to go into all the details. Suffice it to 
say that what we're attempting to do is to hijack the cutting-edge 
tools of runaway speculative finance to create what is essentially 
a post-scarcity anarcho-communist micro-society operating in 
the pores of the dominant economy, specific to a single DAO 
serving a particular collective project in a way that frees it from 
institutional funding, and by doing that from all of the neoliberal 
strings that are increasingly attached to outside funding, whether 
it comes from private foundations or government sources. If it 
works, it could expand to include mutual aid systems to help 
members of the collective survive in the dominant economy. 
The need to buy food and pay rent will not be going away soon. 
The convertibility between the particularist currency of the 
Three Ecologies Process Seed Bank and national currencies 
is a complicity with the general capitalist economy – but it is 
also the condition under which it can contrive a partial but 
effective freeing from it. The Economic Space Agency is working 
with a number of other initiatives looking to develop collective 
economies based on notions of the common rather than private 
property, again taking advantage of the potentials created by the 
blockchain. Their aim is to prototype new economic platforms, 
to be made available on an open-source basis, that can be used 
as templates by others. Ours is the most radical in terms of its 
attempt to imagine into being a non-exchange-based, purely 
qualitative, collectivist economy. We may not succeed. It may 
prove impossible. But even it does ultimately fail, it has already 
taken our collective along a germinal line of escape.
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KW: You started to explain how the vocabulary you’re developing 
departs from classical Marxist terminology. Could you go back 
to that point?
BM: Another way that what I have been saying deviates from 
traditional Marxist concepts is that the notion of surplus-value 
of flow I talked about toward the beginning of the interview 
calls into question the labor theory of value, which was long 
considered the sine non qua of Marxist analysis. Surplus-value of 
flow is an example of what Deleuze and Guattari term “machinic 
surplus-value” (even when it isn’t generated by machines in 
the narrow sense; machinic can be taken as a synonym for 
“processual”; Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 232-237). The old labor 
theory of value is the idea that all surplus-value production is 
based on leveraging labor time – basically, the theft of a portion 
of what is produced, as measured by the difference between 
workers’ labor-time, expressed monetarily as salary, and the 
capitalist’s returns.
Earlier, I talked about how the crowdsourcing and data-mining 
of people’s network-enabled movements generate a “surplus-
value of flow” in the form of monetizable information. This is the 
generation of capital out of information, purely as a function of 
the flow of information. This occurs with little or no labor input – 
certainly none commensurate with returns. It is an achievement 
of the algorithmic. You could also cite style scouting in the urban 
environment, where capital is extracted from variations in 
style, from the flow of modes of life signalling their difference in 
relation to one another. The “work” is performed as part of the 
collective composition of a form of life. This is not labor, but self-
affirming, self-inventing activity that is undertaken for its own 
experienced value.
The mining and monetization of this activity is labor, but again 
the yield that is arrived at is not commensurate with the work 
“invested” in the act of capture. The return is excessive. The 
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exploitation is incommensurate, immeasurable. Automation in 
general, and in particular automation in the form of network-
trawling self-executing algorithms, “leverage” life-forms in 
a similar manner to the way derivatives leverage debt. The 
leveraging in the financial markets can be by a factor twenty, and 
that is not considered high. It can run to hundreds of times the 
nominal value of the underlying assets.
As Elie Ayache shows (2010), in the world of derivatives, 
pricing, the measure of value, loses its mooring. It becomes 
a pure effect of the conjunction of abstract flows, of flows of 
capital intersecting at an arbitrary point where the event of a 
transaction occurs, often automatically through the decision 
of an algorithm. Derivatives are justified as a way of “putting 
a price on risk.” But that assumes that risk is calculable, which 
is little more than a kind of magical thinking conjuring away 
the contingency endemic to far-from-equilibrium systems with 
the wave of an abstract wand (whose name is probability). To 
believe that risk analysis effectively expresses that complexity is 
comparable to confusing the thermometer for the weather.
To return to the point I was making, with surplus-value of flow, 
the differential between input of labor and surplus-value tends 
toward the exponential. In the case of form-of-life mining, the 
possibility of quantifying the exploitation is no longer present at 
all. How do you compare the theft of an expression of a mode-
of-life’s self-affirming with a quantity of profit? The exploitation 
is in fact directly qualitative. This is easy to see, for example, 
when indigenous peoples’ cultural signs and sacred symbols 
become commercialized motifs on outdoor wear (to cite a recent 
example of the poaching of Inuit motifs by a European clothes 
manufacturer). The grief over the degradation of an expression 
of a qualitatively different mode of life that has formerly been 
purely self-affirming dwarfs the grief of the loss of any income 
the preyed-upon communities might have made by controlling 
their so-called “intellectual property.” 
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The Three Ecologies project seeks to hold to that aspect of 
the logic of derivatives that overspills quantification in the 
production of surplus-value, but to do so in a way that fosters the 
invention of forms of life, valued in and for themselves, rather 
than being predicated on the appropriation of their emergence. 
Rather than leveraging them toward capitalist ends, they would 
be enabled to self-leverage, to leaven themselves, toward their 
own emergent ends.
KW: Intellectual property is perhaps the biggest battleground 
in the arena of network cultures and in the so called digital 
society as a whole.
BM: Intellectual property is the form in which social or cultural 
difference – qualitative relational difference – is monetized. 
It marks a partial belonging, a non-exclusive inclusion, in the 
capitalist system of movements that do not flow first and 
foremost according to capitalism’s logic, as governed by the 
attractor of the capitalist relation: a capture of something that 
is incorporated into capital while remaining resistant to it, that 
is taken into it but is never wholly of it; a forced complicity 
(calling for strategic duplicity). The concerns for “cultural 
preservation,” which translates here into the preservation of 
minoritarian becomings affirming a surplus-value of collective 
life, and concerns for protecting intellectual property may occur 
together. But this does not make them the same thing. They 
are incomparables. The processual distance between them is 
immeasurable. They belong to qualitatively different logics. A 
person or group who holds to both cannot be dismissed as a 
dupe to capitalism, as unwittingly falling into a contradiction, 
or as complicit in the way the word is so often used with 
moralistic overtones.
Rather than falling into a contradiction, what they are doing is 
straddling a schizz. They are living up to their dividuality. We all 
do that, must do that. Precisely because “there is no outside of 
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capitalism,” said once again in a way that does not mean that 
we are all simply “in” it. At the same time as exploitation ceases 
to be meaningfully measurable, complicity does as well. All the 
more reason to insist on directly qualitative understandings of 
economic processes, on the need for purely qualitative notions 
of value, and a complex appreciation of how they are articulated 
to the mechanisms of quantification that are everywhere 
in capitalism. That is not a simple task. Our understanding 
of nonquantitative surplus-values of life cannot simply be 
conceived. As their name implies, they must be lived. Their living 
beyond capitalism is still to be invented. And all the more reason 
not to be seduced by the breeziness of the accelerationist thesis.
KW: Today the notion of flow and the notion of real-time 
flow have become commonplace. The rise of digitality, for 
instance, hinges upon this idea to the degree that people 
believe in instantaneous online communication without 
ever understanding that the movement of data never works 
without interruptions. Ideally, there is just-in-time delivery of 
data, but never real-time transmission. However the illusion is 
uncontested. Moreover it seems to be attributed to any type 
of movement today (the movement of underclass migrants 
being an exception). Is this illusion a symptom of the general 
misrecognition of how infrastructure for movement is actually 
built and how power permeates it?
BM: This is another prong of the question of quantification, and 
the difficulty of approaching current cultural and political issues 
without a thorough calling into question of the tendency to give 
quantitative notions the last word. The notion of real-time is a 
chronological notion. It refers to the speed of a transmission 
through space, increasing in measure toward the ideal point 
where the thickness of space is overcome, where the drag 
and delay it represents disappears. This overcoming of space 
is a fiction. There is no such thing as simultaneity. The idea 
of attaining it treats space and time as though they could be 
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separated out as independent variables. But there is not a spatial 
frame on the one hand, and a time-line on the other. Time and 
space always come together. They come integrally, as a block. 
There are only space-times – durations. The world is made of 
duration. Divide an occurrence as far as you can, and what 
you get is only smaller and smaller patches of space-time, little 
smudges of duration.
What real-time refers to is really the point at which the delay 
in transmission becomes negligible, where it ceases to be a 
noticeable factor. This is a relational reality, having to do with 
how different durations meet, across differences in scale. Real-
time is when the duration of transmission becomes negligible in 
relation to durations on the scale of human perception – which 
are themselves relational realities bound up with the larger 
culturally inflected movements of changing expectations, habits 
of attention, and perceptual orientations. Real-time is a fiction, 
but at the same time it is a practical reality. There is always a 
selling point at which a technology can claim to operate with 
a delay that is as good as real-time for that particular cultural 
conjuncture. Real-time is really just-in-time.
You are right to point out that the fiction conveniently glosses 
over the hard reality of infrastructure and the economic 
and political power relations that are concretized in it. From 
the process-oriented perspective I try to work within, the 
purported overcoming of space can be thought about in terms 
of deterritorialization. The push toward real-time does enable 
the flow of images and information to accelerate and circulate 
farther, faster, through more meanderings, to the point that 
the force of its anchoring in its space of departure, the trace 
of its element of spacing, becomes attenuated. As you say, 
this rebounds on perceptions of the movements of objects 
and people whose durations are very different to the speed 
of circulation. The duration of an image’s appearance in and 
passage through the media networks takes the fore, so that 
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it appears as if things, like flows of refugees, have appeared 
in “real-time” out of nowhere. This has tremendous affective 
effects. Everything comes as a shock, creating a perpetual state 
of agitation, of activation, that easily tips over into fear. More 
and more images begin to prime for fear. It is an odd fact of the 
affective constitution of human perception – at least present-
day networked human perception – that words and images that 
prime for fear produce nonconscious associations with death.
Studies of priming in experimental psychology suggest that with 
every perceived threat there appears the horizon of death. Every 
threat comes with a tinge of existential threat. Certain political 
movements regularly capitalize on this tendency by mobilizing 
fear in relation to perceived threats associated with out-groups, 
treating them as existential threats regardless of their true 
proportions (or even whether they need to be treated as threats 
at all). Examples are too numerous to list, from the rhetoric of 
the right around the Brexit campaign to Donald Trump’s wall 
against Mexico.
KW: Is thinking about infrastructure one way to start bringing the 
complexity that this tendency elides back into the picture?
BM: Philosophically, it points to the fact that the condition 
of possibility for every movement of deterritorialization is a 
reterritorialization. The deterritorialization has been enabled 
by the painstaking construction of an extensive apparatus for 
the facilitation of flows whose putting in place has required 
economic and political will and resources, and therefore 
stands as an expression of power. Every reterritorialization-
deterritorialization constitutes its own space-time of power. Each 
such space-time is quantitatively as well as qualitatively different. 
But they conjoin across their difference. Differential flows of 
commodity goods, flows of human bodies, flows of networked 
images and information, conjoin in different manners to different 
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effect, depending. The political question is how to act upon that 
“depending”: how, relationally, to modulate the conjunctions.
This is a much larger question than debunking “illusions” or 
communicating a correct analysis of the complexity of the 
situation, because there is always that affective element. 
Affective modulation must be met with affective modulation. 
Reason, as Hume argued, gives none: alone, it is impotent to 
motivate action. It cannot give a reason for itself. There is no 
a priori reason why being reasonable is “better” – unless it is 
felt to be. The force of reason is found in affect. In addition to 
giving all the reasons why, for example, the fear of immigrants 
is unreasonable, the fear of the stranger must be fought on 
the same affective register as it is produced, but in a different 
tonality. A politics of care must be made as compelling as the 
appearance of existential threat. Transindividual sympathy – 
sympathy operating in radical affective proximity-at-a-distance, 
across lines of identity – must be mobilized, not as a personal 
act, not as a moral act, but as a directly political, that is to 
say, transindividual, act. The shock-effect, the immediation-
effect, of “real-time” processing and the agitation/activation 
it produces could provide as fertile ground for this alternative 
politics as it does for right-wing politics, if only it is attuned to a 
different affective tonality, within a different horizon than that of 
existential threat – namely, the horizon of intensities of life that 
arise through the collective interplay of differences.
Debunking the fictions, unveiling the illusions, will do little 
by themselves. That can actually be counterproductive, if 
it leads to a misapprehension of the affective environment 
and the counter-powers that may be found in it in germ. An 
overreliance on critique is destructive of potential, because 
it perpetuates the myth of reason’s motivating power and 
encourages an underappreciation of the power of affect, where 
activated potential dwells. Critique is demobilizing. Affect is by 
nature mobilizing – which is why it can be both dangerous and 
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empowering. The quality of the movements that are primed out 
of it are what is crucial. What tendencies are tweaked from it are 
what is decisive.
KW: What do you mean?
BM: Well, if anyone has doubts about the limits of political 
reason, they need only read an account of a Trump campaign 
rally or listen to a Trump speech. We were warned. From 
Ronald Reagan’s “facts are stupid things” to the George W. Bush 
administration’s condescending dismissal of the “reality-based 
community,” the role of critical factual analysis and political 
reason has been on the wane. Trump sounds the death-knell of 
its power to be determining. Trump can contradict himself from 
one sentence to the next. He can change his policies today, and 
change them back tomorrow. His supporters know very well he 
is doing it. But it does not matter. The Trump-effect is operating 
in a totally different register, a different kind of “knowing” 
immune to the need for argumentative consistency. With Trump, 
a threshold has been passed. I seriously doubt, now that he has 
won the presidency, that there is any going back.
This is a very complex moment, having everything to do with 
the politicization of personality. But I am convinced that the 
extreme personalization of politics we see with Trump cannot 
be understood in traditional psychological or psychoanalytic 
terms, in particular in terms of identification. Franco “Bifo” 
Berardi’s recent work, for example, makes the mistake of 
psychologizing the field of capitalist life. But the dividualization 
of the person has gone too far for that. We need new tools to 
understand the profundity of Trump’s superficiality, and the 
force of its reinvention of fascism for the neoliberal age, adapted 
to the figure of the enterprise-subject and appreciative of the 
duplicities of the dividual. We need to think hard about the 
stupidity, the willful stupidity, and the way Trump’s personal 
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embodiment of it collectively mobilizes. We do not have a model 
for this. It is too dangerous to rely on models from the past.
KW: Trying to grasp the significance of movement today one 
could also talk about the illusion of movement in general: from 
semi-automatized expressions of infatuation on Facebook to 
activists who fight and fight without ever sensing that their 
actions have actually some impact on society. Are we seeing in 
our time a particular influx of such illusions or delusions? And if 
so, do they have an effect on the politics of movement?  
BM: I just used the word “illusion” in my last answer, which was 
an admission that the issue is an important one. But at the 
same time, I felt the need to put the word in scare quotes to 
distance myself from it. Then again, I used the word “stupidity” 
unselfconsciously. I think I owe an explanation.
KW: Indeed.
BM: The reason I distance myself from words like illusion is that 
it brings up the old image, associated with the mid-twentieth-
century critique of fascism, of the “masses” deluded by those 
who know. The idea is that there are those who know, and 
oppress, and there are those who know even better, and can 
liberate. Those who know better can outfox those in the know 
and provide a beacon of reasoned understanding and rational 
hope, and the two combined into an effective strategy, to the 
poor deluded masses. Then there is the cynical version that says 
that no one knows better, but no one knows better than I that 
no one knows better, so you might as well forget about your 
pipe-dreams of direct democracy, stop expecting your sappy 
occupying to do anything but lead to a few hugs from strangers, 
and just listen to me. This is the Žižek version. I know that neither 
of these is the way you meant it.
KW: No. My question was based more on concerns for the 
way in which the technosocial conditions in which we live 
Capital Moves 49
produce illusions that it is very difficult for anyone to see their 
way through.
BM: I have a lot of sympathy with this concern, but prefer not 
to use the words illusion or delusion because of the traces of 
those other ways of thinking – the too-earnest way of the militant 
and the way of the cynic – that they might reawaken. I prefer an 
analytic of stupidity, but one that recognizes that we are all in the 
same boat together, that none of us is immune from stupidity, 
or what Spinoza calls “inadequate ideas,” because the error at 
the root of them is of the warp and woof of perception itself. 
It’s constitutional. It has to do with what Deleuze and Guattari 
sometimes call “objective illusions,” true and necessary illusions. 
Stupidity is holding obstinately to objective illusions, and allowing 
one’s actions, even one’s entire life, to revolve around them. 
This is not just a personal question, and has nothing to do with 
lesser intelligence or an inability to be rational. It is an existential 
posture having to do with how one’s life is anchored in the 
field of bare activity, and what potentials that posture toward 
the immanent limit allows to express themselves – how a body 
perceives and channels potential.
An inadequate idea for Spinoza consists in identifying an external 
object as the linear cause of a pain, a distress, or a wrong. These 
“sad” affects are always relational in their genesis, since they 
arise from encounters. Every encounter is an affective complex: 
a patterning of capacities to affect and to be affected. This is not 
a dualism, but a relational matrix, because both capacities are 
found on both sides of the encounter. Peirce makes this point: 
there is no such thing as passively undergoing a force, because 
even resistance or friction, even shrinking back, constitutes a 
capacity to counter-affect: they can modulate the application of 
force, or its follow up. There is no active-passive dichotomy, only 
affective fields of intermodulation. It is totally understandable, 
however, that the pain be plotted to an external object. In 
fact, it is a necessity of survival. The object is the perceptible 
50 Chapter 1
sign of what is stirring in the relational field – many of whose 
dimensions do not appear by nature. Among the many things 
that are active but do not appear as such are tendencies and 
habits of counter-affection that self-execute nonconsciously. 
The object is the visible index of the expanded relational field, 
including what plies it but does not appear in it. Pinning reactions 
on the appearance of the object is an indirect way of addressing 
what does not appear – the tendencies and counter-affections 
that may express next, and impinge on the life of the body. It is 
a necessary survival strategy, enabling avoidance, or a choice as 
to the conditions of an encounter. The object’s presence visibly 
indexes logical nextness – what can be anticipated based on past 
encounters and the regularities they presented.
The tendency to isolate the object and glom onto it as the visible 
index of what in the relational field exceeds present perception 
and extends in a future-oriented direction into the imperceptibly 
felt is, paradoxically, of the very nature of perception. It is of the 
nature of perception to exceed itself. Perception is constituted 
by this topological torsion, whereby the relational in-which of a 
pulse of life, the affective matrix of the effectively lived occasion, 
the impossibility of assigning passive and active roles as long 
as the relational complexity of that occasion is being fully felt, 
is projected outward and undergoes a transformation. The 
complexity is projected onto an objectified region of the external 
world. It is important not to understand “projection” to imply that 
there was a pre-existing interiority, and that something in it is 
displaced toward a pre-existing outside. I’m using the word in the 
way Whitehead and Simondon use it, which is a bit of a misnomer 
because the idea is that the “inside” of perception arises with 
its relative outside, as a co-effect of the objectification of an 
external region: they are reciprocals, co-generated (this is the 
case for all inside/outside structurations or systematizations).
The main point for this discussion is that the objectified region 
stands out as a limited clarification of the complexity of the 
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relational field, which is presented in it in a restrictive expression, 
strictly in terms of the world’s regularities and their anticipatable 
results. The region indexes what is pertinent to what might come 
next, with an emphasis on the body’s capacity to act, but only 
as a function of what it recognizes. As Bergson said, perception is 
the way in which our virtual actions actually present themselves. 
Whitehead calls this necessary but reductive topological 
transformation of the relational field of life “transmutation.” 
In both cases, the operation is intimately related to the needs 
and fragilities of the body. It is a necessary operation for the 
resolution of problems of need.
For example, isolating certain kinds of objects and glomming 
onto them as food is the way an animal resolves the relational 
matrix of hunger in a happy way. There is no other way to 
succeed in eating than to index the complexity of hunger, in its 
myriad dimensions, physiological, psychological, ecological, to 
the recognized simplicity of an ingestible object. There is no way 
to avoid danger to life and limb than to objectify the threat in a 
way that allows its direction of its arrival to be tracked and the 
regularity of its movements to be anticipated.
KW: I doubt that one can objectify threat in this way only, 
because I believe that this approach is very much consistent with 
Western culture while it plays out differently in other cultural 
contexts. In Japan for example the idea of living with threat and 
with uncertainty in general is fairly developed in culture – be it in 
martial arts or architecture.
BM: Yes, there are certainly other ways of dealing with threat, 
counteracting this tendency. If the only option were to act in 
direct accordance with it we would be stuck in reactive postures, 
and reactionary politics. The problem with the objectification 
of threat is that what is good for survival is bad for living in the 
larger sense: for feeling one’s way beyond mere survival to 
greater relational-affective intensities. The transmutation at the 
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basis of perception is true – for all apparently needful intents and 
purposes. But is in error to the extent that life potential exceeds 
need, to the extent that the world affords more in the way of 
life potential than can be recognized in the name of already-
established intents and purposes. The focus on the object as 
indexical sign of the transformational-relational field occults the 
full range of the complexity of the affective field, obscuring its 
harboring of potentials for living otherwise.
KW: In What Animals Teach Us about Politics (2014), you argue 
that survival is not the only drive, or tendency, definitive of 
animal life.
BM: There are relationally intensifying tendencies that are just 
as strong. These counter-tendencies have to do with play and 
inventive improvisation (at least in my neo-Spinozist version, 
if not in Spinoza himself). It is through play and improvisation 
that adequate ideas may be arrived at – at the ulterior limit of 
survival. Not against it, but out the far side of its objectifying 
movement, in a return of perception to the more integral 
relational field of feeling from which it separated itself out in the 
object-form. Adequate ideas, for me, are feelings of potential. 
Since potential is their “object” and potential has as yet no 
particular actual shape, they are by nature abstract in a way that 
is not objectifiable in perception.
Perception is a form of lived abstraction, to the extent that it 
indexes nextness: what is not present, but may be expected to 
come. But adequate ideas are yet more abstract, in a way that 
is directly, bodily felt, immanent to perception, and felt as an 
opening for acting otherwise, resonant with the full complexity 
of the relational field. They are a mode of lived abstraction that 
I call “thinking-feeling.” Thinking-feeling occurs immanently to 
perception, flush with bare activity. This is the realm of Bergson’s 
intuition and Peirce’s abduction.
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This brings us to the idea of objective illusion. The objective 
illusion in what I’ve just described is treating the object as 
the efficient cause of the pain, danger, or worry: as a simple, 
isolatable cause in a linear, one-to-one connection to a sad result. 
The cause, however, in its fullness, is relational. It is the playing 
out of the relational field itself, in its integrality. The causation is 
not fully externalizable. In its fullness, it is immanent to the event 
of the field’s integral playing out. It cannot be simply located on 
the “outside,” because the potentials for acting otherwise that 
the field harbors cannot be exhaustively projected. Their full 
spectrum cannot be perceived on the outside. They can only be 
lived-out, immanently.
Stupidity is when the objectified attribution of external causality, 
which is necessary but also necessarily incomplete, becomes 
a node around which an entire mode of life is organized. 
Pain anticipated becomes a generalized posture of fear. The 
posture of fear is itself felt as a second-order pain, leading to 
over-vigilance and resentment. This in turn can lead to an over-
generalized reaction that, at the extreme, can extend to hatred 
of the entire class of objects with which the pain is identified. The 
merest hint of a threat that can be in any way associated with 
that class of object becomes a trigger. Soon, the mere presence 
of an object belonging to the feared class itself becomes 
experienced as a threat, in the absence of any actual threat. 
The fear becomes self-driving. Apply this to different classes 
of people, and you have the kind of racism and Islamophobia 
we see today.
KW: In today’s multifaceted, ubiquitous “threat environment,” 
as military and security experts like to call it, this means that 
virtually everything becomes a trigger.
BM: Precisely. Signs of threat are everywhere, arriving as out of 
nowhere at the “real-time” speed of the networked media. The 
reactive response to this always overreaches its target, because 
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what is being reacted to are generalized signs of the object’s 
class or category, irrespective of individual characteristics or 
the singularity of situations. The response is always too “big,” 
too generalized, not nuanced enough – basically off-base. Again, 
this is not a personal error, and has nothing to do with stupidity 
in the usual sense of a lack of intelligence. It is a processual 
error, bearing on the way in which bodies are postured into the 
relational field, and what manner of potential they selectively 
channel from it as a result. This channels potential limitatively, 
selecting for reactions to threat. 
Reaction is a sundering of the affective field. It does violence 
to it by imposing an opposition between activity and passivity. 
To react is to assume a posture of passivity in the face of a 
threat which, for a shocking moment, seems to monopolize 
all potential for action, leaving a body in suspense, in pained 
anticipation, cowering before potential rather than embodying 
a share of it. Reactivity separates a body from what it can do, as 
Deleuze puts it.
The objective illusion is ultimately that potential can be sundered 
from the body, that a body can be separated from what it can 
do. But reactivity does just that: it enacts the illusion. It does 
the impossible: curtail life’s tendency to affirm and expand its 
powers to be, which are one with its powers to act (which move 
its becoming). As an aside, Agamben’s concept of bare life, with 
its evocation of the abject body relegated to absolute impotence, 
is complicit with this operation. An account of the political as 
founded on bare life stages a becoming-reactive of the very 
grounds of political thought, suspending the political in the 
separating of a body from what it can do affirmatively.
The becoming-reactive of thinking-feeling is what Nietzsche 
rebelled against as the life of ressentiment. Ressentiment takes 
many other forms. All, in one way or another, involve what 
Deleuze called a refusal of the event as a consequence of how 
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the objective illusion constitutive of perception plays out: a 
simplifying, generalizing, self-stereotyping response to the 
transformational-relational field that misperceives its potentials, 
and in doing so curtails them. Although my focus is on right-wing 
versions of ressentiment, because I find them so dangerous and 
so off-base, it is important to acknowledge that there are leftist 
versions of it as well.
My use of the word “trigger” will immediately evoke associations 
with the vocabulary of the current revival of “progressive” 
identity politics in North America, which in certain forms 
assumes ressentiment as a political tool of resistance against the 
opposing identity politics of the right with its resurgent racism: 
a counter-becoming-reactive. This is certainly understandable 
and, given the situation, may well be strategically necessary, at 
least at certain levels or certain moments. But it is important 
not to forget that it builds from what, from the point of view 
of a processual take on the subjective becomings stirring in 
the transformational-relational field, must still be considered 
inadequate ideas. Serious efforts are made to overcome the 
inadequacy through attention to the systemic nature of racism 
and other forms of category-based oppression, which resituates 
the perceptual triggers in a larger perspective of what organizes 
patterns of perception without itself being perceptible as 
such. This steers this form of politics away from “stupidity” 
as I’ve been talking about it, as the blank refusal of the event 
(something the right specializes, even revels in). So does the 
active reconnection to bodily potentials for resistance achieved 
through a political use of anger as a reaction. But the starting 
point is still reaction. And the activation achieved remains wed 
to an episodically renewed becoming-reactive, which continues 
to serve as its motor. The political activation paradoxically builds 
upon the point at which a body is separated from what it can 
do. Capacitation is arrived at, but its reaccess is always via a 
detour through reaction, raised to a higher power by negative 
critique. This formats the achieved capacitation along pre-laid 
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ideological lines. The operation activates, but only to the extent 
that it is possible to do so by mobilizing anger, the most active 
of the “sad” affects. But like all sad affects, anger remains on 
the reactive spectrum. What has been achieved is a becoming-
active of the reactive (re-activity). Each renewed act of resistance 
must run back through, from hurt to anger to critique, in a cyclic 
return to reactive origins. The positive solidarities that are built 
out of the process are hard-pressed to shake free from their 
reactive origins, whose mark they bear in the form of a will to 
judgment accompanied by a hardening of boundaries toward 
what is judged. Once re-active judgment is unleashed, it, like fear, 
over-generalizes. Every tendency wants nothing more than its 
own prolongation and intensification – Spinoza calls this conatus. 
It can happen, following the momentum of the conatus of 
judgment, that one begins to turn it against one's own and one's 
allies as severely as one's adversaries. The solidarity created by 
political anger then devolves into painful divisions among those 
whom it was meant to unify. The shaming and call-out culture of 
the left in the United States today is at that cusp.
The point for me is to resituate the systemic context in process, 
as I defined it earlier. If identity-based practices are strategically 
necessary at certain political junctures, then it is also necessary 
to take them to the immanent limit, to supplement them with 
agitations, with just-emergent activity at the threshold of the 
knowable, felt unrecognizably, but in a way that is already 
becoming actionable, without cycling through the detour of a 
becoming-reactive: with direct plumbings of liminal potential for 
the integral modulation of the relational field. With accessions 
to counter-ontopower on an affirmative note, in the key of 
invention. I understand Fred Moten and Stefano Harney’s 
concept of “black study” in these terms (Moten and Harney 2013).
KW: How does this critique of identity-based politics relate to the 
concept of the dividual?
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BM: In his Late Notebooks, Nietzsche gives an account of this 
becoming-reactive as a constitutive function of perception in 
ways that relate directly to the concept of the dividual I have 
been talking about (2003: 34-35, 37-38). He describes what I 
call bare activity, the transformational-relational field of affect 
at the level of emergence, where events and actions are just 
edging into determinate existence. He talks about how conscious 
thought and voluntary action begin in a nonconscious or liminally 
conscious welling of bodily sensations, feelings of all kinds: 
desires, aversions, and germinating abstractions that are not yet 
owned by an “I” but agitate on their own, for themselves.
None of the elements agitating in this infra-individual “crowd” of 
forming experience can be unambiguously categorized, he says, 
as falling on the side of willing or thinking. They are integrally 
both. In other words, they are tendencies (even the most bodily, 
apparently purely physiological, among them). Tendencies are 
of the nature of thinking because what they tend toward is 
not sensibly present. They are equally of the nature of willing 
because they are preferentially oriented and are self-executing. 
Nietzsche underlines their durational nature. Each enfolds, from 
its particular angle, a feeling of the process under way: a feeling, 
he says, of the state to leave, the state to be reached, the feeling 
of this leaving-and-reaching itself, all bundled with many other 
things, notably the feeling of the muscles tensing for a coming 
movement, a feeling of the quality of the movement before it 
comes: an abstract feeling of the movement, without the actual 
movement – but with its affective force. All of this underlines the 
primacy of movement we were talking about earlier.
Nietzsche maintains that these durational creatures of the 
infra-individual primal crowd fight it out among themselves, 
or combine forces, and then as a consequence of this dynamic 
interrelating, issue in an action accompanied by a conscious 
perception. The interrelating cannot be limited to an interiority, 
because the elements in question are highly sensitive to 
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perturbation. Their infra-individual domain is radically open 
to the outside. The infra-individual is a field of exteriority, in 
exactly the same way as the capitalist field (in fact, they entirely 
overlap, in partial belonging to one another, or in differential 
mutual inclusion, as I like to put it). The issuing into perception 
creates the objective illusion that, in Nietzsche’s words, there are 
external multiplicities separable from the crowd, and that among 
them is to be found a culprit that can be singled out as the cause 
of any given unpleasant perturbation – and in a sense, all of 
them are unpleasant, because perturbation is agitating, and 
agitation is restiveness and discomfiture. All perception resolves 
the unrest of an agitation on the level of bare activity. Because 
of this, it is necessary to call radically into question the “hedonic” 
categories of pleasure and pain, in favor of notions of intensity of 
activation and the fullness of that activation with potentials.
The moral category of culprit, of a guilty party, is for Nietzsche 
more fundamental than the category of efficient cause, which 
is a generalizating abstraction that works to neutralize the odor 
of moral judgment that comes with ressentiment. With the 
perception of the guilty party, or more generally the object, an 
“I” posits itself as an opposing unity. The “I” overlooks the crowd 
from whose collective willing-feeling it arose. The “I” takes credit 
for the issuing action. It arrogates the formative activity to itself. 
It puffs itself up with the affective force of the self-executing 
movements over which it claims possession. It circles the 
wagons of its arrogance around the feelings it purports to unify, 
construing them as arising from the depths of an interiority 
all its own, rather than from the playing out of a relational-
transformational field of unbounded exteriority. Identity is built 
on this necessary error, incumbent in the genesis of perception. 
“I” is constitutively stupid.
KW: Could you explain more about the idea of objective illusion 
or necessary, constitutive error? Which role does it play in your 
philosophy of perception?
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BM: It is easy to grasp using one of Whitehead’s favorite 
examples. We sometimes look into a mirror and mistake what 
is reflected from behind us as being laid out in front of us. This 
illusion is the objective result of the conditions of perception. The 
perception truly expresses the misleading conditions. Objective 
illusions are truly embedded in the world. It is just that they do 
not always truly embody the consequences of the actions that 
might be carried out as a result. If we reach our hand forward, 
we will not touch the objects in the mirror. When our reach is 
frustrated, we immediately adjust our perception. This at the 
same time readjusts the field of the muscular movements that 
are poised to come, already tendentially present in activated 
potential (what I call the proprioceptive body-without-an-image). 
The perception we began with is still there. The illusion, because 
it is objective, cannot be dispelled. But it can be resituated in 
a more complex relational field in a way that supplements the 
perception with an immediate, embodied understanding of the 
potentials brewing.
This reinstalls us in bare activity, in a way that takes account 
more fully of the field. We are partially liberated from the 
perspective of the “I” that arose with the transmutation of the 
fullness of the causal situation into an erroneous objectification. 
A fuller field perception becomes available to our body. This 
field perception contains the original objectified perception 
as a perspective within it, supplemented by others. Instead of 
a simply located “I” before a simply located object, cause of 
our desire or pain, we have a differential mutual inclusion of 
perspectives, including that of things. In the mirror example, 
“I” was taken in by the mirror’s perspective on the world. In one 
way or another, “I” is always included in a field of relation that is 
irreducible to its own perspective, that includes it in a larger field 
brimming with alien, non-I, even nonhuman, perspectives. “We” 
(our sensitive, thinking-feeling body) are always living larger than 
ourselves, even if unbeknownst to our “I,” and more intensely 
(more fully potentialized). It is crucial to note that the regaining 
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of the larger field has been achieved, not through any critical 
reflective consciousness, but through groping in error, knocking 
against the surface of the mirror – against the clarity of conscious 
perception as it presents itself.
So, this is my prescription: relational groping in error, toward 
a more adequate embodiment of the complexities of the field 
of life. An embrace of the cyclic, corrective return to bare 
activity. A noncognitive respect for the crowded affective field. 
A sympathetic posture of differential mutual inclusion of all of 
its teaming creatures, however alien their perspectives. A joy in 
the potential to be regained, snatched from the jaws of objective 
illusion, even in experiences whose hedonic tone is negative, 
even in discomfiture. This potential regained is experienced, 
purely qualitatively, as a surplus-value of life that worth living for 
itself, purely for the process, purely for the movement and how 
the movement moves. Follow that as a tendency with conatus, 
and everything changes.
This “affirmative” stance is frequently mistaken for a “feel-good” 
attitude with fuzzy new age connotations. It is anything but. This 
misapprehension, which is currently being widely embraced 
by “dark” philosophy currents, is based on a fundamental 
misunderstanding of Spinozist joy, as it is taken up by Deleuze. 
It cannot be repeated often enough that this idea of joy and 
sadness is not mappable onto the hedonic distinctions of 
pleasure-unpleasure, pleasure-pain. Again, this brings us back 
to the quantitative question. The hedonic distinctions carry 
an underlying quantitative bias. The attainment of pleasure 
is understood in terms of satisfaction, and satisfaction is 
understood as the release of tension. Tension is thought to 
be physiologically measurable, often in a way that is tied to a 
biologistic, reductive notion of drives.
This way of thinking is endemic to Freud’s thought, and also 
informs Silvan Tomkins’s theory of affect. Joy, understood 
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from the neo-Spinozist perspective, is a question of intensity. 
Intensity is understood in terms of activation. And activiation 
is understood not in terms of quantifiable tension, but rather 
as qualitative potential. For me, this is in turn understood in 
terms of surplus-value of life. Joy can be tinged with any of the 
categorical affects, even the “darkest.”
In his book on Nietzsche, Deleuze in fact establishes an 
essential link between joy and tragedy. This is because in when 
the emergent stirrings of the relational field peak in an event, 
a cut occurs. The tranquility of the “I,” based on its habitual 
anticipations of a certain regularity, is shattered. This is another 
meaning of the shizz: the “I” is sundered from “within” (from 
movements to the ulterior limit folding back-under to the 
immanent limit, in-coming forth). It is cracked open by strikes of 
potential whose sudden effectuation hit it like fate. A crack opens 
between the past and the future, cutting across the anticipatable 
regularities that normally run from one to the other through the 
thickness of the present. Fate is the present without thickness, 
pure cut. In it, the “I” confronts the uncontrollably larger-than-I 
of the field of life erupting: what Peirce, with uncharacteristic 
evocativeness, called the “strange intruder.” The stranger 
intruder is not another person. Neither is it the mirror-image 
alter-ego of the “I.” Again, in the example, the mirror reflected 
an embedded perspective on the world. The strange intruder, 
Peirce says, is the “non-I.” The non-I is of another order than the 
“I.” Taken at its widest connotation, it is the event “in person” 
(representing nothing but itself, meaning nothing but the 
transformation it brings) with whose complexity “I” must join 
affective forces in order to live life to fullest potential. Joy is the 
affirmation of the event, in all its multi-perspectival glory.
This puts it all in somewhat grandiose terms, which might 
seem to converge with philosophies of the event, like Badiou’s, 
which consider the event to be exceedingly rare, and to 
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constitute a total break with the situation. What I mean is 
completely different.
KW: Doesn’t this hinge upon what you consider to be an event 
and how you define its political quality? 
BM: From my point of view events are always happening. 
They swarm. The cut of the event is everywhere, all the time, 
most often in ways that it is possible to neglect, because the 
regularities of life pick up again right away, and retroactively 
smooth over the interruption. Benjamin Libet’s famous 
experiments show how conscious perception “back-dates” 
decisions that set in on the nonconscious level of bare activity 
to make it seem as if the individual “I” had made them, when 
it wasn’t even there. Only its dividuality was. “I” had been 
momentarily shattered, disappearing into the schizz, falling 
back into bare activity, for an instantaneous beat in the pulse of 
life. This means that the breaking-and-entering of the strange 
intruder is also endemic to perception. It is as constitutional as 
the tendency for the “I” to emerge, and continually re-emerge 
to smooth over its eventful blanking out. Perception blinks. 
Consciousness “flickers,” as Whitehead said. Peirce’s theory 
of the strange intruder is a theory of perception, emphasizing 
perception’s overfullness with non-I experience.
This means that the “tragedy” of the event most often takes 
“minor,” relatively neglected forms. What Erin Manning (2016) 
calls “minor gestures” can pick up on and amplify the otherwise 
negligible effects of liminal events. The everyday practice of the 
minor gesture is far more important than the grand gesture 
of the militant’s faithfulness to the “rare” event. One of the 
problems with grand gestures (and there are many) is that they 
leave one in wait for the rare event, deactivated. They are a good 
excuse to do a lot of nothing, other than trumpet one’s own 
ability to recognize the rare event when it comes and be faithful 
to it in a way that only the rare few can. There is an astounding 
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arrogance to that idea, and a divisiveness that easily leads to 
violence (clearly seen in the Jacobin overtones of many currents 
of thought associated with this way of thinking).
If minor events are everywhere we look, then minor gestures 
can be also. They are always available to amplify the potential 
that the minor event imperceptibly expresses. Politics then, can 
be practiced everywhere, all the time, in whatever situations 
through which we live our lives, at school, at work, among 
friends and lovers, in the streets of the city. This is the idea of 
“micropolitics.” For me, the concept of micropolitics is closely 
akin to the anarchist insistence that the politics practiced in 
the present should prefigure the relational field to come: that 
the job of political activism is to make the futurity in the present 
already actionable.
KW: Could you explain your take on micropolitics?  
BM: There are two warnings I always feel I have to emphasize 
every time I bring up the notion of micropolitics.
1) “Micro-” or “minor” are not necessarily synonymous with 
“small.” Again, it is all about qualitative distinctions. “Small” is 
relative to scale. A minor event in a group interaction is “larger” 
than a minor event in an individual’s perceptual constitution, and 
a minor event in the media is “larger” than both. The criterion is 
qualitative. It bears on the smooth-over-ability of the event. Its 
negligibility. A minor event is imperceptible, but on the verge of 
becoming-perceptible. It is on the edge of perception’s forming, 
on its fateful, cutting edge. A minor gesture leavens the minor 
event into perceptibility, so that it is no longer negligible but 
comes to matter. It is equal to fate. Micropolitics is the politics 
of making-matter. It is not just any making-matter, but one 
oriented toward joy. Joy involves the “tragic” affirmation of the 
integrality of the tendencies plying the relational field, in the 
name of surplus-value of life. In political terms, this means the 
mutual differential inclusion of individuals in the event – but 
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as grasped from the angle of their dividuality, from the angle 
of their activated, agitating, potentializing participation in 
transformational-relational field of bare activity. Micropolitics 
is the modulation of this dynamic differential mutual inclusion, 
tending toward greater field-intensities.
What I mean by that is a maximally inclusive co-patterning 
of contrasting tendencies, co-habiting the field in a way that 
facilitates each fully realizing itself. What I mean by that is 
following the field’s tendential bent to its ulterior limit – where 
it bends back to the immanent limit, where it risks becoming 
eventfully, irredeemably other, as a function of its own self-
accomplishment. The challenge of the co-patterning is to 
facilitate this passage to the limit of tendencies’ intensive 
becoming in way that they do not oppose and curtail each other.
This requires the processual concern and sympathy I spoke of 
earlier. That this is practiced in the horizon of becoming-other, 
rather than in the name of identity, in defense of the self-same, 
makes all the difference. It potentially erases the paranoia of 
the other that makes co-patterning impossible. It enables a 
becoming-active of everybody, against the separative becomings-
reactive we all know too well. If this sounds utopic, it isn’t. It 
is just always-as-yet unknowable (but already coming to be 
actionable, wherever a minor gesture cares to go). It is important 
to note that the co-patterning at issue is aesthetic. It is at the 
core of Whitehead’s theory of beauty. Beauty, for Whitehead, is 
not reducible to harmony. It requires an affirmation of discord, 
a co-operation of incommensurable movements each affirming 
itself, but in resonance with others.
2) Micropolitics cannot be separated from macropolitics. 
It is not the not opposite of macropolitics, but rather their 
underside: associated with what Moten and Harney call the 
“undercommons.” An action always straddles both levels, even 
if it is oblivious to its participation in the minor. All acts are 
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duplicitous, participating in both dimensions at the same time, 
but not with the same effects. It’s a kind of aparallel, double-
inscription, on correlated but divergent tracks. A corollary of this 
is that micropolitics, while necessary, is not self-sufficient. Minor 
gestures always have to play the major, subverting, perverting, 
hijacking, or hacking it. And however dismissive I can be about 
the grand gestures of macropolitics, they, like the ressentiment 
of anti-racist identity-based politics, are strategically necessary 
at certain junctures.
Under certain conditions – and these conditions are rare – a 
grand gesture may open the relational field in a way that the 
minor gestures swarming in it have room to amplify and bloom. 
It can only do this if it is not stuck in its own programmatic 
groove: if its programmatic pronouncements carry an 
illocutionary force, not expressed in their semantic context, 
that makes them performative of a schizz leaving a proliferating 
pattern of cracks for bare activity to seep through, each crack 
oozing potentials for surplus-value of life. The micro-cracks may 
proliferate to the extent that they converge into a macro-shatter: 
a revolutionary passing of a threshold.
This illocutionary force of a programmatic utterance is what 
Deleuze and Guattari call the “order-word” (1987: 75-110). A 
recent example that stands out is the Occupy Wall Street order-
word of the “one percent.” It was centrally issued by Adbusters 
but, against all expectations, opened onto the assembly-form 
of attempted direct democracy and its swarm of expressive 
agitations, with just as unexpected powers of contagion. What 
is needed is an ecology of qualitatively different, but correlated, 
agitations operating in both dimensions at once, micro- and 
macro, playing minor gestures and order-words, in alternation 
and concertation.
KW: You have been using some of the same vocabulary to 
describe counter-ontopower as you do to talk about the 
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ontopower it opposes. For example potential, and the idea of 
making the future actionable in the present. One of the ways 
you talk about ontopower accessing the future in the present 
is through the notion of double-conditional, the “could have .. 
would have.” How does that work, and how is it different from 
how counter-ontopowers work with futurity?
BM: That really goes to the crux of why I started working on 
the concept of ontopower, in the aftermath of 9/11. It seemed 
to me that the kind of vocabulary that had been used by the 
revolutionary left since May ‘68 could just as easily be applied 
to the dominant regime of power that I felt was consolidating 
itself in the post 9/11 period, and was already prominent in 
the management and business strategy vocabulary of the 
hypercapitalists of the 1990s. But part of me felt that even 
within this convergence, there was a qualitative distinction to be 
made, between ontopower as the new dominant and counter-
ontopowers. It is the way in which the future is made actionable 
in the present, the mode of potentialization, that makes the 
difference. When I use the phrase counter-ontopower, I don’t 
mean that they are the opposite of ontopower, but rather that 
there are ontopowers that run counter to the dominant mode.
The dominant mode of ontopower crystallizes as a military 
move. I am referring to preemption. That is the idea that I talk 
about in Ontopower that threat has become so ubiquitous and 
unpredictable that it is apt to irrupt into a full-fledged danger 
anywhere, in any form, at any moment. Threat is now by nature 
“asymmetrical”: it is fleeter and suppler than the plodding top-
down apparatuses of the traditional military organization and 
deliberative political decision-making. To wait until a threat 
materializes into a full-fledged danger is too late: it will already 
have hit before you know it. So you have to hit it before it emerges. 
This is how George W. Bush put it in his administration’s official 
military strategy.
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This makes preemption a directly temporal mode of power. It 
requires the application of what some military strategists have 
called “the force to own time.” You have to act not in time, but on 
time. You have to go back to the “before,” as it is in the present. 
This is the present-futurity of what already potentially brewing, 
about to brim over into action. You have to act on the incipiency 
of actions to come. This poses sticky perceptual problems.
KW: Looking at what you develop in Ontopower one could 
ask: How do you perceive what is imperceptibly brewing 
and may be coming, before it has taken on the contours of a 
recognizable object?
BM: Well, the only way to do that is to stir the mix, and make 
what may come, come. Flush it out into taking a determinate 
form you can determinedly attack. Make it start to “go kinetic” 
so you can meet it, counter-kinetically, as it is just arising, before 
it has actioned-out, before it can detonate, and before it can 
defend itself. This is what I call the “perception attack.” The 
practice of war recenters on the problem of the preemptive 
perception attack. The perception attack is a way of taking 
the battlefield into the field of emergence, of weaponizing 
potential. It is military power becoming-immanent to life’s field 
of emergence: “endocolonizing” (Virilio) the transformational-
relational field; capturing change itself. This is a kind of power 
that is productive of what it fights: the perception-attack leavens 
the threat, makes it rise, so it can be seen, recognized, and 
stamped out, before it solidifies into an objective danger.
The time-signature of preemption leads to a paradox. This is 
a strange kind of paradox that makes everything done in the 
name of preemption right and true, even if it was wrong (rather 
than merely undecidable as to its truth or falseness). This is 
the paradox of the “could-have/would-have,” also explicitly 
articulated by Bush: it turns out, he opined, that Saddam Hussein 
did not have weapons of mass destruction; but he could have 
68 Chapter 1
had them for all we knew; and he is the sort that if could have 
had them, he would have had them forthwith, and he would have 
used them without a second thought. Therefore, we were right 
to invade Iraq. The proof? Iraq did indeed become a breeding 
ground of terrorism.
KW: Witness ISIS...
BM: Yes, the fact that it was the US decision to preemptively 
invade that made Iraq a breeding ground for terrorism is treated 
as if it is beside the point. All it means is that the invasion 
multiplied the opportunities to fight terrorism. It successfully 
flushed out more threats. To be successful, preemptive attack 
has to be iterative, cyclically producing and attacking what it 
fights. Asymmetrical war is the Long War, with many rounds to 
go, and we shouldn’t shrink from it. By this logic, what was wrong 
was not Bush’s invasion of Iraq, but Obama’s unwillingness to 
follow through to the end in Iraq and Afghanistan and to up the 
ante by invading Syria. His preemptive strategy went drone-ward 
instead: toward the preemptive war equivalent of the minor 
gesture (all but imperceptible on the systemic level, liminally 
war-waging, leveraging surplus-values of the flow of surveillance 
information). In that direction, he was most willing and eager, 
becoming the kill-list president.
This logic allows any decision to be factually wrong, but 
preemptively right, in the perpetual future-perfect tense: when 
we act preemptively, we always will have been right. Faced with 
any threat, you can say “could-have/would have,” will have been.
A threat is different from a danger. It is effectively menacing the 
moment it is felt as a threat, even if it isn’t effectively present. 
Threat does make itself present, but not in the form of a clear-
and-present danger, rather in the form of fear. Fear is the 
presence of the futurity of threat. Threat, as it presents itself, 
is a creature of affect. “Reality-based” deliberation has to yield 
to the affective facts, and the affective facts always indicate 
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preemptive action – if we are to feel secure. Preemption is 
entirely bound up with security. Wherever security mechanisms 
are taken, the logic of preemption is in some way activated. So 
while preemption crystallized in its baldest, most extreme form 
as a mode of military power, it has proliferated piggy-backed 
on security concerns. It is also a policing logic on the domestic 
front. And it is a financial logic – derivatives as a “securitization” 
strategy says it all. It has gone viral. Ontopower explores the viral 
logic of preemption, with a focus on its weaponization of the 
relation between the field of immanence and perception and the 
dynamics of the affective contagions this produces.
The way all of this comes back to the question of the 
endocolonization of potential and the possibility of making 
qualitative distinctions that break the symmetry between 
dominant power and resistance to it, centers on the tautology of 
the could-have/would have and its paradoxical power to make 
wrong into a priori right. The making of wrong into right is an 
operation of legitimation. Preemptive power operationalizes 
threat in a way that is self-legitimizing, independent of rational 
argument. As a result, it can be used to legitimate the people and 
collective apparatuses that wield it by purely affective means.
KW: Do counter-ontopowers, for their part, care about 
self-legitimation?
BM: No. They are concerned with self-valorization. They don’t 
try to be right when they’re wrong, they try to supplement the 
necessity of error. They also target perception at the constitutive 
level at which it is just forming, but they do so in a way oriented 
toward resituating the constitutional error of experience in an 
expanded field where it takes on qualitative “added-value” as 
a relational surplus-value of life that makes the event worth 
living for its own intensity – where, instead of being right, it 
becomes beautiful. They also operate in an affective register. 
Counter-ontopower’s affective orientation toward the generation 
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of alter-surplus-values it by nature anti-capitalist and anti-
militaristic. Dominant ontopower power leverages threat in a 
way that feeds the capitalist machinery with which the military 
apparatus is in symbiosis. It also produces a surplus-value of 
perception, in the form of a productively preempted threat.
However, that surplus-value of perception is not produced 
for itself, but for the service its playing-out provides for the 
furtherance of the capitalist process. Preemption’s capture of 
change is captured for capital. It could-have/would have forms 
a closed loop, channeling the futurity of potential back into 
capitalist channels. Preemption preempts the openness of the 
future to the great outside of potential, pre-formatting it for 
capture by the capitalist process. It makes the future actionable 
only in order to close it back down, to recapture it in the capitalist 
relation and the limits of the process it governs.
Counter-ontopowers’ affirmation of values other than capitalist 
surplus-value puts them at loggerheads with the capitalist 
process, in consonance with non-capitalist modes of relation 
ungoverned by the logic of capital. As these movements self-
affirm, and push toward their mode of relation’s ulterior limit, 
they are in the same movement pushing toward the ulterior limit 
of capitalism. They must do this in a non-militarisic way, or they 
will get ugly. When discord plays out in such a way that emergent 
tendencies oppose and curtail each other, when the tendency 
of tendencies is to construe their own self-accomplishment as 
hinging on the annihilation of the others, then the “beauty” of 
radical differential-mutual-inclusion becomes impossible.
This, unfortunately, is the direction things seem to be heading 
in today, under the sway of identitarian becomings-reactive 
butting heads with each other. Counter-ontopower’s orientation 
is aesthetic, not warlike (which is one of the reasons I prefer 
the vocabulary of activism to that of militantism). Counter-
ontopowers move within the horizon of the discordant 
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co-patterning of incommensurable contrasts that constitute 
Whitehead’s beauty. They are tendentially nonviolent, in a 
way that does not translate into the moralism associated 
with nonviolence as a transcendent principle. For counter-
ontopowers, there are no transcendent principles, just immanent 
stirrings and self-affirming arcs of self-accomplishment, cycling 
back in a looping that is cut into, schizzed wide open, by strange 
intrusions, returning always to the great outside. This is what 
Whitehead called the “adventure.” We should goad each other on 
to adventure, not beat each other with weaponized potential, or 
brow-beat each other with militant pronouncements.
2Movements of Thought
Interview with Brian Massumi 
By Adrian Heathfield
Adrian Heathfield: Does movement play a role in your 
writing practice?
Brian Massumi: Like a lot of people, I have to get up and move. 
I tend to pace, or do something else that’s rhythmic. It’s often 
when I’m in movement and not specifically thinking about what 
I’m writing that the ideas come. It puts me into the movement 
of the writing itself. When I was learning to translate, I quickly 
realized that it’s as important, if not more important, to analyze 
the rhythm of the language. The semantic aspects aren’t 
separate from the rhythm, and other non-semantic factors. I 
started thinking in terms of managing the paces and pulses of 
ideas, and the fields of ambiguity surrounding the concepts. Not 
all ambiguities are equal. Each phrase is surrounded by a field of 
ambiguity carrying sets of connotations, some broader, others 
more narrow, some readily accessible, others backgrounded. 
How they all come together, and the tensions between them, 
inflects the reading. If you just translate what’s there, you miss 
the inflection, you miss the movement. To translate “faithfully,” 
as if there were a one-to-one correspondence between words 
in different languages, is just a rigorous way of falsifying. It’s 
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the bane of academic translating. There isn’t even a one-to-
one correspondence between the words that are there in one 
language and the textual movement of meaning production. 
Meaning is always fielded.
When I started developing my own writing practice, this lesson 
stayed with me. I was very influenced by that exercise of 
ventriloquizing other people’s style through translation. I started 
to pay a lot of attention to the movement of my own writing. 
There’s a point when I’m composing where the movement starts 
to take over and I begin to feel that instead of me thinking the 
concepts, the movement is thinking them through me. The 
concepts are fielding themselves, step by step, pulse by pulse. 
There’s a certain sense of abandon, or perhaps surrender. But 
it’s a surrender to the intensity of a movement of thought in 
the making, with all its precision – which in the way I mean it 
includes the way the text manages its ambiguities and distributes 
inflections. It became very intuitive to me, the notion that 
thought is a force that moves through personal enunciation, 
rather than being contained in it.
AH: That’s super interesting to me because it obviously connects 
to a recurring gesture in the rich history of creative writing 
practices: a giving over of oneself to other forces. I’m thinking 
about automatic writing, for example, but here it’s not so much 
that you are giving yourself over to the unconscious, but to the 
non-conscious. Through attention to rhythm, an experience of 
temporality is opened and present to the process of writing.
BM: Yes, the writing has its own rhythm. Sometimes there are 
smooth runs with a sense of continuous movement. Other 
times the writing ties itself up in knots and becomes involuted, 
sometimes so tightly that I can’t necessarily parse it out myself. 
But I can’t take the involutions out, because the knotting’s 
productive. The involution feeds the problem forward. I have 
to go through the knotting in order to find the next continuing 
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thread in the conceptual weave. This idea of the thinking running 
itself through me connects with Deleuze’s notion of philosophy 
as being a creative practice in its own right. Philosophy’s not 
about critiquing concepts, and it’s not about judging other ways 
of thinking or other modes of practice. It’s about creating new 
concepts, producing new conceptual movements. This involves 
a great deal of solitary activity. Because of that, the process can 
turn in on itself and flounder in a black hole. When that happens, 
the philosophizing has to find ways of reconnecting to its own 
outside. That’s why Deleuze so often talks about the importance 
of the non-philosophical field for philosophy. The relation to non-
philosophical fields of activity is a way for philosophy to recharge 
its intensity, to refuel its movement by finding new contributing 
conditions for the next run and the next pulsing. That involves 
participating in other forms of activity that are creative, or 
experimental, or exploratory, and trying to contrive a symbiotic 
relationship between writing and participatory forays into a non-
philosophical field, especially arenas of activity where nonverbal 
activity is a major factor and the thinking is in the doing or the 
making – dance, architecture, performance ... Philosophy can 
and should do field work, bringing the thinking that is in the 
doing into language, to give it new expression, and in the process 
renew itself. Philosophy should never erect itself as the judge of 
correctness or good sense. And it should never ‘apply’ concepts. 
It should lift them, in the sense of pirating them or hijacking 
them, always in seed form, to see how else they might grow; but 
also in the sense of making them rise, like a leavening.
AH: You mentioned philosophy’s relation to non-philosophy, 
and I was immediately surprised that one can think of forms 
of thought or action that could be deemed purely non-
philosophical. Tracking back to the question of your relation 
to philosophy itself, within a broader context of knowledge 
production, one of the things that your writing practice is 
doing is opening new facings, or encounters with other fields 
of knowledge making: the sciences, the social sciences, cultural 
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studies, the arts. This is partly about de-hierarchizing the 
relation between philosophy and these fields, given their 
historical formations, but it is also about making philosophy 
more connective, more felt, and more “grounded,” in both its 
pragmatic and ecological sense. You challenge long-installed 
distinctions in intellectual life: between the empirical and the 
speculative, common sense and experimentation, “hard” and 
“soft” thinking, as it were. So I’m wondering do you have a field 
statement in relation to philosophy itself ? What of philosophy 
needs to be disowned, and what affirmed?
BM: I think philosophy has to continually renegotiate its 
relationship to other disciplines. I wouldn’t say that I’m opposed 
to disciplinarity, but I am opposed to the control disciplines try to 
exert over forms of thought that operate otherwise or elsewhere, 
in the interstices or on the periphery. At the same time, I don’t 
see philosophy as interdisciplinary, in the way it’s usually 
practiced. I think you have to approach any mode of thought 
or experience as a function of its limits. If you think of a certain 
kind of activity as oriented by a tendency, you can ask where 
that tendency leads when it is taken to the limit. That amounts 
to asking what that mode of activity can do when it’s doing what 
it does best, and in what sense that is something only it can 
do. Take it on a run to the limit of what it can do, and see what 
comes, as an experiment. Philosophy is the activity of running 
thought experiments. 
In the first instance, this way of doing things separates a mode 
of activity from others. When philosophy runs away with itself, 
takes itself to its own limit, and truly creates concepts, one thing 
that is guaranteed to happen is that its thinking will outrun utility. 
It will be tapping experimentally into the futurity in the present, 
it will be bringing to expression powers of thought that are just 
dawning. The context is not quite ready for them. They lack a 
proper context. The concepts will be breaking new territory, and 
function and utility will have to catch up, new ones will have to be 
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invented, for which new contexts will emerge. Intensely coherent 
uselessneess is a symptom of philosophy’s success. 
But in a second moment, something else happens. Because right 
at that moment, of intensest creativity, philosophy falls out of 
itself, into an absolute proximity with other modes of activity. 
It’s maybe easier to see what I mean using another example, 
say the senses. What can vision do best, what can it do that no 
other sense modality can do? I would say, colour. Touch can 
do form and outline, in its own way, but colour is untouchable. 
Yet where colour is operating most intensely, say in color field 
painting, there is suddenly a sense of movement in colour. Vision 
has taken up into itself another sense modality. Kinesthesia, 
which in its own mode is invisible, has become visible. And at 
the same time, vision has become kinesthetic. A similar thing 
happens when philosophy reaches the limit of what it can do. 
When it brings the futurity in the present to expression, it’s 
verging on the emergence of new contexts. What is that, if not 
political? Or at least proto-political. Couched in those dawning 
contexts are new forms of perception, new modes of experience. 
And what is that, if not aesthetic, or at least proto-aesthetic? 
If the emphasis, for example, is on new experiences of space, 
philosophy is absorbed in becoming architectural – at the same 
time architecture is absorbed in becoming philosophical. It’s a 
two-way transformation, where the culmination of one mode 
of activity opens out onto another, or others, in a shared state 
of renewal. The non-philosophical – the political, the aesthetic, 
everyday modes of experience, other disciplines – reasserts and 
renews itself at the end of a successful philosophical run. The 
activity of philosophy starts and ends with the non-philosophical.
The point is that the relation of a mode of activity to others is 
immanent to its exercise. It’s not inter-, its infra-. But I’m talking 
here of modes of activity, not disciplines. It’s not necessarily 
the case that a discipline that claims rights over a mode of 
activity actually takes it to its limit. More often, it curtails any 
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movement to the limit. Philosophy departments are typically 
the last place you’ll find philosophy practiced creatively in the 
way I’m talking about. Disciplines are concerned with gate-
keeping to safeguard their prerogatives, and with reproducing 
themselves institutionally. That’s why I never formally studied 
philosophy, and have never taught in a philosophy department. 
The authors I was interested in were being kept outside the 
gates, and I had to go into French literature to do philosophy. 
That interdisciplinary move was a necessary condition for doing 
philosophy for me. I think the non-philosophical has two senses. 
The primary sense is philosophy’s convergence on other modes 
of activity from within its own tendency, taken to the limit. 
You could call that transdisciplinary. Then there’s a secondary 
sense of the non-philosophical that is a consequence of that, 
which is interdisciplinary moment, when philosophy nests itself, 
cuckoo–like, in another arena of activity, in order to be able 
to follow its own movement unencumbered by the discipline 
that has grown up to contain it. Interdisciplinarily, if it’s doing 
its job, philosophy will never be entirely accepted. I currently 
teach in a communications department. I’m treated well, and 
what I do is tolerated, but only as long as it doesn’t lead too 
many students astray or take up too much space. That kind of 
uneasiness is because of philosophy’s necessary relation to the 
useless, its outrunning of function and utility. Disciplines vie for 
funding and students by making arguments about how socially 
useful they are. The first thing I tell my students when I start a 
new class is that if I’m truly successful in my teaching what I will 
teach them will have absolutely no immediate benefit for the job 
market. This doesn’t exactly endear me to most of them. They’re 
supposed to be paying for a service, after all. Philosophy is not a 
service industry.
AH: In your recent writing, the idea of the event has been 
very important and I take from that the notion that an event 
is something elementally transformational. It is something 
singular; something old and new, continuous and discontinuous, 
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at the same time. But it is also extinguished, it evaporates, it 
disappears. I’m wondering how this notion of event relates to the 
everyday, and to the mundane even [dog barking] – and there it 
is! It was a mundane event. Now we don’t even need to do the 
discourse. [laughter] If one thinks in this way one sees, then, 
event everywhere. But for there to be an event at all doesn’t 
there need to be a bracketing around that event? There would 
need to be a constitutive zone or condition of the uneventful? Is 
there then an event of the mundane or even of the banal?
BM: I would say the mundane is full of events. They’re just 
events that on the surface present themselves as being more 
repetition than variation, or that background themselves behind 
other events or objects that might stand out in relief. The object 
is not a non-event. It’s just a slower-paced event compared to 
our activity around it, or toward it. An object is full of activity, 
in it and all around. There’s activity inside it that’s invisible to 
the human eye because it’s too small or too fast. The material 
that composes it is churning with action on the molecular level. 
And there’s activity around that changes it at a rate too slow to 
see – the way it weathers for example, or goes through a phase-
shift, like sap to amber. In our mundane relation to objects, we 
connect with them between these two extremes, where the 
object is sluggish relative to the swiftness of our hands, but not 
too slow to grasp. The object is not the opposite of the event, it’s 
a certain nexus of events. So you’re right, if you start rethinking 
philosophy emphasizing the eventfulness of life, you have to 
rethink a host of concepts.
You can’t start with the object as it’s usually thought of, as a 
more or less inert lump of matter. You can’t start from a concept 
of substance either, because a nexus of events has relation, it’s a 
composition of movements, but there’s nothing underlying them, 
they hold each other in place. Everything is in the way they come 
together and co-compose. There’s no stuff. If you go down far 
enough, all you reach is the void, the restless energy field of the 
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quantum void. You can’t start with the subject either, because a 
nexus of events is in the world, not in an interiority. There is only 
one place to start, and that’s with activity. You have to say that 
the only thing certain is that there is activity always going on, and 
that’s what the world is made of. And when you say that, you’ve 
just added to the activity. Thought itself is an event. So start 
there, and take it to the limit.
A common misconception about this kind of event- or process-
oriented philosophy is that it’s a philosophy of pure flow or pure 
continuity. This is a tenacious misunderstanding of thinkers like 
Bergson, Whitehead, and Deleuze and Guattari, which has always 
surprised me. Because you just have to read one page of a book 
like Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus to see that they make 
the cut as primordial as the continuity (1983). In a process, it’s 
not continuity or rupture, it’s always both. For example when 
the dog interrupted us, he’d taken a big breath, he’d braced 
himself for us going by, he was ready for us. Then he let go, and 
the bark that emerged had an arc to it. It had an internal rhythm, 
it was pulsed, it was composed of mini-events of variation of 
tone and loudness. But the mini-events folded into each other 
to compose a bark, with an overall affect: surprise. That affect 
was also an immediate effect: it gave us pause. It cut into our 
conversation, it produced a rupture in it. The bark was a single 
event for our conversation, even though it was composed of 
any number of mini-events. It figured in our conversation as a 
continuity: one bark, rolling across its pulses. It presented itself 
with a dynamic unity of unfolding that cut it off on the one hand 
from the continuity of the ambient background sound, and on 
the other made it cut into the continuity of our conversation: cut 
and continuity.
So you have to think in terms of rupture and continuity at the 
same time, which means putting them together processually. 
It’s a distraction that goes nowhere to talk about them as 
oppositions or contradictions, because that’s not what they are. 
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They’re co-factors in process. They co-occur, and events happen 
between them. The way that co-occurring plays out will give 
the event a certain arc, a certain lifetime, depending on how it’s 
conditioned, how it’s energized. And then it will dissipate, it will 
“perish,” as Whitehead says. Every event, however mundane, 
however small, has a singularity to it. There’s always something 
different about how it plays out, there’s a unique experiential 
flavor to it. So when we talk about the “new” from a process 
philosophy point of view, we’re not talking about a new object, or 
a new thing, or new gadget, or even a new function. We’re talking 
about the singularity of events – how each is a unique coming-
about, even if it’s also a repetition, even if the “same” event, like 
taking a step, which has happened a million times before. The 
new has to do with what Daniel Stern calls “vitality affect.” That’s 
the sense of this happening here and now, just this once in just 
this way – and then it’s gone. It’s the registering of the singularity 
of this event. The new is the event’s eventfulness. It’s the event-
quality of the event. It’s not a characteristic or property of things. 
AH: It’s a slightly obvious question but maybe it produces 
something interesting: that seems to imply then that there may 
be very little distinction between an aestheticized event and a 
natural event as such. The aesthetic runs all the way through 
perceived reality. But for an artist, that might be a difficult 
thought. There is quite an investment in traditions of art and 
performance practice, of rupturing forms, by opening to the 
event, to the occasion. Are there any specific qualities that 
you would identify with an aesthetic event that you would not 
identify with a natural one?
BM: I wouldn’t make a sharp distinction between them, because 
if you think about events in the way I was just talking about, 
every manner of event is pressing, or present in tendency, in 
the germinal phases of every other event. Every event detaches 
itself from the background noise of all the events it might have 
been. Which is a challenge more to history than to art, because 
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it implies that to write history you have to do something like 
what Foucault calls archeology. It’s not just about the causes 
of what happened. It’s as much about the consistency of the 
might-have-been – the background of potential that events cut 
away from. It’s as much about the doable as the done, and the 
sayable and the seeable, as the said and the seen. You have 
to make a distinction between conditioning and causing. The 
conditions of an event are always much broader than any linear 
causal relationship. The question of conditioning is: in what way, 
for this event, in its germination, have other modes of activity 
come into play, only to fall out of its rising arc? Even so, how may 
they have resonated together, and with the singularity of this 
arising event? How may they have interfered with each other, 
to inflect the event’s happening, even though they didn’t enter 
directly into its constitution? Might that tension, that germinal 
intensity of activity, have contributed to the singularity of what 
happened as it followed its own tendency to completion? Might 
it even potentially complicate the birth of the event so that what 
happens might actually have to take a new tack, even invent a 
tendency for itself? I would situate the aesthetic on this nascent 
level of event-conditioning. The aesthetic has to do with the 
overfullness with potential of what actually happens, and the 
renewal that comes of it. It’s that dimension of experience, 
and any attunement to it. I wouldn’t separate out the aesthetic 
as a separate domain or realm of activity. The aesthetic is a 
dimension of every event’s arising. The question then becomes 
a very pragmatic and constructive one. By what means can that 
dimension of a given event be brought out? By bringing it out, 
can you develop the aesthetic dimension into a tendency in its 
own right? What would happen if you did, and then took that 
tendency to the limit of what it could do? That would be the job 
of art: to distill the aesthetic dimension belonging to every event 
into an event in itself.
Going back to the idea of vitality affect, and our discussion of 
the dog bark, I was saying that you feel it coming even before 
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you can consciously understand what the event is about, in the 
sense of reflecting about it. At that first exhalation of the dog 
barking, you’re already in the barking before you’ve consciously 
identified it as barking, you’re in the arrival of the bark, in a way 
that takes you directly into its movement. You know you’re in 
it, before you can register that fact reflectively. You’re already 
inducted into the event, thinking it on the same level you are 
feeling it, before you can reflect. You’re feeling the singularity of 
this event, at the same time as your induction into it is awakening 
all sorts of things that retrospectively, when you have the luxury 
of reflecting on it, you will recognize as belonging to that kind 
of event. Every barking is singular, but no event ever comes just 
once. They repeat, and the repetition is just as much a part of 
what makes the event as its singularity. So at the same as we’re 
feeling the event dawning, we’re starting to feel the likeness of 
the event. This isn’t a comparison yet, because you can only 
compare when you have an outside vantage point on more than 
one event, but here you’re absorbed in this event. The likeness 
of the event is to itself, as it’s occurring. It’s how the event 
carries its relation to other events, past and potential, in itself, 
presenting both what makes it comparable to them as one of 
their kind, and its own singularity that sets it apart. The likeness 
of the event to itself, in itself, is the difference the event has in 
its own constitution between what’s new in it and what could 
be recognized in it, or between how it can be experienced as a 
repetition of a certain kind and why it has to be experienced at 
the same time as a variation. This is a minimal difference. Later, 
on reflection, when things are quiet, that minimal difference can 
be pried open in reflection, making space for comparison with 
other events.
This likeness of the event to itself is as much a part of the 
event as what actually happens causally, for example in terms 
of what molecules shift place. It’s directly experienced, even 
though it can’t be equated with the causal movement. It’s in the 
movement of the event as such. It’s part of the quality of the 
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event. The qualitative aspect of the event that you can’t reduce to 
quantifiable movements is what I call the semblance of the event 
(Massumi 2011). My proposition is that this qualitative aspect 
is where the aesthetic dimension lies. That minimal difference 
is what the philosopher Raymond Ruyer calls its “aesthetic 
yield.” The question for art is: what can be done with that? What 
may art do? Does it develop that minimal difference into a big 
difference that might lead to new reflections? Does it lift that 
event-quality out of the event, holding it in suspense? Does it 
suspend the already established functionings of the organism 
and the already established meanings of the context, at least for 
an instant before they fall back into place as the event peaks? 
Does it suspend the connection to form and function, and allow 
the dawning event’s fullness with potential to vibrate? If it does 
that, where can that lead? What can it bring it out, if anything? 
Does it short-circuit reflection? Or carry it to a higher power? 
AH: The vitality affect of the event, and its relation to history, 
has been a very big problem for performance art. For such a 
long time performance was associated with presence, with a 
presentational force as opposed to a representational order, and 
so the document, the archive, historiography, etc. were seen as 
suspect iterations in relation to the force of the event. But that 
has led a lot of people to say this is really reifying the event; 
entangling it with “the authentic,” putting a lot of pressure and 
investment into very specific qualities of the event, which may be 
re-performed in other representational forms. So we move from 
trying to think about the ontology of performance as absolutely 
founded in disappearance, towards an ontogenetic model where 
performance is recurring iteratively, proliferating differences 
through multiple forms.
BM: Yes. I think that iterative structure, the structure of variation 
and repetition, has always been part of every art and every craft. 
Technology has accelerated it. Everything is pre-adapted for 
iteration, for quick capture, turnover and distribution. But it’s 
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not just a distribution of things, it’s also of events. If you think 
of it that way, it raises a whole new set of questions. It makes 
reification less of a focus. Things don’t stand still long enough 
to become fixed. There’s still reification, but it’s just a thinner 
and thinner threshold between turnovers. Which means that 
the idea of reification as standardizing and homogenizing is 
out of date. If you do start from activity as the base concept, 
and move into an event-based approach, it’s really all about 
singularization. Reification is just a passing phase in a process of 
continuing variation. Contemporary capitalism is more moving 
than it is reifying. Which is not to say it’s better than its earlier 
incarnations, like the industrial capitalism that the concept of 
reification was designed to grapple with.
AH: When we encountered the dog earlier, you talked of the 
phenomena of the dog arriving before they arrived. You gave the 
dog bark a particular temporal dynamic as a phenomenon. My 
sense is that this term “semblance” is really important for you 
in relation to this kind of occurrence. I take it immediately when 
one says something like “semblance” that it is distinguished from 
resemblance, and from representation. It is already something 
that is less than, or even more than that. I also understand from 
what you are saying that a semblance is something informed by 
the co-constitution of the senses …
BM: Yes.
AH: … all the senses interrelating in particular ways. A semblance 
is then a kind of feeling of something, but it’s a feeling of 
something not yet conscious, not yet arrived.
BM: Exactly. It’s about the interrelating of the senses, but doesn’t 
correspond in any direct manner to sensory input, however 
multi-channeled. The lived quality of an event, its vitality affect, 
which I associated with the semblance, can’t be plotted back 
to any particular sensory input. It doesn’t correspond to a 
particular impingement of light on our retina, or sound on our 
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eardrums. You can’t think the event without thinking beyond 
that level of sense-impression. The semblance of the event is 
nonsensuous. But that doesn’t mean it’s an illusion. It’s as much 
a part of the reality of the event as the movement of molecules 
and photons and their physical impingements on our sensory 
apparatus. Semblance is a way of saying that there’s something 
else in play that isn’t sensuous and in no way resembles it. Does 
a sound wave impinging on our eardrum resemble a dog? I’ve 
never encountered a dog in the shape of a sine wave. Does a 
photon that hits our retina resemble an object? Photons are by 
nature invisible. But they give rise to vision. That’s the point – the 
event never resembles its conditions of emergence. It surpasses 
them, into its own reality as an event, striking on the level on 
which it is experienced. It can’t be reduced to any other level. 
But at the same time it can’t be separated from any of the levels 
that contribute to its emergence. It wraps them up into its own 
arising. Some of those enveloped levels are sensuous, in other 
words correspond to a physical impingement on our body’s 
perceptual apparatus, and some are already nonsensuous. For 
example, every event wraps its immediate past into its unrolling. 
Through the immediate past come more distant regions of the 
past, in the form of various inheritances passing down the line 
of events as they repeat and vary. The immediate past is no 
longer. What is no longer has no physically impinging presence, 
and so can’t possibly correspond to any sensuous input. It’s by 
nature nonsensuous. So is the immediate future that the event 
tends toward, following the momentum it has inherited from the 
immediate past. All of this is something Whitehead emphasizes, 
and makes fundamental to his metaphysics (Whitehead 
1967: 180-183).
One example of a semblance that I often think about goes back 
to my childhood. It was just a small event, but it has stayed 
with me. I was in a car and a van sped past, lost control, and 
left its lane. It tried to swerve back in the right lane without 
hitting our car, and it rolled over several times. There’s a kind 
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of untimeliness to an event like that. It happens so quickly, 
in a state of shock, that you’re bracing for what’s happening 
without cognizing it. You’re aware of what’s happening, of 
course, intensely aware of it, but not in any way you would 
compare to your normal state of reflective cogitation. You know 
exactly what’s happening, but you couldn’t put it into words. 
The understanding comes as a feeling, with a distinct affective 
tonality and force. But in the feeling there is already a thinking 
of the event. You’re braced for what might come. All kinds of felt 
hypotheses about what exactly will happen in the end hit you 
en masse. I call this ‘in-bracing,’ because it’s less that you’re in 
your head bracing for what’s coming, than you’re in the potential 
of the event, body and soul, braced into the event as surely as 
your seat belt braces you to your car. You are utterly absorbed 
in the event, at no distance from its happening. In that bracing, 
you can’t know exactly how it will turn out, but you certainly 
know how it’s “like” to be in that event. That’s pretty much all 
you know. That minimal difference I was talking about before is 
intensified, to the point that it feels uncanny. You have a weird 
sense of déjà-vu, knowing full well that this is a singular event. 
The déjà-vu is not a comparison to a past event. It’s the weird, 
intensified feeling of this event’s likeness to itself: “so this is what 
it’s like be in an accident …” It’s like the event is doubled. At the 
same time it is intensely itself, it is just as intensely like itself. That 
déjà-vu feeling is the semblance of the event. It’s like the abstract 
double of the event. What it boils down to is the feeling of the 
event’s potential to be just what it will have come to be, while the 
potential is still playing out. It’s like a feeling of the dynamic form 
of the event, its arcing out of potential into its own completion. 
This is a thinking-feeling, in the sense that the immediacy of the 
feeling isn’t separable from abstractness, from the abstractness 
of potential, and from the semblance as the event’s uncanny self-
abstraction. None of that can be parsed out into separate sense 
inputs. The sound of the tires screeching heightens your seeing 
the swerve. You’re not hearing separately from seeing. You’re 
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experiencing their interrelationship. The hearing and the seeing 
wrap up together in the semblance.
Another example I like comes from the philosopher Suzanne 
Langer. It’s the example of being in the kitchen in front of the 
sink washing dishes when you sense a scurrying in the periphery 
of your experience. It’s a niggling feeling that you couldn’t even 
identify as something you’re hearing. Even if it’s just a niggling, 
it braces you into the coming event. You know already it’s 
coming, without knowing what it is that’s coming. Then you see a 
movement on the periphery of your vision. It’s not yet a sight. It’s 
a niggling feeling at the edge of vision. The scurrying sound and 
the scurry of almost-seen movement fuse. In their interrelation, 
an immediately lived hypothesis imposes itself: mouse. You 
brace for a mouse event. You are in-braced into a mousing 
event. The event is immediately vectorized in terms of its mouse 
potential: the mouse could be coming towards you, it could be 
going past you, you could be going in one direction, it could be 
going in another. You ‘see’ all this as a tangle of abstract lines – 
mouse trajectories and human trajectories, in their interrelation. 
Mouse tendencies and human tendencies dancing around each 
other, playing themselves out together. The tangle sorts itself 
out as soon as you consciously register the mouse form, as soon 
as you cognise it. Now the event resolves into one abstract line: 
the immediate past of the mouse’s movement arcing toward a 
terminus. You don’t just see the mouse. What you mainly see 
is the arcing, its dynamic form – its semblance – and you act 
accordingly, by jumping aside or rushing after in attack. What 
you’ve seen and act according to is the semblance of the event. 
Nothing sensuous corresponds to it. What you’re “seeing” is the 
abstract double of the event, still with some unresolved potential 
(the mouse could still veer, you could hesitate between fight and 
flight). So the semblance weaves together the immediate past, 
the immediate future in the dynamic unity of the event that is 
seen without being visible. If you just saw the visible mouse and 
not the dynamic unity, you’d be powerless to react. The event is 
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moving too fast to visually track the mouse. You don’t so much 
see the mouse, as the abstract mouse-line of the event. 
AH: So thinking about the semblance as it arises in the aesthetic, 
it reminds me a lot of that phrase of Bergson’s: “a little nothing 
that is everything in a work of art.” And in relation to aesthetics, 
because of its base in the interrelation of the senses, I imagine 
the semblance has a very strong relationship to the invisible, 
to the untouchable, to the silent. But I’m wondering if it’s not 
previously figured in many ways in art history and aesthetics, 
and two immediate examples where it might be found would 
be in the ghostly, and in the sublime, the presentation of the 
unpresentable. But the semblance seems more promising in 
relation to both, because it is something that really thinks the 
imperceptible, not just through sight, but through the senses and 
phenomena of the whole organism, the whole human animal.
BM: The semblance has an uncanniness, but it doesn’t have to 
be so grand as the sublime or so destabilizing as the ghostly. 
You could think of the semblance as a kind of ghostliness 
doubling every sensory experience. The ghostliness is related 
to the feeling of déjà-vu I was talking about. We experience the 
abstract line of the mouse event as if it were in vision, when it 
actually isn’t. The semblance always comes out of the interaction 
between senses. It’s what Michel Chion, the cinema theorist, 
talks about as a synchresis: an emergent effect that works across 
sense modalities and has a unique quality that neither has alone. 
(Chion 1994). He gives examples of how we have the experience 
of seeing things in a film that are actually only heard. But if the 
timing is right, the sound’s interaction with vision creates a sight 
that was “heard.” It’s actually a fusion of hearing and vision: 
audio-vision. It’s what happens between the two, in the way they 
come together. The semblance always happens between two, 
or between three, or between any number of senses that might 
be involved. It’s not in a sense modality. It’s “amodal.” What’s 
between two sense modalities is not in one or the other, it’s 
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in their relationship, and in that relationship a unique form of 
experience emerges that has a quality all its own that’s amodal. It 
always has to do with the composition of the senses. That means 
that you can manipulate or create or construct semblances by 
how you technically rearrange their conditions of emergence. 
That little nothing that is everything in art that you were talking 
about in relation to Bergson, I think that it has to do with the 
amodal, and the idea that what emerges on the amodal level 
doesn’t resemble its conditions of emergence. That aspect of the 
event’s non-resemblance to its own conditions – which is at the 
same time its likeness to itself – means that the event is taking 
a certain distance on itself. That aspect is not often attended to 
directly, but it can be. It’s that little something, or little nothing, 
that makes all the difference, that effectively makes the event 
the event that it is, with its unique vitality affect. That’s precisely 
the event’s aesthetic dimension. For example, if you have an 
interactive form of art based on conversation or conviviality, 
what makes it art, and not just a conversation? A conversation 
has its own mode of activity. A conversation becomes artistic 
when the conditions of its occurrence are set in a way that 
offsets it slightly from its own mode, that create that minimal 
distance of conversation to itself, giving it a unique vitality affect 
that just any conversation doesn’t have – a little something 
extra. In what we recognise as an art context, we’re primed to 
attend to the something extra. Art brings the amodal, and the 
qualitative element of vitality affect that coincides with it, to 
more palpable expression.
AH: Part of what you’re invoking in these phenomena seem 
to be elements of experience that are in some way or another 
excessive, unpossessable. But I’m wondering how this relates 
to aesthetics in the sphere of what people are calling the 
“experience economy,” where what is being traded, bought and 
sold is no longer simply a material object, but a set of affects 
associated with objects or an experience itself, or a “service” as 
one might say, in slightly older language. There has been a vast 
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expansion of experiential practices in contemporary art in the 
last twenty or thirty years: the development of relational art, 
then participatory practices, the reincorporation of performance 
art into the visual arts institutions, and now dance has followed 
this assimilation. So I’m wondering what you think of experiential 
art practices in this capitalized context? What happens to 
those aspects and dynamics of excess, of redundancy or 
waste, when capital has become so great at turning those very 
phenomena into value?
BM: That’s a very good question. I was talking earlier about how 
an event-based way of thinking centers on process. Capitalism 
itself is a process, the prime process of our epoch. As a process, it 
shares a lot of the characteristics I was talking about. As markets 
have become saturated with consumer objects, capitalism 
has become more and more focused on selling experience. Its 
constant need for turnover means that it’s centrally concerned 
with the emergence of experience, its repetition and variation 
in new iterations. This focuses it on what I was just describing as 
the aesthetic dimension. When I was talking about vitality affect 
and the semblance as a qualitative double that is the thinking-
feeling of what’s happening, but comes in excess over any literal 
interpretation of the event, I was talking about a kind of surplus-
value – a surplus-value of life. Surplus-value of life is in excess 
over function, utility, already known structures of meaning, and 
even the strictly material conditions of the event’s occurring. It’s 
what art is in the business of producing. But more and more, 
capitalism is literally in the business of doing the same thing. 
We all know the slogans: the experience economy, the creative 
economy, immaterial production. Capitalism, at its leading edge, 
is mad about producing surplus-values of life. It’s excited about 
inciting movements of emergence and of expression, tendencies 
and potentials. But what it’s most excited about is capturing 
them – channeling them into the production of its own mode 
of surplus-value, which is monetary surplus-value. It’s all about 
monetizing experience, to the point that for the neoliberal 
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economy we are no longer human beings, but “human capital.” 
Capitalism has learned to exploit experience at its emergent 
level, and to channel the emergence toward its own ends, which 
are purely quantitative: more. More turnover, more profit, always 
faster. It’s all about excess, but not qualitative excess. It’s about 
quantitative excess, which can only be produced capitalistically in 
a way that mass produces inequality. 
The problem that I grapple with is that this emergent level is also 
where you connect with the aesthetic dimension. That means 
that when art goes there, in a sense it’s going into the heart of 
the capitalist process. There’s almost no way for artistic activity 
to evade capitalist capture. Just think of the emphasis today on 
art-based research. The neoliberal university, which is more and 
more indexed to the market economy, loves it because it sees it 
as a way of corralling art for the capitalist process, as a way of 
capturing the surplus-values of life art produces and channeling 
them into monetary value production. It sees practice-based 
research as a product development laboratory for the creative 
economy. There is no getting around this question of complicity. 
Some people, like Žižek for example, say that it invalidates the 
whole event-based, process-oriented approach, that the whole 
approach is complicit through and through because of it. But 
another way of thinking about it is that it gives creative practice 
a point of contact with the capitalist process, at that problematic 
node where it converges with aesthetic activity. Why can’t that 
be a strategic node, where the potentials entering into process 
might be leveraged in a different way? Perhaps they can be 
made to evade being captured for the market and channeled 
toward the production of monetized surplus-value. Perhaps 
countertendencies might be found at that emergent level that 
are affirming surplus-values of life as values in themselves, 
and not just as qualitative means to quantitative ends? Let’s 
face it, we’re all complicit with the capitalist process. There’s no 
standing outside it. There’s no way of surviving without being 
complicit with it. So the question for me is less to denounce 
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complicity. That’s all too easy. The question is to experiment 
with modulating complicity, to learn how to inflect it toward 
other kinds of emergences which, at the limit, might be capable 
of composing a purely qualitative alter-economy of life-value. I 
think that imagining and constructing qualitative alter-economies 
is a major task of our time. And it’s a task that can only be done 
collectively.
AH: Can I ask you about Tino Sehgal in that regard? In many 
ways Sehgal’s work seems to embody that particular tension 
between the dynamics of capture by capital and some potential 
movement, or escape velocity out of capital. You performed in 
Sehgal’s This Situation recently here in Montreal: a piece that 
convenes a scene of public discourse on debates in critical 
thought and philosophy. One of the questions there, in terms 
of this tension with modes of capture, is around the nature of 
the convening of a space of public discourse: to what extent 
that space falls into generic formulae of discursive exchange, 
and therefore into a sanctioned knowledge economy? Or to 
what extent it can carry or hold a rather amorphous, constantly 
evolving, differentiating space of discourse? Does that resonate 
with your experience of making this work?
BM: Yes, well I think it’s a very good example because Sehgal is 
very consciously playing on modes of complicity. And he’s often 
criticized for bringing relational or participatory art back into the 
gallery, and for selling the work. But he’s selling it in a different 
form. He forbids documentation, visual or auditory. What he 
sells is a set of instructions for remaking the event. So he’s 
playing on the immaterial products of the new capitalist order, 
finding a way to literally sell abstract germs of artistic events. I 
wouldn’t fault him a priori for choosing to work inside the gallery, 
and I don’t think complicity in itself is an adequate critique. The 
question is, given this choice of emplacement, and the patterns 
of complicity that come with it, is there something else that can 
be made to come to pass? Is there something different that is 
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being made to happen that is not reducible to the complicity, 
but might in fact be enabled by it, and wouldn’t come about 
without it? In addition to producing a monetary surplus-value for 
himself that allows him to keep his work going, is Sehgal in any 
sense creating surplus-values of life for the participants and/or 
for the performers? This Situation is one of those artworks that 
play on the conversational form, as we were talking about earlier. 
So returning to that discussion, the question for me is, does he 
make a semblance of it? Does he open the minimal difference 
of conversation to itself so as to make it an intense likeness of 
itself, foregrounding the thinking-feeling of what is happening as 
it happens? And does having the piece in the gallery enhance or 
dampen that gesture?
In the case of This Situation, I think it’s actually a very different 
experience for the participants than for the performers. I can 
only talk about it from the performers’ side, and I have a feeling 
that it succeeds more on that side. Just to explain briefly what it’s 
about. There’s a set of quotations from thinkers starting in the 
sixteenth century going forward on just the kinds of questions 
we’ve been discussing: the relation between the aesthetic and 
the political, between the aesthetic and the economic, between 
work and leisure, and on the nature of creativity. There are six 
performers in the room standing in set position against the walls. 
Everyone has memorized an assigned number of quotations. 
A performer pronounces a quotation at a moment of their 
choosing, introducing it with a stereotyped formula mentioning 
its date but not its author. Then everyone shifts positions in a 
predesignated pattern, and once they’re in their new positions, 
there’s a discussion coming out of the quote. The positions are 
tableaux vivants gesturing to famous paintings in the European 
canon. The interaction is quite ritualized. As they are speaking, 
the performers are supposed to be gesturing nonstop at an 
excruciatingly slow pace in a rhythm that doesn’t match the 
rhythm of their speech. There are certain ways for interpellating 
the public in the gallery, inciting them to speak. The performers 
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are instructed never to comment on the performance, even in 
response to a direct question about it from the public. Meta-
reflection is forbidden. There are ritualized mechanisms for 
triggering a cut in the discussion and a move to a new position 
in order to deal with things like that without directly addressing 
them, just making the performance move past them.
So there is a whole choreography that ritualizes the conversation. 
I think this drives some people crazy, because they feel it’s not 
a “real” conversation, like it’s less than one. But that’s the point. 
The point is to make conversation reflect upon itself, not just 
to reflect in conversation on other things, and certainly not 
to reflect on conversation. When the performance is working, 
that little something less becomes a something more. The 
ritualization does create the conditions for a semblance of 
a conversation to emerge. The experience doubles over on 
itself. You’re experiencing the semblance of the conversation 
at the same time as you’re experiencing the conversation, and 
they resonate in each other to yield a peculiar vitality affect. 
This is not quite like any conversation you’ve been in before. 
There’s also a very interesting dynamic that sets in over time, 
as the performance ran for seven hours a day six days a 
week for two months, with the performers working in shifts. 
The conversational form begins to exhaust itself. There are a 
limited number of quotes, which makes for a huge amount of 
repetition for the performers. After awhile, you start rolling 
your eyes when a certain quote comes up again, because you’ve 
exhausted everything you have to say about it. So then you 
have to find a way to deal with your own potential boredom. 
This is actually the point where the performance becomes truly 
relational, because you can no longer just draw on your own 
resources – you’ve already exhausted them. You have to find 
ways of triggering the other performers into seeing the issue 
differently, so they say something different, and then you can 
work from that to generate something to say that you would 
never have thought of saying otherwise. That’s where it begins to 
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get inventive. It becomes truly improvisational. It is no longer you 
who are speaking, or some other individual. The conversation 
passes between. It truly becomes a collective enunciation – a 
subject-group as Guattari would say. It doesn’t happen all the 
time, in fact it’s pretty rare that it happens, but for me as a 
performer when it did happen it reenergized the whole piece. 
The weird thing is, the whole thing gets most intense at those 
moments, where you’re no longer speaking in your own voice, or 
performing your individual point of view. You even start saying 
things you don’t actually believe, because the situation seems 
to be asking for it to be said. It becomes a kind of group thought 
experience of what is it possible to think with these people, in 
this situation, around the issues brought up by the quotes. It 
does become a quite singular situation. It’s different each day, 
and it’s especially different depending on the cast of performers 
who happen to be there on a given shift. That makes the idea of 
selling the piece interesting, too. Without documentation, when 
the piece is reperformed, it will resingularize itself. It will go down 
really differently. So Sehgal is drawing on the iterative powers 
of variation I was talking about before, and making something 
happen that recapitulates the way capitalism and the art market 
operate, but can also make something not entirely capturable 
come to pass. Different cultural contexts undoubtedly make a 
big difference. The bilingual nature of the Montreal performance, 
and all the etiquette and tensions around which language is used 
when, certainly made for a singular dynamic in that iteration.
The reason I don’t think it works as well for the public is because 
the effects I’m describing require long duration. They come from 
the ritualization and repetition – how the piece iterates internally 
to its own performance. Some people from the public stay for 
several hours, or come back several times, but most participants 
stick their head in and leave. They don’t stay long enough to 
get any sense of what manner of event it is. The other thing is 
that the mechanisms for interpellating the public to speak more 
often clam them up. It’s very intimidating for a lot of people, 
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and when we did it, most people weren’t able to respond. But 
if they stayed, you could often sense them itching to speak, 
and if you went back to them they did participate. In any case, 
there is something unresolved in the piece having to do with the 
performer-public dynamic that left a number of the performers I 
was in it with feeling that it wasn’t really working.
AH: One of the phenomena you are describing reflects the 
way in which an approach to an aesthetics of duration enables 
you to activate a strategy of exhaustion. It is that strategy of 
exhaustion – when there is nothing left to be said between you 
– that manifests community, that is a fabric-forming, powerfully 
generative situation.
BM: Yes, because you have to step outside of your normal ways 
of entering into conversation or into a convivial situation, and 
reinvent them, without necessarily knowing what will come of 
it. And yes, the question of duration is really crucial. As you say, 
there is a certain method of exhaustion built into This Situation 
that has broader implications. Deleuze always said that in order 
to create you have to first subtract. He’s not necessarily referring 
to the number of elements, it’s not a quantitative distinction he’s 
aiming at. What he means by subtracting is putting in suspense 
the way things normally interconnect and roll onward together, 
so that there’s a moment of rejigging that has to happen for 
things to start going again. That moment of suspense can invite 
other tendencies in, and bring other unfoldings about. It’s less 
important to claim to have a solution to problems, like whether 
the gallery is so compromised that art should go entirely 
elsewhere, or how to condition the performer-public relation, or 
whether an artist who sells his or her work is selling out. These 
questions are too general to be of value. What’s important is not 
coming to supposedly final solutions to general questions. What’s 
important is problematizing – creating singular fields of collective 
experimentation that make something happen that strikes you 
as an event, and that offers a relational affordance to others who 
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might want to take up the techniques used, and rework them 
in their own way, for other situations – a kind of event-variation 
contagion. That’s not about community in the usual sense, but it 
is about collectivity. It’s about collective potentiation that inheres 
in a fabric of uniquely interwoven events, rather than in any 
group identity.
Going back to the question of surplus-value, and the distinction 
I was trying to make between surplus-value of life and the 
monetary surplus-value of capitalism. I was talking about 
surplus-value of life as a qualitative excess over functionality, 
and over capturable utility, as a self-affirming, lived value that it 
is an end in itself, in a way that doesn’t directly feed the capitalist 
process. A surplus-value of life that is truly uncapturable is, 
by virtue of that fact, ephemeral. It might return, but each 
repetition of it is a regeneration, a reinvention, with its own 
singular vitality affect. The balance shifts toward variation and 
newness in the sense I was talking about, as an event-quality 
that is inseparable from the event, and slips away the moment 
it is reified. So if we’re interested in resisting capitalist capture, 
an important element of that would be to find ways of re-valuing 
the ephemeral. Capitalism is all about ephemerality, but only as 
it serves product turnover. Capitalism’s interest in ephemerality 
is about what Schumpeter called “creative destruction.” What I’m 
talking about is ephemerality as part of a process of potentiation. 
Each singular iteration of an event has contributed a potential 
to the world that is left in reserve, or in trace form, but as a 
reactivatable trace. Its newness is renewable, across iterations. 
What kind of practice could we envision that would be dedicated 
to the production, storage, and reactivation of event-tracings 
of this kind? What techniques could be invented for that? And 
for orienting the iterations politically? There’s a term that’s 
become popular that I like a lot: the ‘anarchive’. There are a lot 
of definitions of it. I tend to think of it as an archive of events: 
an archive that stores only in order to hold an eventful coming-
again in reserve, that holds in store for reactivation and variation, 
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not to preserve. The anarchive seems to me to be an important 
avenue to explore in relation to the question that keeps coming 
up, of how to resist capitalism given there is no outside of it. 
Another aspect to grappling with that issue is collectivity. Just 
as in This Situation, when events truly renew themselves, when 
they are best able to improvise on themselves and invent 
new variations on their theme, it’s because something has 
been conditioned to occur that’s in surplus over the individual 
contributions. There’s an emergent excess that’s irreducibly 
relational, making the collectivity a group-subject. How do 
you make yourself a group-subject? How do you transmit the 
conditions that make one emerge? If you succeed in transmitting 
group-subjecthood, rather than, say, a political platform or an 
ideology, the potentials are intense. The event-contagion will 
naturally tend to escape predefined channels, and may turn 
back against the State and against capitalism. We have seen a 
number of events in the last few years that have triggered this 
kind of contagious becoming. The Arab Spring and Occupy are 
the prime examples. What if we kept experimenting collectively, 
in whatever context we live or work in, to invent techniques for 
this kind of self-improvising movement?
AH: I’m wondering if there might be a tension between those 
two tactics, because one of the things that capital does is to 
forcibly accelerate processes and time; ephemerality is highly 
amenable to that acceleration. But I’m wondering if, as a tactic, 
slow time, slow down, endurance, is actually more affective 
simply because it runs counter to the temporal organization of 
capital; the imperative to condense and traverse space, to move 
ever faster. Or, perhaps the ephemeral strategy, to be effective 
at all, might be more to do with a tactic of radically multiplying 
ephemeralities to a point of excess. So a catastrophic speed-up 
that brings structures, logics and forms to the point of collapse.
BM: There’s been a lot of talk recently in philosophy and cultural 
theory about capitalism as mobilizing circulation of goods, 
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information, people, bodies, and also forms of collaboration, 
forms of relationality, forms of experience, and pushing them 
ever further in a tighter and tighter circle, in faster and faster 
turnover. There is a critique of Deleuze and Guattari coming 
out of that. Deleuze and Guattari are interpreted as advocating 
the strategy you just mentioned, as saying that we have to 
take the tendencies of capitalism further, to the point that the 
system crashes. This is one version of what is referred to as 
“accelerationism.” But Deleuze and Guattari don’t actually say 
that. What they say is that at that emergent nexus I was talking 
about before, at the infra-level of event formation, there are 
tendencies stirring which, if they were fostered and taken to their 
logical conclusion, would outrun or overspill capitalist capture. 
They’re not talking about taking capitalism’s tendencies further. 
They’re talking about counter-tendencies to capitalism that are 
infra-, or immanent, to capitalism’s process – but not its system. 
They’re not in the way capitalism orders or regulates itself, or 
fails to effectively, they’re in its conditions of emergence – which, 
going back to our earlier discussion, do not resemble it. The 
immanent counter-tendencies stirring at the emergent level are 
by nature self-affirming, unless they’re captured or preempted. 
They are self-validating, and create their own experiential 
value. What they “want” is to run to their fullest expression, 
and capitalist capture curtails that. So they’re off-kilter to the 
capitalist system, which is not monolithic. It’s global, even 
universal in a sense, but it’s not monolithic. It’s too adaptable, 
too transmutable, and too wily in its transmutations, for that. 
Which is another reason why it’s not reducible to a structure or a 
system, that it’s a process. Anyway, it’s the off-kilteredness that 
you have to push further, not the tendencies of capitalism, even 
its own potentially suicidal mania for acceleration and faster and 
faster turnover feeding the production of its monetary form of 
surplus-value. When capitalism crashes, it carries countless lives 
down with it. The accelerationist strategy is playing with fire, 
and it’s not the relatively privileged proponents of that doctrine 
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who would get burned the most. The idea I’m suggesting is that 
you can meet capitalism strategically on the ground to which 
it returns to renew and reenable itself, that is to say its field 
of emergence. That field is rife with germinal potentials of all 
kinds which are not capitalistic per se – capitalism wouldn’t 
have to “capture” tendencies if they weren’t liable to escape. 
The idea is to find a way to return to that terrain of emergence 
otherwise, spiking the potential differently, fostering different 
kinds of tendencies oriented toward the production of self-
affirming surplus-values of life that answer to a purely qualitative 
economy, multiplying and accelerating that escape from 
capitalism, that leak from it.
AH: Many of the examples of semblance phenomena and vitality 
affects we have been discussing have a movement content: the 
mouse that runs at the edge of perception whose trajectory 
you feel, the dog whose bark arrives before it arrives, and the 
crashing vehicle, which carries a very paradoxical temporality, at 
once too fast and too slow. So: a little constellation of relations 
between the human-animal, the animal and the machine. 
Thinking about the relationship between movement and 
politics: we are the animals that have a very particular historical 
imperative in relation to movement. As modern subjects we are 
supposed to move, to use our tools and machines to eliminate 
the limitations of movement, to keep moving. Movement is not 
neutral or benign, but pre-conditioned by powers. Part of the 
consequence of that movement imperative politically is not 
very good, let’s say for instance, ecologically in terms of these 
relations between human-animals and other animals, between 
humans and the planet. I’m wondering whether in relationship 
to politics, or to aesthetics, what’s actually really imperative is 
to find forms of movement that are self-questioning, or self-
annulling; that it is movement itself that must be interrogated as 
a prior organizing condition of subjectivity.
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BM: I think you’re absolutely right that it is precisely movement 
that needs to be interrogated, but it’s not an either/or between 
moving or not moving, because there’s no such thing as rest. 
Whitehead talks about one of the basic metaphysical concepts 
being a “principle of unrest.” This dovetails with the idea of 
what I call an activist philosophy – a philosophy for which the 
fundamental concept is activity. As I was saying earlier, there’s 
always movement going on, of some kind, at some level. So 
movement or rest is not the question, but rather economies of 
movement and rest, by which I mean rhythms of movement, 
modes of movement, patterns of cut and continuity, of arising 
and perishing, and of the experiential qualities associated with 
those modes. There’s thinking and experimenting that needs 
to be done on how to counteract mechanisms of capture that 
we think of as stilling. Like the way a self-organizing political 
movement so often gets rechanneled into traditional politics, 
as happened last year to the 2012 Quebec student movement, 
which was on the verge of veering in explicitly anticapitalist 
directions when an election was called in response to the student 
demands. The movement got immediately rechanneled into 
electoral politics at that point. That was certainly a capture. But 
it wasn’t a stoppage of the movement, it was a channeling of 
movement. The enormous energy and potential the movement 
had released was channeled into a different mode of activity, 
on a different level. The students “won” on their immediate 
macropolitical demand – tuition was not increased. But they lost 
their movement. The new government took it, and dissipated it. 
But there’s always something that continues across any capture, 
on what Deleuze and Guattari call the micropolitical level. 
Despite the term, it actually doesn’t mean politics on a smaller 
scale, although it can be, and in general it’s easier to get it moving 
on smaller scales. What it actually refers to is imperceptibility. 
The micropolitical can occur at any scale, but wherever it is, it 
passes unrecognized. It isn’t caught in the usual filters of activity 
and structures of understanding, because it embodies a singular 
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mode of movement that’s too ghostly or slippery for that. 
“Micropolitical” refers to a quality of movement – a movement 
doubled by its own semblance and resonating with the potential 
of that intensification. Deleuze and Guattari define the State 
as an “apparatus of capture” (1987: 424-473). It captures and 
channels, in order to slow things down and dissipate untoward 
potentials. Capitalism, on the other hand, captures in order 
to speed them up, for its own purposes. It mobilizes – but it’s 
important not to reduce movement to mobilization. The crucial 
point is that an apparatus of capture has to wait for things to 
start moving on their own before it can capture them and feed 
off them. It has to wait until the movements afoot become 
perceptible to it, so that it can apply its mechanisms to it. This 
isn’t just a question of scale. Occupy was “imperceptible” to 
traditional politics, in the sense that it just didn’t compute. What, 
no leaders? No demands? Group mechanisms of enunciation, like 
the human microphones? Something’s going on here, but what it 
was totally escaped the grasp of those, on the Left or the Right, 
who think in terms of the traditional macropolitics of political 
programs, representation, and recognizable forms of advocacy. 
Occupy was not following a program. It was embodying the 
principle of unrest. It was operating on the germinal level of 
event-formation. For the participants, this did generate a surplus-
value of life, a self-affirming qualitative intensity of the kind you 
don’t often get to experience, and that never really leaves you. 
It leaves its traces. I can say that for certain, thinking back on 
my own formative involvement in the anti-nuclear movement in 
the 1970s and 1980s and the direct-action anarchist collectives 
I was working with and living with. It leaves traces, and the 
micropolitical unrest comes back, in other forms and other 
contexts, in imperceptible ways. So in the end, I don’t consider 
Occupy or the Quebec student movement as failures. They 
succeeded in the way micropolitical movements always succeed. 
They feed potential forward, into the iterative event-fabric of 
life. You can feel a palpable change in Montreal since the student 
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movement, a bubbling of energies and political imagination that 
you would never know was there if you weren’t attuned to it. It 
certainly doesn’t show up at the level of macropolitical debates, 
or in the media. 
There’s no general rule, or sure-fire techniques for micropolitics. 
Slowness can be extremely useful given the acceleration of the 
mobilizing tendencies, but there are other ways of becoming 
imperceptible. It’s more about qualities of movement than speed.
AH: When they arise in social bodies or movements, these 
micropolitical tactics that you’ve been speaking of work a 
lot through differentiation, and through dissensus, through 
amorphous collective agency. Is there a tension or a redundancy 
when one moves to the macropolitical, which seems to need to 
work through consensus, through whole identifiable agents who 
activate things in the world, who stake claim to projects that 
have objectives?
BM: Yes, there’s a difference in mode of organization, mode 
of activity, between the macropolitical and the micropolitical. 
What characterizes the macropolitical is that it has a central or 
general organizing principle, which it tries to apply. That implies 
that what effectively organizes the field of relation, the social 
field, is somehow separable from it. The principle of organization 
comes from above, and then swoops down in order to make 
what happens on ground level conform with it, channel into its 
mechanism, and to pacify it. It is the anti-principle-of-unrest. 
It often has a representational mode of operating. Another 
characteristic is that macropolitics thinks in terms of bounded 
wholes, bounded unities. It is always concerned, even obsessed, 
with setting the boundary between the inside and the outside. 
This is even true of the most liberal democracy. To say that a 
representative democracy is “inclusive” presupposes a boundary 
that you cross to come in, which amounts to implicitly admitting 
that there have been exclusions. You just have to look at the 
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way migration and refugee issues are playing out in Europe and 
North America to see how fundamental the notion of the social 
field as a bounded whole is to the macropolitical State. 
At the micropolitical level, things are very different. For one 
thing, the principle of unrest rises up, it doesn’t swoop down. 
It emerges into determinate expression. At the micropolitical 
level, there’s a multiplication of differentiations and a vagueness 
that’s not a simple lack of definition, but an overfullness with 
potential. Whatever emerges from that germinal reality takes on 
a clarity and a precision where something determinate happens. 
But that’s just a region of clarity surrounded by a penumbra 
of potentials held in reserve, in trace form. There’s a fringe or 
periphery that goes out in all directions, full of tendencies that 
have not been actualized, but might be at another moment, 
under different conditions. These potential movements might 
even infect or inflect what clearly happens without ever being 
actualized, just by exerting a pressure of potential. So the 
micropolitical field is a constitutively open multiplicity populated 
by tendencies and potentials, not subjects or objects. The 
macropolitical has a structural unity, it sets down boundaries 
and accretes centres of power, centres for the deployment of 
an order to which everything is called upon to conform. These 
centres of decision can be democratic in the representative 
sense, or they could be dictatorial. They can be distributed 
throughout the social field, or centralized in a monolithic State. 
The structural unity could even conceivably organize itself 
through a friendly consensus-based democracy. But then it could 
just as well be a fascism that gets so obsessed with policing 
the boundary of what’s in and what gets excluded that it turns 
murderous. The macropolitical is itself a tendency that takes 
many forms of expression. But there is always the concern for 
the boundedness of the field of relation. For macropolitics, 
everything within that field must be well identified and defined, 
it has to have an assignable position in a structure of power. 
On the micropolitical level, on the other hand, there is always a 
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surplus of organization, or better, organizability: a surplus-value 
of life stirring in the between of positioned things, moving to take 
its own form of expression, self-organizing and self-affirming. 
Broadly, micropolitics corresponds to what macropolitical 
discourse dismisses as the pipe-dream of “direct democracy.” I 
prefer to think of it as the nightmare of the State.
AH: Can I ask you then about the role, the function of belief, 
faith and hope in the political? When you laid a name to the 
operations of the micropolitical as “a pragmatics of potential,” 
you framed this as neither being buoyed by false hope, nor 
paralyzed by hopelessness. I’m wondering about the nature 
and necessity of belief and hope for political transformation. 
Is it not the case that people, political subjects, need to feel 
that they have found belief, that belief is not necessarily an 
automatism, something just happening to them, but that an 
important political agency arises from a sense of “ownership” 
over their beliefs? 
BM: I wouldn’t put it in those terms, because I think that in 
moments of change, we’re immersed in a relational field where 
actions are so closely intertwined that it’s very hard to separate 
out an agent. There’s a kind of field-effect that means that 
factors combine, fuse, enter into tension, so that what happens, 
happens between, in the complexity of it. So if you talk about 
what the political subject needs, I think you’re already making the 
transition toward the macropolitical level. The concept of belief 
is very problematic for me because it brings the political back 
into the interiority of the subject. The concept of hope is similarly 
problematic. It addresses individual aspirations, even if it’s often 
in the name of a coming-together. What I think is needed in 
political action is not a hope, but a way. Ways of continuing to 
move, continuing to be implicated with others in activities that 
have their own value, their end in themselves, just by virtue of 
the quality of experience that they give. I think more in terms of 
intensity, intensities of relation, than of hope. As we saw with the 
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2008 Obama presidential campaign, hope can be an extremely 
powerful mobilizing force. But it is just that, a mobilizing 
force, not a self-organizing movement. A mobilizing force is a 
sovereign force, a power-over. At any rate, the mobilization of 
hope is guaranteed to disappoint because it promises some 
sort of lasting solution. It’s a kind of redemptive gesture. But 
in this world there is no redemption. There’s only the intensity 
of the ongoing, with the variations that eventuate. Instead of 
offering hope, what I think needs to be done is to experiment 
with techniques enabling people to reconnect with relational 
fields that yield enhanced intensity, that produce surplus-value 
of life expressing themselves in emergent forms of organization 
and experience. As these movements grow and proliferate, it is 
inevitable that at some point they will confront macropolitical 
obstacles. If the technique is there, they may even be able to 
assert solutions to macropolitical questions while refusing 
capture, while refusing to abandon their own micropolitical 
quality, tendencies, and penchant for escape. 
This is where a concept of belief can come back in. But it doesn’t 
have to do with belief in a political program, or belief in an 
ideology or doctrine. There are other forms of belief that you 
could think about. For example, at the incipient level I’ve been 
talking about, the germinal level of any event, I think it’s more 
the case that you find yourself again in an event, rather than that 
you believe in something and get there following your belief. It’s 
related to the kinds of interruptions and ruptures we were talking 
about when I was saying that we’re braced into an event before 
we have a chance to cognize a path, or stop and choose where 
we are going. That bracing into the event happens so quickly 
that our cognizance of it is always at a slight remove, at a slight 
lag, so that by the time we are in a reflective mode of assessing 
and choosing, we’re already out of the event, in its future. In 
the moment, there is no act of judgment that occurs separate 
from the in-bracing – which as we saw, was already a form of 
thinking, considering the abstractness of the semblance, and the 
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immediate comprehension of potentials and alternate outcomes 
it envelops. In the event, there is no doubt. There’s no possibility 
of doubt, because you’re already in a movement you’re going 
to have no choice but to ride out. The event is compulsory. That 
doesn’t mean the outcome is predestined, and that there is no 
freedom. The coming of the event carries imperatives, but it also 
carries potential, possibilities for improvisation and change. The 
freedom we have is to modulate its unfolding, from within that 
very unfolding, at no reflective distance, in the immediacy of our 
thinking-feeling of what is happening as it ushers into action. 
Connecting thinking-feelingly, at no remove from the event, to 
the aspects of the event that carry potential is a kind of belief. 
It’s what Deleuze called a “belief in this world” – a faith that the 
world has always more to offer, if only we ride its waves with 
intensity and technique. This has nothing to do with a belief in 
a doctrine, or a belief in a representation of the world, certainly 
not a belief in another world. It’s a lived belief in this world, in this 
world’s richness, its changeability, it’s capacity to offer intensity 
and surplus-value of life. This is a belief that is one with our 
active, intensely feeling and thinking participation in the world. 
So I think more in terms of intensifying that, finding methods, 
techniques for furthering it. So in that sense, yes, there’s a place 
for a certain notion of belief, or even of faith. But it’s more a form 
of intuition than a form of conscious belief in the normal sense. 
There’s no adherence in this kind of belief. You don’t believe in, 
you’re in your belief, with every dawning thought and act.
AH: I’d love to hear more about reactivating a notion of intuition, 
either in relation to art practice or in relation to political activism. 
In relation to art practice it has been such a degraded term, 
partly because of its association with the holding of transcendent 
powers and the mystification of processes, and in activism I’m 
not sure how it would even begin to operate as a notion. Had you 
thoughts on that?
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BM: Yeah… the concept of intuition comes up for me because 
of my particular background, coming out of Bergson. Bergson 
defines intuition as the “lowering of the barriers of space” in 
such a way that we’re “transported into the heart of the object” 
in a condition of absolute “sympathy” with it (Bergson 1998: 
177; translation modified). For that to work for me, given my 
process philosophy bias, I need to strike “object” and replace 
it with “event.” And I need to rethink “sympathy” as something 
that is not in the interiority of a subject. Sympathy is rather 
“the relational activity constitutive of the event,” the formative 
activity of the event’s arising. The clichéd idea of intuition as a 
bolt of inspiration that hits the individual has nothing to do with 
it. Sympathy in the sense I was just talking about is collective – or 
better, transindividual, to use Simondon’s term. So if the barriers 
of space lower in relation to the formative activity of an event, 
what that means is that you have a direct prehension (to avoid 
the term cognition) – an immediate, active grasp – of what may 
come of the event on all sides. You’re not just thinking-feeling 
it from your point of view. Because you’re in the middle, where 
actions and formative factors are intersecting at the level of 
their tendencies. You’re in the potential filling the gaps between 
the tendencies. There, you can’t be in your subject position, 
because who or what you will be will play out of a function of 
how the intersecting tendencies shake down. You’re not in your 
subject position, you’re in becoming. Sympathy in this sense 
has nothing to do with the human emotion of empathy. It’s not 
a human emotion. It’s a state of the world, at a point of rupture 
or discontinuity – when the dust settles, things will be different. 
Sympathy is the immediate embodied enactive understanding of 
the potentials coming out of that field of relation, from the angle 
of this differencing. 
AH: Wouldn’t that be braided with multiple emotions though? 
Why distinguish that feeling, that prehension from the emotive?
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BM: Yes, it is braided with all kinds of affects. Normally there’s 
a dominant affect that is unrefuseable, that takes you in, and 
in which you have no choice but to believe, because that’s just 
the quality of what’s happening. That’s what Whitehead calls 
the “affective tonality” that imposes itself at the beginning of 
an event, and marks the transition from the last event into this 
one. He uses the example of anger. When your life partner gets 
angry at you, you don’t have to stop and think about what kind 
of event this is. You feel it, unmistakeably. You already know 
that you’re in an anger-event, and there’s no way to unchoose 
being there, you have to deal with it. At that moment, the anger 
is much more than an emotion. It’s colored by any number 
of other emotions – shame, love, a desire for reconciliation. 
What we think of as an emotion is an affective nexus. It always 
envelops a whole spectrum, just as every color on the spectrum 
is inhabited by other colors. It’s only after the event that you can 
tie up the nexus neatly enough to fit into a single category, and 
leave behind the fullness with immediate spectrum of feeling, 
which can be frightful because of its intensity, and destabilizing 
because of its multipleness. The reason to say “affect” rather 
than “emotion” is that affect carries a bodily connotation. Affect, 
coming out of Spinoza, is defined very basically as the ability to 
affect and be affected. But you have to think of the affect and 
being affected together as a complex, as two sides of the same 
phenomenon that cuts across subject positions. You are affected 
by anger, but you also affect it in return, for example by stiffening 
up to repel it or to brace for a fight. Your affecting your being-
affected-by the anger immediately affects the other person. 
The force of their anger has shifted, and with it the potentials 
they have in that situation. Affect escapes the active-passive 
opposition, and it always directly operates transindividually. 
The bodily dimension is that the feelings this transindividual 
affective nexus carry envelop incipient actions, they’re already 
incipient actions. When you bristle in the face of another’s anger 
you stiffen as in anticipation of a punch. The other’s anger has 
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already hit like an inhibited punch, it carried germs of punching 
that were not allowed to unfold, but still hit you with an abstract 
force. Semblances can hurt. That’s why the concept of affect is 
so fundamental to an activist philosophy. It gives you a way of 
thinking about emotion, and other things we take to be interior 
and subjective, in terms of activity and movements in the world.
AH: There is then never “an emotion” at all, in a unitary 
sense: emotion is always already shot through with immense 
multiplicities, paradoxes and contradictions?
BM: That’s right. There is no unity of emotion. Affectively, we’re 
always talking about multiplicities. Politically, thinking on this 
affective, germinal level of events in the making suggests that 
we can create collective platforms for experimentation at the 
level of our shared belief in the world. In other words, we can 
experiment with techniques that bring people together, leaving 
behind their subject positions, suspending their personal beliefs, 
their doctrines, but bringing with them what moves them. What 
forces them to think, what forces them to act, their passions, 
their techniques, their competencies, all of that brought as a kind 
of gift, not to others, so much as to their interaction, to the event 
that’s brewing between. A germinal politics.
3Collective Expression: A Radical Pragmatics
Now it is undeniably conceivable that a beginningless 
series of successive utterers should all do their work in 
a brief interval of time, and that so should an endless 
series of interpreters. Still, it is not likely to be denied 
that, in some cases, neither the series of utterers 
nor that of interpreters forms an infinite collection. 
When this is the case, there must be a sign without an 
utterer and a sign without an interpreter. … Neither an 
utterer, nor even, perhaps, an interpreter is essential 
to a sign. … I am led to inquire whether there be not 
some ingredient of the utterer and some ingredient of 
the interpreter which not only are so essential, but are 
even more characteristic of signs than the utterer or 
interpreter themselves.
C.S. Peirce (1998: 403-404)
A Technique
1. Choose a generative text.
2. Choose a minor concept weaving through the 
generative text.
3. Ask each person in the group to count off as a 
one or a two.
4. Instruct the ones that they are “posts.”
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5. Instruct the twos that they are “flows.”
6. Ask the posts to find a post: a spot in the room where they 
would like to have a conservation.
7. Ask the flows to pair up with a post.
8. Direct everyone to a page in the text where the minor 
concept occurs.
9. Ask the participants to discuss the function of the minor 
concept, staying as close as possible to the text, with 
detailed attention to how it is constructed.
10. Notify participants that when exactly five minutes are up 
they will hear a signal, and that when they hear the signal 
they must end their conversation immediately, even if they 
are in the middle of a word.
11. When the five-minute signal sounds, ask all flows to move 
to the next post in a clockwise direction.
12. Repeat eight to ten times.
13. Bring the group back together and discuss in plenary 
session what was discovered about the minor concept 
and the text.
This is “conceptual speed dating.” It is a technique that has been 
practiced at the SenseLab for ten years, and has been adapted by 
a number of its participants for classroom use. Its introduction at 
the SenseLab1 was motivated by the disappointments of plenary 
discussions of assigned texts. Full-group discussions predispose 
participants to perform themselves – their own already-acquired 
knowledge or interpretive virtuosity – at the expense of truly 
exploratory thinking-together in the moment, for the collective 
movement forward into follow-up activities. Self-performance 
can quickly have the effect of silencing those whose practice is 
not primarily text-oriented or language-based, as is the case of 
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the majority of SenseLab participants with backgrounds in dance 
and movement, materials-based creative processes, and media 
art. It also skews participation along gender lines and according 
to personality traits like shyness. The quality of the interaction 
tends to suffer as well from a conversational birth defect: 
the scourge of generality. It is difficult to keep a large group 
focused on the specificity of the text before it. In the absence 
of an effective anchoring in the singularity of the thinking 
process embodied in the text, the discussion quickly slips into 
comparison. Given the diversity of backgrounds, the comparative 
allusions inevitably reference texts or bodies of knowledge 
known only to a few of those present. In an attempt to overcome 
the divide, the discussion will invariably start to pivot on hinge 
words that seem at the same time to offer a common ground 
for understanding and to illuminate some aspect of the text at 
hand: “history,” “culture,” “nature,” “life,” “matter,” “space, “time.” 
It could be just about anything, but “subject” and “object” always 
figure, bringing in tow a host of others. The problem is that the 
force of these terms actually differ substantially from discipline 
to discipline, and even from text to text within a discipline. The 
differences hover in the background, unspoken, their mute 
presence creating an illusion that speakers’ remarks are actually 
intersecting, when a little scratching below the surface reveals 
that they are passing each other in the ether-sea of generality like 
phantom ships on a low-budget cruise. Missed encounter. The 
unacknowledged mutual incomprehension appears as difference 
of opinion, and the missed encounter is experienced as debate. 
What is actually accomplished is an object lesson in why Deleuze 
always said that the greatest enemy of thought is conversation, 
understood as the exchange of individual ideas and opinions. In 
a word, communication. The aim of the technique of conceptual 
speed dating is to address the group-dynamics problems of the 
plenary discussion format, while disenabling the tendency to 
default to the communicational model of verbal performance 
and its general sea-sickness.
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The conceptual speed dating technique assumes that the text 
under consideration is “generative.” By this is meant that no one 
reading can exhaust its potential for producing meaning. Each 
return to the text, even by the same reader, will crystallize new 
thoughts. One way of thinking about this generative capacity is 
to approach the key concepts of the text as nexuses composed 
of a number of conceptual lines entering into constellations of 
varying emphasis, certain of them rising into relief at what stand 
out as key passages. The particular force of these passages is 
synthetic, leaping out from the weave of the text as a joint effect 
of the contributory lines. The constellations dissolve, reform, 
and reconstellate around each other’s emphases as the text 
advances. What stands out at key passages, or in the same key 
passage that commends itself to attention in successive readings, 
moves and varies. The variation is related to many factors, not all 
of them internal to the text: the reader’s level of attention, how 
his or her understanding has been primed by the experience 
of the day, how knowledge and experience accumulated since 
the last reading informs the reading, and even (or, as we will 
see, especially) by modulations of attention and concern by 
the situation in which the reading or discussion is taking place. 
A generative text is constitutively open to its outside. It does 
not just transmit significations. It welcomes inflections. It is 
hospitable to new thought. This puts its meaning always in-the-
making, making the meaning inexhaustible. A generative text is 
never done. 
The openness of the generative text to its outside must not be 
reduced to a question of reception. The reader is not adding 
meaning to a finished text. S/he is entering the unfinishment of 
the text, and drawing from it a new determination. The text’s 
power of variation is as composed within as it is inflected from 
without. In the synthetic meaning-effect of a given constellation, 
the relevance of the contributory conceptual lines is graded. 
Many register less noticeably, some barely register at all. Many 
more do not register at all – yet are still positively contributory 
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in virtue of how their avoidance affords other conceptual lines 
a chance to shine. These shaded conceptual lines are what 
we refer to, for the purposes of conceptual speed dating, as 
“minor” concepts.
It is crucial to the success of the conceptual speed dating 
technique that the concept chosen for the exercise be a minor 
concept. What rises into relief at a key passage stands out 
from the weave of the text in a way that can be misunderstood 
as detaching itself from the text to claim general validity. If a 
danger-word, like “nature” or “subject,” occurs in the passage or 
is even just implied by it, the risk is extreme that the discussion 
will cruise into general waters. When this happens, the minor 
concept assumes “major” status. Major concepts, those of the 
general, communication-ready kind, must be avoided at all costs 
if the technique is to work. It is always the case that a minor 
concept will also be present. This is one that a reader may well 
not have noticed. But once attention is drawn to it, it becomes 
palpable how integral it is to the passage, and that the passage 
could not have worked its effect without it. It is also always the 
case that the minor concept will recur, explicitly or implied, in 
other passages, making it an essential, if underappreciated, 
contributor to the warp and weft of the entire text. Analysis of 
the minor concept and its textual weave offers a singular angle 
of approach to the text as a whole, from which new thoughts are 
more apt to emerge. The process of working the minor increases 
the sensitivity of the text to its outside, and particularly to 
modulations owing to the particularities of the situation of the 
reading and discussion. This is because major concepts carry 
dead weight. They are laden with baggage that exerts an inertial 
resistance against effective variation. Minor concepts, once 
noticed, are self-levitating. Once the ballast of the general ideas 
is thrown overboard, minor concepts’ sensitivity to the outside, 
coupled with their intimateness to the compositional weave 
composing the text, makes them rise.
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In the practice of the SenseLab, the most generative concepts 
are philosophical concepts. Approached as generative, even the 
abstractest, seemingly hermetic texts, rise and fly. Conceptual 
speed dating with philosophical texts is used by the SenseLab 
for the purpose of collectively “activating” minor concepts. The 
collectivity is key. The project of the SenseLab is to experiment 
with event-based modes of creative collaboration cutting across 
the established boundaries between disciplines, and between 
“theory” (language work) and “practice” (movement, materials or 
media-based work). For this to happen, the collaboration cannot 
be conceived of as a meeting-place of constituted methods, 
or even of individuals. The individuals involved, and whatever 
they bring to the event in terms of already-acquired knowledge, 
skills and approaches, must enter a space of relation whose 
complexion does not preexist the event, but emerges from the 
encounter – meaning that the “space” of the event is a space-
time singular to it. The space-time of the event is not located 
in individual actions. It is in the interstices between them. It 
is inhabited as the environment of the interaction, as well as 
emerging from it. It is a third, interstitial space, irreducible to the 
sum of individual inputs. “Collectivity,” in the SenseLab context, 
does not mean the aggregate of individual actions. It means what 
cannot be ascribed to individual actions, taken separately or in 
aggregate –but would not arise without them. 
In conceptual speed dating, the focus on close reading of the 
text, together with a ‘”minor” sensitivity to the situation, helps 
produce the conditions for the emergence of a space-time of 
active relation. Close reading is requisite. The question asked 
of the minor concept is how it helps make the text, and helps it 
mean what it says, ever in excess of any settled meaning that 
might be ascribed to it by a disciplinary reading. Approaching the 
text through the minor concept is a way of asking the text what 
it does, and how it does what it does, compositionally. If instead 
of starting with these minor questions, the discussion moves 
too quickly to comparison or critique, the potential for active 
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relation is lost. Comparison begins by assuming a commonality 
between texts. This in turn assumes that there are certain 
overarching concepts that apply to both texts, and against which 
the adequacy of each text can be assessed. Comparison begins 
with the sameness of the conceptually already-given. Minor 
reading looks to the text’s potential differencing: its capacity to 
exceed the givenness of ideas – especially its own. Critique, for 
its part, begins by separating the reader from the text so that he 
or she may stand over and apart from it as judge. From the lofty 
height of judgment’s peak, the minoritarian texture of the text 
fades into a feature-poor, homogenized expanse. Only stand-out 
concepts, telescoped to the general level, remain in view. This 
kills the potential movement of the text’s thinking even before it 
begins. SenseLab reading groups take place under the sign of a 
priori sympathetic reading, as expressed in a famous quote by 
Bertrand Russell (literally – a large-scale printout of the quote is 
often hung in the room):
In studying a philosopher, the right attitude is 
neither reverence nor contempt, but first a kind of 
hypothetical sympathy, until it is possible to know 
what it feels like to believe in his theories, and only 
then a revival of the critical attitude, which should 
resemble, as far as possible, the state of mind of a 
person abandoning opinions which he has hitherto 
held. (Russell 1996: 47)
Directing participants toward a close, textural reading of how 
the text means helps disable the default positions of comparison 
and critique. It also helps lessen the silencing effect that might 
otherwise take hold due to differences in background, gender, 
and social ease, by literally putting everybody on the same 
page. When discussion is oriented toward the detail of what is in 
the text, and everyone has the text in front of them, the hump 
someone has to get over to make a contribution is significantly 
lowered. In close-reading practices, the first question is not 
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“how does this compare to other ways of thinking with which I 
am more familiar but others may not be?” or “how am I going 
to position myself in relation to this, given where I’m coming 
from?” The first question is: what page is that on? What concepts 
co-occur there? On what other pages do they reoccur, and do 
they re-co-occur in those passages in the same constellation, 
or do they go off on their own trajectories and just check with 
a congerie of others from time to time? If the latter, where are 
those other trajectories leading?
In not a few cases, they will turn out not to lead anywhere. A 
conceptual line of development has embedded itself in the text 
which the text was not willing or able to follow through on. This 
amounts to the discovery of a seed of thought planted in the 
text that did not fully germinate in it. These germinal thought-
lines are not gratuitous. They are necessary contributors to the 
weave of the text. They are in a certain way affirmed by the text, 
even though they are not fully assumed by it. They are thought 
tendencies that the text needs – but that it needs not to follow 
in order to remain the text the author generally understood it 
to be. They are thought potential that the text has planted on its 
own soil, but that needs new soil to flourish. Minoritarian close 
reading seizes upon these seeds of thought potential. Where 
might it lead if one of those trajectories were assumed, were fully 
activated and followed through to their logical conclusion? They 
lead into new territories of thought, beyond the ken of the text’s 
author him- or herself. Exploring these tendencies is a way of 
remaining radically faithful to the letter of the text, avoiding the 
pitfalls of comparison and critique, without being boxed in by it. 
What occurs, rather than comparison or critique, is an immanent 
conversion of the text by way of its own thought tendencies. Gilles 
Deleuze’s books on other philosophers are prominent examples 
of this process of immanent conversion, taking the text where 
the author couldn’t take it, by excess of faithfulness to its texture. 
This can be seen, for instance, in Deleuze’s book on Bergson, 
where an episode in Bergson’s thought in which matter and 
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memory (mind) lose their opposition to one another and place 
themselves on the same continuum as different degrees of the 
same variation. Deleuze seizes upon this moment as a germinal 
tendency, then takes that tendency to its logical conclusion, 
yielding a Bergson no one before had suspected, different from 
all other Bergsons, including Bergson’s Bergson, but no less 
Bergsonian for that –on the contrary, all the more so.
The technique of conceptual speed dating is designed to stage 
a collective encounter between a group of readers and a text, 
at the point where each side is outdoing itself: participants are 
brought out of their personal opinions, preestablished positions, 
and expert identities, at the same time as the text is made to 
outpace itself with its own tendencies. At that point, a power of 
thought that cannot be reduced to either the text or the readers 
as an aggregate of individuals is released as a vector: a creative 
vector in the direction of new thought. This can be achieved 
without the speed dating technique, for example through a 
sustained reading-group practice based on a dedication to 
“hypothetical sympathy,” safeguarded by a culture of that kind of 
reading, an ethos tended by all involved. 
It is at the point of the text’s and the readers’ mutual outdoing 
that concepts are activated. In SenseLab practice, “activating” 
concepts means outdoing them in such a way that they fly off 
from their textual homes and migrate to other modes of activity 
whose primary medium is not language, thereby crossing the 
supposed theory/practice divide. The first time the technique 
was used at Dancing the Virtual (2005), one of the texts we read 
was William James’ “The World of Pure Experience” from Essays 
in Radical Empiricism (1996). Rather than concentrating on a 
major concept such as “experience” or “consciousness,” the 
minor concept of “terminus” was chosen. This is a concept that 
to our knowledge had never been focused upon in the literature 
on James and radical empiricism as a full-fledged philosophical 
concept. In James’ text, the terminus is the end of a process, 
120 Chapter 3
as it is present to the process in anticipation. In other words, 
it is an attractor pole that lies at the limit of a movement, but 
dynamizes it from within as that which the movement tends 
toward. Although it exerts a formative force on the process, 
operating immanently to it, the terminus does not actually exist 
for the process until it is reached and the process makes done 
with itself. The terminus is realized by the process and actually 
exists only as realized by that very movement toward it. The 
terminus is effectively created by the movement tending toward 
it, giving it a strange status of future-past. A James different from 
all other James, including his own, comes with seizing upon the 
terminus as a tendency. For this terminally reactivated James, 
the virtual – that which exerts a formative force without being 
actual – becomes key to the understanding of pragmatism (of 
which radical empiricism is the metaphysical correlate for James). 
Everything changes when pragmatism is seen to revolve around 
the formative force of the virtual, rather than the obligation of 
utility. Everything changes, but nothing so much as our sense of 
what “practice” means. 
The speed dating with the concept of the terminus at Dancing 
the Virtual activated the notions of immanent formative force, 
tendential unfolding toward attractor poles, the ability of that 
tendency to actually create its own end, the future-pastness 
of that creativity, and the abstractness (virtuality) of the motor 
of the movement toward it. In the follow-up materials-based 
practice session, these seeded concepts were enacted: they 
recurred to the group in the form of embodied interactions. 
How does the terminus work in dance improvisation? How 
does it work in everyday perception? Small groups invented a 
number of variations on what happens when the concept of the 
terminus becomes immanently formative of embodied action. 
The small groups were then invited to bring the result of their 
experimentation back to the whole group. They were asked 
not to report on what had happened. No description from a 
distance. No conversation. No comparison or (self-) critique. 
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They were asked instead to perform it anew, in a way adapted 
to the larger group: to reactivate it again. This ignited a series of 
reenactments that continued, themselves becoming an formative 
force immanent to the three-day event’s trajectory. The terminus 
became the refrain of the event. Its serial actings-out in-formed 
the reading of the other texts the group read together. The 
terminus migrated from text to embodied action and back again, 
eventually spinning out from the event to take on a life of its own. 
The concept became a formative factor in the writing practice of 
a number of SenseLab participants (including myself), and the 
tendency toward it still regularly returns to in-form SenseLab 
activities foregrounding media other than language. A formative 
potential was planted that continues to grow and vary. 
As this example shows, activating a concept does not just lead 
to new thoughts, but extends to new actions as well, and to the 
new perceptions that new actions allow to unfold. How to do 
things with words … How to make language and non-language-
based activities enter in symbiosis, without one side lording it 
over the other. How to transduce a conceptual force incumbent 
in language into a full-body enactive potential that can act itself 
out. And vice versa. Once the transductive circuit is set going, the 
in-formative movement is two-way. It is just as possible to start 
with a making that privileges a material other than language and 
then go on to generate concept-formation follow-on effects as it 
is to start with textual concept work and move into its embodied 
acting-out. This two-way processual reciprocity lies at the heart 
of the SenseLab’s discourse/practice of “research-creation” (the 
Canadian term for art-based research).
The very experience of conceptual speed dating is a lesson in 
itself. The first five-minute exchange or two are often spent 
orienting to the conceptual problem, reading the initial passage 
that had been indicated looking for pointers, moving up and 
down from it to get a sense of the lay of the textual land. The 
change from one exchange to the next creates a cesura that 
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raises the question of how to rebegin. One party may ask what 
had come of the other party’s last exchange. Or, buoyed by an 
unexpected realization, one of the parties may immediately set 
the agenda, with a sense of urgency to make further progress 
before the bell rings. The sounding of the signal to change 
partners always feels as though it has come at an inopportune 
time, either because it come before a good connection was 
made between the interlocutors, or for the opposite reason, 
because an intense connection was made but didn’t have time 
to reach the end of its arc. After a few changes of partner, the 
cesuras between the exchanges begin to feel less and less 
like interruptions. Strands of discussion hang in the air, not 
neutralized but pressing to continue, with different degrees 
of urgency. An odd sensation builds that the texture of the 
discussion’s continuity fills the intervals, vaguely but insisently 
felt as the co-pressing of lines of thought. In the cesura, they 
are intimately interwound. But over the threshold to the next 
exchange, it goes without saying that they will separate out, 
before re-interwinding. Each cesura is filled with the resonation 
of the many lines of thought, jostling each other, each vying 
to follow its own trajectory further, sometimes in a mutually 
reinforcing way, at other times in interference. Some will fall 
into the gap, failing to reemerge in the next exchange, fallen 
mute. Mute but not inert. They will have a mark, of some kind, 
somewhere, and it is never a foregone conclusion that they will 
not revive later, perhaps elsewhere. What does not flourish, 
nevertheless seeds itself.
Speaking personally, by the midway point of the exercise, what I 
say as I enter the next exchange ceases to feel as if it came from 
a separate decision made by me. What I say feels moved by the 
necessity of a particularly pressing strand that takes my tongue 
for a ride. The result often surprises me. I find myself saying 
things I hadn’t plan to say, or hadn’t been able to say before. 
Sometimes I’m not even sure I agree with them. But rather than 
being alienating, that feeling intensifies the sensation of being 
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in the disussion. Owning a thought personally and expressing 
an opinion has simply ceased to be what is at stake. What is at 
stake is a movement of thought passing through the exchanges 
and rolling with the intervals. The felt imperative is to be true 
not to oneself but to that movement: to help further its iterative 
unfolding, toward a terminus whose contours are unknown 
in their details, but whose presence is effective: compelling 
(another iteration) and orienting (giving a sense of direction). 
The vagueness of the terminus does not feel like an absence. It 
feels creative. Whatever series of exchanges lead further in its 
direction will have to construct the path it will follow toward it. 
By the end, I have the odd sensation of having had an experience 
full of thought, but without being able to say who it was who 
actually thought it up. Thinking of a particular point that arose, 
I often cannot remember if it was I who had that thought, or 
another who passed it on to me. I feel as though I have been 
in thought – rather than the thoughts having been in me.2 The 
plenary session following the final speed dating exchange is 
permeated by this feeling, giving each person’s utterance a flavor 
of indirect discourse – under conditions in which it is impossible 
to single out the author of the reported speech. 
Who is speaking? Me, my interlocutors, the text itself? In this 
event, where did thought begin and end? The initial suggestion 
of the minor concept to be discussed is not really where the 
thinking began. “Life” – the life of thought, and living thinking 
– “begins only at the point where utterance crosses utterance” 
(Vološinov 1986: 145). In other words: in the cesuras between 
individual speakings. The thinking originated in the multiplicity 
of its speed-dated rebeginnings. The event generated its 
own effective origin, immanent to its occurrence. The initial 
suggestion was only the pretext for this immanent origin, 
which is one with the articulations of the event. This is what 
Simondon calls an “absolute origin” (Simondon 1969: 57). The 
initial gesture that gives the thought to come its pretext is 
but its jumping off point. The origination of thought is in the 
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event-articulations where utterance crosses utterance, in serial 
interations interwinding. The origin is not a first time: it is time 
and again. It parses the event into separate episodes, rising in 
each cesura’s fall into silence. It inhabits the event, immanent 
to the event’s occurrence, the overall effect of which is not 
attributable to any one gesture or any one participant, or even 
to the sum total of the participants considered in their individual 
inputs. It all amounts to an eventful self-reporting of thought, 
indistinguishable from its multiply authored occurrence, arising 
from its distributed “absolute” origin.
A successful conceptual speed dating session will bear the 
same relation to a follow up session that each of its constituent 
exchanges bore to each other. What flourished and what self-
seeded will co-inhabit the interval, and what presses forward 
from it will be conditioned by the nature of the initializing 
gesture that will be the jumping off point of the next event. If the 
initiating conditions for the next event are couched in movement 
rather than language, the lines of thought will press for whole-
body enactment, activated and oriented by the same terminus, 
continuing the same tendency in a different materiality, the 
phonic movement of thought in language transduced into a full-
spectrum embodied thinking in movement. The movement that 
arises from the next collective exercise will have been in-formed 
by the preceding movement of thought in language, as by an 
immanent formative force. A return to language further down 
the line will in-form language, reactivated and reoriented by 
movement. At that point, it is no longer possible to assign either 
language or movement as the origin to the unfolding. Thinking 
will have outdone itself. It will have tendentially spread.
This is the cross-practice equivalent of free indirect discourse. 
Thinking self-reports cross-wise. It “says” itself multiply, across 
words and movement (and images and sounds; and bodily 
gesture and verbalization). But through that multiplicity, it says 
itself of a single process of “absolutely” original articulation: a 
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creative movement, single in its occurrence. For the SenseLab, 
this transductive relay, this singular cross-articulate expression 
of thought eventfully self-reporting, is what best characterizes 
what research-creation can do.
It is conceivable, Peirce was saying in the opening quote, that a 
beginningless series of successive utterers should all do their 
work in a brief interval of time, and that so should an endless 
series of interpreters. But it gets really interesting, he continues, 
when neither the series of utterers nor that of interpreters forms 
an infinite collection. When the set is finite there will be signs 
without utterers or interpreters. It is precisely at these points 
that expression asserts its autonomy. Thought (or what from 
the point of view of the theory of the signs necessary for its 
enactment Peirce names “semiosis”) will have become its own 
self-creative movement.
A Pragmatics
Peirce’s emphasis on finitude when talking about the self-
propagating power of thought, apparently limitless in its 
autonomous cross-power to relay itself, seems paradoxical 
at first sight. But it makes perfect sense if you consider that if 
there were an infinite series of utterers and interpreters, there 
will always be an interpreter downstream of every utterer, 
and an utterer upstream of every interpreter. Expression 
still hinges on the individual, at each successive utterance. 
All along the beginningless and endless line, the movement 
of thought remains a dual affair between individual utterers 
and interpreters. Rather than opening expression, this in fact 
only closes it down all the more exhaustively by infinitizing 
the centrality of the individual subject. Expression is endlessly 
imprisoned in the interiority of the speaking subject. If, on the 
other hand, the collection of utterers and interpreters is finite, 
then there are loose ends. There is a cut-off point where an 
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utterer’s enunciation fails to find an interpreter and falls into the 
gaps – which is the same thing as an interpretation remaining 
in potential with no one yet to pass it down the line. Cesura. 
“If a sign has no interpreter, its interpretant is a ‘would be’, i.e. 
it is what would determine the interpreter if there was one” 
(Peirce 1998: 409). A would-be determination of an interpreter: 
a potential expression. In-forming. The opening of expressive 
potential is predicated on the finitude of the collection of utterers. 
Expression is no longer a dual affair. It is opened to a “Thirdness,” 
and the third is potential.3
The idea of an endless series of utterers and interpreters 
infinitely displaces the notion of the origin. But an autonomy of 
expression does not come from the mere absence of the origin. It 
comes from the affirmation of an absolute origin, at loose ends. 
As the technique of speed dating makes palpable, this is where 
potential is to be found: in the gaps in expression and in the 
threads left hanging. The infinitization of the series of utterers 
and interpreters actually ends up de-potentializing expression. 
The farther along the infinite line, the harder it becomes to 
imagine that there could be anything new left to say or think, 
as the series reaches closer and closer to the ideal limit where 
every possible permutation has been exhausted. Even though 
this limit is ideal, in that it can never actually be reached, the very 
idea of this infinity of chatter is exhausting. Rather than buoying 
one with a sense of the richness of variation, it bludgeons one 
with the sinking feeling of the exhaustion of novelty. What Peirce 
is inoculating us against is mistaking the openness of thought 
for an ideal infinity of utterance, and confusing the origin of 
expression with the beginning of a series (rather than a seriating 
rebeginning).4
What is the “ingredient” of thought-expression that Peirce 
says comes to the fore when the collection of interlocutors is 
finite and the reality of signs without utterers or interpreters 
affirms itself? What can go without an utterer or an interpreter, 
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functioning as “a sort of substitute for them” that fulfills “nearly 
the same, but more essential, function,” at the loose ends of 
thought-expression? 
This essential ingredient, as regards the utterer, is what Peirce 
calls the “Object” of the sign that constitutes an utterance and 
enacts an expressive movement of thought through it. This is a 
peculiar notion of an object. The usual connotations of the word 
must be bracketted. Here, “object” is really just another word for 
the meaning or sense of the sign: what the sign “stands for.” This 
standing-for is not to be taken as a synonym for “represent.” It 
must be taken more strongly, as in “take the place of” and even 
“bear,” “carry,” or “endure.” For rather than being what the sign 
expresses, the sense/Object of the utterance is actually what 
goes “necessarily unexpressed in the sign” (Peirce 1998: 407).
The sense, Peirce explains, can only come from “a collateral 
source” (404). It is incumbent in the surrounding situation: the 
situation itself, not as it is represented in the mind of the utterer 
or the interpreter. It is precisely for the mind of the individual 
utterer or interpreter – the interiority of his or her thinking – 
that the Object functions as a more essential substitute. The 
idea that sense is sourced in the situation collateral to the sign 
brings thought out into the environment. In What is Philosophy? 
Deleuze and Guattari speak of the work of art as “standing up” 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 164). By this they mean that what 
it expresses has its own reality, independent of how the work 
was pictured in the mind of the artist and how it is received in 
the mind of its audience. What it expresses has the status of a 
“being of sensation” or a “block of sensation” to which the work 
gives standing in the world. Suzanne Langer uses the oxymoron 
“objective feeling” to get at much the same idea about the import 
of art (Langer 1953: 19-20). All signs “stand for” in the same way 
that a configuration of signs composing an artwork “stands up.” 
A sign’s sense/Object is a being of thought, a block of thinking: 
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an objective contemplation given standing in the world through 
its utterance.5
A “block” of thinking is not a simple unity. It stands for 
many. Peirce takes the verb as the privileged example for 
understanding how signs stand, fully aware of the implications 
this choice has for our understanding of the nature of the sign-
process that is thought-expression (“semiosis”). By privileging 
the verb, Peirce is asserting that semiosis must be approached 
on the model of the event. A verb, he says, does not designate 
particular things. It designates a set of “partial objects.” These 
are not in the first instance objects in the everyday sense. They 
are roles composing the event that the verb stands for. The 
verb “runs” designates a someone who embodies a running. 
The verb “gives” designates a someone who proffers, a someone 
who receives, and a something that passes between them. 
Both verbs are one word – but stand for more than one, for 
a some composing the action. Their object is unspecified. In 
the abstract, there are an infinite number of runners, and an 
infinite series of givers, giftees, and gifts. But neither verb is 
ever used in the abstract, in the sense of lacking a surrounding 
situation, whatever, whenever, or wherever that situation may 
be. The sense of the utterance is never purely general. It is 
never the infinity of objects that might answer to it generally, in 
the abstract. The sense of the utterance is the suggestion that 
there will be someones or somethings in the situation indicated 
that embody the roles that the event for which the verb stands 
is wanting. Precisely which ones those are unspecified by the 
verb. The verb’s utterance kick-starts the process of thought-
expression by substituting itself for them: it is in the verb’s 
inability to specify precisely which objects are wanting that its 
sign-power resides. It leaves them to be determined by the 
situation. The sign points to their specification. It stands for what 
actions may come next that leads to their determination. The 
power of the sign is to determine a process of determination to 
take place. The process of determination must move collaterally 
Collective Expression: A Radical Pragmatics 129
into the situation of the utterance – toward where it points – 
and supplement the utterance with follow-on actions. Thus, the 
power of the sign is pragmatic. The essay in which this discussion 
of Peirce’s is found is entitled, simply, “Pragmatism.”
A sign does not impress an abstract meaning on the mind. 
More fundamentally, it poses a question to the situation. Some: 
someone, something. But which one(es)? The sign points not 
to a thing, but to an event which it “directs us to seek” (Peirce 
1998: 406). The verb powers this collateral action of seeking 
(what Peirce terms “collateral observation”). The sign’s sense 
– its meaning, import, enunciative force – is none other than 
this powering of an expressive movement inviting a relay 
into collateral observation and an embodied movement of 
exploration supplementing the action of the verb. 
The Object of the sign is the “quaesitum” (“that which must be 
sought;” Peirce 1998: 406). The quaesitum is the terminus of the 
expressive movement that orients the process powered by the 
sign. It is an attractor pole lying at the limit of the movement of 
sense-making – semiosis, the movement of thought-expression 
– but at the same time dynamizes it from within, as that toward 
which the movement tends. It exerts a formative force on the 
process, operating immanently to it. 
As immanent formative force of the movement of thought-
expression, the quaesitum is the “requaesitum” (“essential 
ingredient;” Peirce 1998, 404) of making-sense. This Object of the 
sign is necessarily unexpressed in the sign because it is realized 
through the unfolding of the process that the sign powers into 
motion. It is effectively created by the movement of thought 
actively tending toward it. It is all of this – this unfolding toward 
a realized fulfillment – that the sign “stands for.” It for all of this 
that it substitutes itself at the inception of the process set in 
motion by that very standing-for. It is this – the insistence of 
quaesitum as the necessary ingredient to be sought for –that 
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the sign bears, that is process carries, endures. In short, the 
Object of the sign is unspecified in the abstract in order to be 
determinable by process.
Seek – and you may not find. There may be no requisite runner 
present in the situation, or even anywhere in existence.6 
However, the verb still functions expressively. It “expresses” 
a process in the sense of “forcing out (as the juice of a fruit) 
by pressure” (Merriam-Webster). To pressurize the process of 
thought-expression, the sign doesn’t need an actual object. All 
that is requisite is a quaesitum, a that-which-must-be-sought 
juicy enough to whet the appetite: a “would-be” terminus; an 
attractor taking upon itself, in the form of its being sought, 
the sign’s expressive force. Would-be: the Object of thought-
expression points to the conditional. Conditional: of the order 
of potential. That, finally, is the essential ingredient. Potential – 
determined to be determined (to paraphrase another Peircean 
formulation7) by a process moving thought out, under the 
pressure of the situation. 
When an actual thing is found to fulfill the role of the verb’s 
some/ones or some/things, the process still does not end. 
Termini are slippery things. The question “which?” just sets 
the stage for the follow-up question what else? What else was 
required for the required determination to be fulfilled? What 
more is there that would even more determinately determine the 
sense of the sign –for example by filling in details or filling out its 
background? Or by specifying how it plays its role in the event. In 
what manner is the what-else co-determining of what happens? 
Thus it is not simply a question of some/ones or some/things 
being actually present or not. It is also the way in which they 
are present, or would have been. Peirce insists that the Object 
of thought-expression as quaesitum is necessarily “singular, not 
general.” The Object, when there actually is one, is not general, 
but neither is it a particular this-here. It is this-here-in-this-way, 
along with all else that made it so – and would potentially have 
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made it otherwise. What else? is not a controllable question. It is 
“impossible to complete our collateral observation” (Peirce 1998: 
409). Where does the seeking stop? Between every two would-be 
this-heres there potentially lies another. At the limit, “there 
is a continuum between them.” The Object, “though singular, 
may nevertheless be multiple, and may even be infinitely so” (408; 
emphasis added).
Is this not a contradiction? The whole discussion started with 
the problem that where there is an infinity of utterers and 
interpreters, the movement of expression comes to a halt, 
exhausted by the very thought of itself. Yet now we’ve what-elsed 
and in-what-mannered our way back to infinity. The difference 
is that this new infinity at which we have arrived is in no way 
a purely abstract or ideal infinity. It is infinite “in completed 
existence” (Peirce 1998: 408). It is a potential infinity that is 
pragmatically inscribed in the situation. It is an effective infinity, 
because it does: it demands more seeking; it calls for and enables 
collateral action.8 It is in no way general, but singularly ingredient 
to the situation. It is the more-than of the situation. It will never 
be exhausted, try as we might to seek it out. To avoid exhausting 
ourselves, at some point we will just have to call it quits. We 
have to deem our collateral observation sufficient to what is 
Objectively required by the situation for it to terminate itself, for 
all pragmatic intents and purposes, so that life may move on to a 
new situation and expression to a new iteration. 
It is important to note that this effective infinity is on the side of 
the environmentality of the Object, not of the individuality of the 
subject. It is just as important to bear in mind that it overspills 
any dual relation, being a question of an always-another in 
between: a third. This thirdness interposes itself between the 
subjects involved, over-filling the gaps between their utterances. 
It is also what is left over and above the finitude of the individual 
subjects involved in the situation. It is what exceeds them, so that 
there must be a sign without an utterer or an interpreter – and, 
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substituting for them, something essential for thought’s moving-
out pragmatically into process. The something essential that may 
substitute for the individual subject of expression is all that is 
potentially sought for collaterally. It is the Object of expression 
that can never be fully expressed, but without which expression 
would have nowhere to go but into generality. It is the Object as 
incumbent in the texture of the situation, replete with would-
bes: all that is potentially sought for collaterally to “some” up the 
situation. An all surrounding the some of the sign: the Object 
become environmental, operating throughout an expanded 
field. The essential ingredient, the “Object,” is what Peirce calls 
the environmental “form of fact” (Peirce 1998: 408). It is the all-
around of the in-situation, as triangulated by potential.
Once again, Peirce models his pragmatic account of signs and the 
thought-expression on the verb. As the model verb, he chooses 
“expresses.” “Expresses” is a very special verb. At the same time 
as it expresses something, he says, it “expresses its expressing 
something” (Peirce 1998: 408). It is self-reporting. But just as 
the oneness of a verb like “gives” envelops a some, a manyness 
of roles and potential objects, “expresses” envelops many a 
verb. In fact, it wraps itself up in all of them, and swaddles 
them all. For is not “expresses” of the nature of all verbs? Of all 
signs? Is “expresses” not the natural environment of signs? Do 
they not, each and every one, have an expressive dimension 
of self-reporting to them? Is it not through the pressure of the 
self-reporting of their standing-for that the form-of-fact of 
their situation comes Objectively to express itself through the 
would-bes and collateral action with which it pragmatically 
supplements the sign?
Looked at this way, the “partial objects” of the sign’s utterance 
are in form-of-fact partial subjects of the process of thought-
expression powered by the sign. They collectively self-report 
through that process’s playing out. Peirce says that the utterer 
and interpreter are “inessential” because the pragmatic “fact” of 
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the situation can substitute for them, in the form of the partial 
subjects collaterally pressured into, and clamoring, to self-report 
– and through their self-reporting, potentially bringing the all of 
the situation to expression. Emphasis, again, on “potentially.” The 
Object is essentially speculative. As self-reporting, the factual 
form of its infinity is all but one with the Subject of expression, 
environmentally wrapped up in the situation processually 
swaddling the requisite would-be somes.
It is important to note that a slippage has occurred in the Peirce 
terms of this discussion. The analysis imperceptibly transitioned 
from a something more essential that can fulfill the role of 
the utterer (the Object) to the corresponding something more 
essential that can fulfill the role of the interpreter: what Peirce 
calls the interpretant. Technically, the Object is what in-forms 
the sign’s utterance and orients the movement of thought-
expression it inaugurates. The Object is what the sign stands-for. 
The interpretant, for its part, is what the sign stands-toward: this 
same Object transformed by the action of the sign into a sought-
for terminus. The transition occurs at the quaesitum, which is 
the Object as necessarily sought in the situation. The Object, 
as that which in-forms the sign and orients the movement of 
thought-expression it triggers, has the force of an imperative: 
it necessarily imposes itself on situation at the utterance 
of the sign. The interpretant is this same imperative turned 
into a conditional, a would-be: as what, necessarily sought, 
may be found.9 
The Object and interpretant are strictly complementary. They 
reciprocally presuppose each other as indissociable aspects of 
the same process.10 They relay other in the quaesitum, which is 
like a gear-shift mechanism or hinge between their respective 
modes. They overlap in the quaesitum, allowing for a smooth 
transition and imperceptible transformation from the mode 
of the imperative to the conditional. The Object prefigures 
the interpretant, and the interpretant reprises the Object. 
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They are interwound as inseparable pulses in the playing out 
of the same tendency to sense-making. It was by virtue of 
their reciprocal presupposition as indissociable aspects of the 
process of thought-expression’s playing-out that the foregoing 
discussion was able to segue imperceptibly from the Object to 
the interpretant. Peirce insists on their logical difference and 
real distinction, as different aspects. But he also goes out of 
his way to specify that the interpretant – counter to virtually 
every secondary interpretation of it in the literature – does not 
have to be “a modification of consciousness” (Peirce 1998: 411). 
After all, the would-bes of a situation are as much a part of its 
reality as the imperatives it harbors. The modification of the 
consciousness of an individual interpreter is not required. All that 
is required is “a sufficiently close analogue of a modification of 
consciousness” (411). 
This means that the transition from the Object to the 
interpretant is not, as it is too often made out to be, a transition 
from the objective in the usual sense to the subjective as 
normally understood. Something else entirely is at stake: that 
“the minds of the utterer and the interpreter have to be fused 
in order that any communication should take place” (Peirce 
1998: 478; emphasis added). This Peirce enigmatically names 
the Commind (commens). It “consists of that which is, and must 
be, well understood between the utterer and the interpreter, 
at the outset, in order that the sign in question should fulfill its 
function” (478). In light of Peirce’s statements that the utterer and 
interpreter are inessential, this definition needs to be amended 
to: the commind “consists of that which is, and must be, well 
understood between the utterer and the interpreter, should 
they be present, or at points where the process does not recede 
collaterally into the gaps or come to loose ends …” Elsewhere 
it is more vaguely understandable. Even where there is a well-
understanding utterer and interpreter, the Commind is not 
just “what is forced upon the mind in perception, but includ[es] 
more than perception reveals” (478). This more-than can only be 
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all the more so in the gaps of potential into which perception’s 
seek its would-be interpretants. So when Peirce says “between” 
the utterer and interpreter it has to be taken in the strongest 
sense, as involving the continuum potentially inhabiting the 
gaps in the situation into which the quaesitum recedes. This 
effectively extends the Commind well beyond what is “well 
understood” at the outset, into the processual more-than of the 
situation: to the partial objects that are also partial subjects. 
The Commind exceeds the individual subject of perception by 
nature. It shades into the more-than of the situation’s immanent 
all – where it is always and in any case “already virtually present” 
(Peirce 1998: 403). It fuses not only utterers and interpreters, 
should they be present; more-than that, it fuses the effective 
infinity of partial objects and partial subjects on the continuum 
of potentially completed existence filling the situation. In the 
Commind, the Object of expression becomes all but one with a 
collective (commensal) Subject that is irreducibly environmental. 
It is this all-in-and-around of the situation that virtually thinks 
itself, always. In every case, it is essentially the situation’s 
virtual thinking of itself that self-reports through the process 
of semiosis.
To my knowledge, the Commind occurs in Peirce’s implausibly 
voluminous work exactly once. It is the minorest of all Peircean 
concepts, the one he left in tendency out of “despair of making 
my own broader conception understood” (Peirce 1998: 478). 
To follow through on its tendency is to produce a Peirce more 
Peircean than Peirce, and hopefully all the more faithful to Peirce 
for that (in the same way that Deleuze remained faithful to 
Bergson). This is not just a matter of exegesis of interest to the 
hermetic society of Peirce hounds. It has tremendous import 
for the theory of signs and expression, for all of semiotics and 
all that has come out of it. It turns the normative readings of 
Peirce that largely informed the construction of late-twentieth-
century semiotics on their environmental heads by asserting 
the absolute necessity of a theory – and a practice – of collective 
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expression. It also underlines the impossibility of representation 
as a foundational category for thought-expression. The same 
reasoning that led Peirce to the Commind requires that the 
interpretant (the sign’s fulfilled sense) “does not correspond” 
to the Object (whose imperative in-forming powers the sense-
making process; Peirce 1998: 410). This is because, although they 
are reciprocally presupposing processual complements that 
cannot actually be dissociated, the object and the interpretant 
have different logical status and by virtue of that are really 
distinct.11 The “defect of correspondence” is rooted in the 
“essential difference to their natures” (410): the fact that one is in 
the imperative that coincides with the triggering of the process 
by the sign (and is thus left in the past by its unfolding), while the 
other is in the “relatively future tense” of the conditional (410).12 
For both of these reasons – Commind and the essential defect 
of representational theories of the sign – speed dating with the 
ghost of Peirce is sure to be challengingly mind-bending, and is 
highly recommended.
A final note: it is arbitrary, if instructive, to use parts of speech, 
such as verbs, in order to model the process of expression, 
as was done earlier. But of course not every sign is linguistic. 
A gesture is a nonlinguistic sign. A gesture involves seeings, 
perhaps touchings, definitely kinesthetic feelings. The 
interpretant (Commind) “in all cases, includes feelings” along 
with “something that may vaguely be called ‘thought’” (Peirce 
1998: 409). Vaguely, because the process of thought-expression 
Objectively seeks its own would-be fulfillment, which it cannot 
clearly or distinctly know until it reaches its terminus. However, 
ninety-nine times out of a hundred (to quote James; 1996: 69) 
the terminus is not reached, so that the process must continue 
virtually. Or, it will just have to call it quits in the interests of 
moving on to a next iteration, across a cesura filled with the 
resonation of many potential lines of thought jostling each 
other, vying for self-fulfilling what-elses, plying the continuum 
between the partial objects that collaterally self-report as partial 
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subjects and whose infinite fusion composes the Commind. This 
pragmatic seeking-doing is a vaguely thinking-feeling, complexly 
determined to be determined environmentally, unfolding in 
the collective, commensal expression that constitutes “actual 
Experience” (Peirce 1998: 478; emphasis in the original). Actual 
Experience: the virtual thinking-of-itself of the situation coming 
pragmatically to expression, self-reporting. 
Actual experience is the creature of expression’s autonomy.
Radical Pedagogy
Conceptual speed dating is a pragmatic technique for staging 
the autonomy of collective expression within the particular 
situation of a given, finite group of utterers and interpreters. 
In the particular context of the SenseLab, it is a technique for 
would-be collaborators seeking to transduce their encounter 
with a generative text into improvisational follow-on explorations 
in other modes than textual, where linguistic expression moves 
into an intimacy of thinking-feeling with other-sense activity. 
The individuals involved in this practice themselves carry 
collaterals: their moods, habits, technical and social skills, 
acquired knowledge, any number of things. In fact, an effective 
infinity of things. These are also partial objects of the thought-
expression that occurs, incumbent in their own way in the 
situation. Whether or not they are sought, whether or not 
there is a group determination to determine them, they belong 
to the form-of-fact of the situation and in-form its potential. 
Whether sought or not, they self-report: in the strategies an 
individual deploys to negotiates the enabling constraints of the 
exercise, in particular the time-limit, and how as a function of 
those strategies the collective movement of thought-expression 
is inflected. Sought or not, this range of partial objects of 
expression are partial subjects of enunciation, by virtue of their 
inflecting the self-reporting of the situation’s all. Although they 
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are usually considered factors “internal” to a speaking subject, 
the technique of speed dating activates them on the same basis 
as other situational factors that would normally be categorized as 
“external.” In short, speed dating activates what is normally taken 
as the personal characteristics of the individual participants as a 
subset of the environmental factors in play. This is done in order to 
express thought, in the sense used earlier of forcing thought out, 
like the juice from a fruit, so that it lubricates the situation where 
it collectively moves, in all of its dimensions, involving all of its 
collaterals operating on the same speculatively pragmatic plane: 
a kind of “flat ontology” of expression in actual experience.
It is a peculiarity of SenseLab not to seek these “internal” factors 
as such. This is a general principle of SenseLab activities, 
in all their forms-of-fact and phases. To seek these factors 
would be to impress them into the individual: bring them out 
from their potential environmentality and limit them to the 
individual subjectivity of the utterer/interpreter. This would be 
to personalize expression again, at the expense of the infinity 
of potentiality that the movement of thought-expression 
is capable of mobilizing if it is pressurized pragmatically in 
Peirce’s speculative sense, through the thirdness of free 
indirect discourse. At the limit, it is the process of free indirect 
discourse that is the autonomous Subject of expression all but 
one with the environmental Object of thought extending into 
potential (Commind). To personalize this process is to diminish 
the environmental force of the sign-power of semiosis, whose 
determination to be determined can only be unleashed if the 
autonomy of that expression is valued, cared for situationally, 
and tended to transsituationally with technique. The personal 
is an interiorizing limitation of that autonomy. Vološinov made 
the point that expression is in any case only ever personal 
secondarily. The interiority of the individual speaking subject 
is the result of signs being “inwardly impelled” by specific 
techniques of power” (Vološinov 1986: 153). In this, he prefigures 
Foucault’s conviction that the interiorization and personalization 
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of the individual subject is the product of certain historically 
specific strategies of power. To the extent to which we speak in 
the first person, rather than the unspecified third person of free 
indirect discourse, we express not our subjective freedom, but 
the history of the subjection of expression. 
It is a key proposition of the SenseLab that the intensest 
expression is impersonal and collective in the environmental 
sense glossed in this essay, where “collective” ceases to be a 
synonym for a collection of individuals to become the sign-
function pointing to the effective potential in the situation that 
exceeds both the individuals in the group and their aggregate 
number –but cannot come to expression without them, through 
their finitude. “Collective” in this sense is the quaesitum: that 
which must be sought in any event of expression if it is to fulfill 
its Object (in such a way that it pragmatically becomes all but one 
with the commensal Subject of expression).
Radical pedagogy, for the SenseLab, consists in recognizing this 
quaesitum as the requaesitum it is: as the essential ingredient 
for expression to raise itself to its most fully potentialized plane, 
in a thinking-feeling of the intensest sort. It is the SenseLab’s 
proposition that a radical pedagogy is a collective-seeking that 
honors the autonomy of expression and tends to its intense 
impersonality, experimenting with very precise speculative-
pragmatic techniques for staging it and caring for its process. 
This is what sets a radical pedagogy apart from mere learning, 
and the way the modes of learning dominant in our institutions 
misconstrue the Object of thought-expression for an object of 
knowledge to be acquired by an individual subject (impelled by 
the many limiting powers of subjection structuring contemporary 
institutions of learning). Radical pedagogy operates in the gaps 
in knowledge. Its process moves thought-expression collaterally 
into the unknowns of the situation, where its effectively infinite 
potential self-reports. 
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A radical pedagogy:
1. Proceeds rigorously through technique.
2. Uses the technique to jump start an event of expression. 
3. Strategizes the jump-starting of the event in such a way as 
to take up a finite collection of utterers and interpreters in 
a collective movement of thought. 
4. Collateralizes expression so as to bring the situation of the 
event to singular expression.
5. Brings the situation to singular expression in a way that 
gives complete existence to the situation’s real potential as 
potential, objectively infinite.
6. Is attentive to the manner in which every expression also 
expresses its own expression, building on that to double 
the objectively infinite potential of the situation with 
an expression-of-expression that enables the event to 
reference its own process, so as to correct, perfect, and 
vary its own technique.
7. Leaves loose ends, releasing and remaindering potential in 
a way that it self-forwards across the gaps to a next event 
in a different mode of practice, relaying the expressive 
event into situations and techniques beyond itself.
8. Takes this outdoing of itself to be its content, in dogged 
resistance to any notion of knowledge in terms of a 
content separable from the event of its own expressive 
self-production.
9. Transduces rather than transmits.
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Notes
1. By Andrew Murphie, during the first international research-creation 
event the SenseLab hosted, Dancing the Virtual (2005). 
2. This is a similar feeling to the one described in chapter 2 in the 
context Tino Sehgal’s This Situation, which uses a completely 
different technique, demonstrating that the same effect may be 
achieved by many different means.
3. “Semiosis” involves a “tri-relative influence” that is “not in any way 
resolvable into actions between pairs” (Peirce 1998: 411).
4. The subtext here will be clear to readers old enough to remember 
the general academic discourse of the 1980s and much of the 
1990s. The idea of an endless series of utterers and interpreters 
gained prominence with the poststructuralist concept of 
intertextuality. Postmodernism took on board the logical 
consequences of this concept, in its ironic affirmation of the sinking 
feeling of the exhaustion of novelty, accompanied by the refrain 
of the impossibility of creativity. A compensatory discourse of 
appropriation and remix emerged. But it was not enough to save 
the strands of poststructuralism embracing intertextuality and its 
digital culture equivalent, hypertextuality, from postmodernism’s 
carrying of it to its logical conclusion.
5. Since artworks are compositions of signs, this means that their 
objective feeling envelops thought: that they are thinking-feelings 
presenting with the feeling standing out. Conversely, all signs 
composing what we call thinking as opposed to feeling, envelop 
feelings, with the thinking standing for.
6. There are of course many uses of language – the vast majority, 
in fact – where there is no assumption of the physical presence 
of the Object of expression. The ability of language to function in 
situations where the Object as it might figure in the immediate 
situation is absent is, as is so often pointed out, what gives 
language its vast powers of expression. Peirce’s point is that 
when this is case, there is still seeking – but one that remains in 
the register of potential. The follow-on actions are performed 
virtually. It is in order to make this point that Peirce emphasizes 
that a thought is sign for another thought (“every thought beyond 
immediate perception is a sign;” Peirce 1998: 402). Everything 
that applies to situations assuming the possible presence of 
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the object applies to the virtual situations of thought operating 
directly in its natural environment of potential. Even the seemingly 
contextless examples of analytic philosophers and logicians, like 
the infamous cat on the mat, are not entirely without an appeal 
to a situation (is the cat on the mat because it wants to exit the 
door, or is it just taking a nap?). But more importantly than this 
abstract context (in the sense of being without pragmatic stakes) 
is the context of the enunciation. A discussion of an abstract cat 
on a mat is a concrete demonstration belonging to a genre of 
language (philosophy) that carries institutional weight. The stakes 
of the enunciation itself are all the more weighty the more distant 
the Object of expression. These stakes include the assertion or 
imposition of the genre of expression to which the utterance signs 
its participation, the institutional associated with that genre, the 
informal factors associated with the particularities of the situation 
of the enunciation, and the way in which all of these factors position 
the speaker and give authority or performative efficacy to his or her 
utterance. The dimension of “self-reporting” (discussed below) that 
is an element of every utterance becomes all the more pronounced 
here, to the point that under certain circumstances it becomes the 
equivalent of the self-presentation that the technique of speed 
dating attempts to side-step, even if that gesture is not explicitly 
performed. That is why it is crucial for practices like the SenseLab’s 
to create open situations of unspecified potential that support 
collateral action without directing it advance, and that foreground 
the collectivity of expression, while avoiding general statements.
7. “Potential means indeterminate yet capable of determination. … 
The vague always tends to become determinate, simply because 
its vagueness does not determine it to be vague. … It is not 
determinately nothing” (Peirce, 1998: 323-324).
8. The distinction being made here between a general or purely 
abstract infinity (what Peirce calls a “hypothetical infinite collection”) 
and and an effective infinity pragmatically inscribed in a situation 
(thus having what Peirce calls an infinity having “completed 
existence”) corresponds to Whitehead’s distinction between “pure 
potential” and “real potential.” Real potential is “indetermination, 
rendered determinate in the real concrescence … it is a conditioned 
indeterminacy” (Whitehead 1978: 23; see also 65-66). The demand 
that real potential makes for a process of thought-expression 
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seeking to determine it is what Whitehead calls the “proposition” 
(1978: 184-207). 
9. The Object is singular. The interpretant, on the other hand, is 
“either general or intimately connected with generals” (Peirce 1998: 
410). A general would-be is a possibility. The transformation from 
imperative to conditional is associated with a transformation of 
potential into possibility. This linking of potential to the imperative – 
the requaesitum – and the idea that possibility is produced, derived 
from the imperative movement of potenital, is a significant shift 
in the way we normally think of these categories, with even more 
significant implications for how we conceive of freedom. In terms of 
the earlier discussion of generality in this essay, it is when possibility 
is disconnected from its derivation in potential that the plane of the 
general seems to take on independence from situation and process, 
and assert its claims to abstract self-sufficiency. The lesson is not 
that generality is not useful or is not produced; it is, rather, that 
generality is always produced as a phase-shift of singularity.
10. As is the case with Peirce’s triadic categories of Firstness/
Secondness/Thirdness, and icon/index /symbol which are similarly 
mutually participating processual complements that cannot be 
dissociated from each other.
11. A real distinction, as employed by Deleuze, is a distinction that is 
“essential or qualitative” but non-numerical (cannot be parsed out 
as belonging to different substantially different things) (Deleuze 
1994: 40). Peirce’s triadic categories are similarly real distinctions.
12. See also their difference as regards singularity and generality 
discussed in note 9.
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The Principle of Unrest explores the contemporary implications of an activist phi-
losophy, pivoting on the issue of movement. Movement is understood not simply 
in spatial terms but as qualitative transformation: becoming, emergence, event. 
Neoliberal capitalism’s special relation to movement is of central concern. Its 
powers of mobilization now descend to the emergent level of just-forming poten-
tial. This carries them beyond power-over to powers-to-bring-to-be, or what the 
book terms “ontopower.” it is necessary to track capitalist power throughout its 
expanding field of emergence in order to understand how counter-powers can 
resist its capture and rival it on its own immanent ground.
If you have ever wanted to ask one of the most important philoso-
phers of his generation a question about politics or the economy, 
if you ever wanted to know how his thrilling conception of being 
would illuminate the quotidian gloom of our markets, our workplac-
es, our legislatures, this book is a true gift. Brian Massumi’s discussion 
of these topics is every bit as charged as his more philosophical 
works, and just as startling.
—Stefano Harney, Singapore Management University
Compelling and incisive as ever, Massumi continues to show with a 
deftness of philosophical touches why he’s one of the most impor-
tant critical minds writing today. More than providing an accessible 
introduction to his formidable corpus, The Principle of Unrest is a 
provocation to thought and call to action.
—Brad Evans, Reader in Political Violence, University of Bristol
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